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INTRODUCTION

In 1972, the Maryland General Assembly drastically altered
Maryland's public policy regarding reparations for automobile acci-

t

B.A., summa cum laude, 1980, Wilkes College; J.D., cum laude, 1983, The
Washington College of Law, American University; M.A., 1984, Johns Hopkins
University; Partner, Mudd, Harrison & Burch, Towson, Maryland.

Baltimore Law Review
[Vol. 21
172
dent victims· by enacting "substantial changes in the insurance law
pertaining to motor vehicles."2 The legislative changes were designed
to protect members of the public "from the economic harm produced
by automobile accidents."3 The most significant change4 was the
addition of sections 538 through 546 5 to the Annotated Code of
Maryland, Article 48A-the Insurance Code. These sections comprised Subtitle 35, entitled "Motor Vehicle Casualty Insurance."6
Designed to supplement the Transportation Article's financial
responsibility provisions, 7 Subtitle 35 mandates that every automobile

v'

1. Jennings v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 302 Md. 352, 360, 488 A.2d 166,
168 (1985).
2. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund v. Sun Cab Co., 305 Md. 807, 810, 506 A.2d 641,
643 (1986).
3. Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 240, 528 A.2d 912, 916 (1987).
4. See Sun Cab Co., 305 Md. at 810, 506 A.2d at 643 (stating addition of Subtitle
35 to motor vehicle insurance law was "of particular significance"). The list
of changes was extensive, as the court of appeals explained:
In addition to mandating compulsory automobile insurance with required coverages, Ch. 73 of the Acts of 1972 effected many other
changes, such as creating the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund,
a state-owned automobile insurance company, to insure persons having
difficulty obtaining automobile insurance policies in the private sector,
abolishing the former assigned risk program, abolishing the former
Unsatisfied Claims and Judgment Fund and transferring to some
extent its functions to the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund,
enacting new procedures for the cancellation and nonrenewal of
automobile insurance policies, and authorization under some circumstances for prejudgment interest in money judgments in automobile
personal injury cases.
Jennings, 302 Md. at 357-58 n.3, 488 A.2d at 169 n.3.
5. Section 547 was added by Act of May 15, 1975, ch. 775, 1975 Md. Laws 3345;
§ 547A was added by Act of June I, 1982, ch. 844, 1982 Md. Laws 4660.
6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 538-547A (1991 & Supp. 1992).
7. These provisions regulate owners, and to some extent operators, of motor
vehicles by requiring each owner of a motor vehicle registered in Maryland to
provide proof of financial responsibility. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-104
(1992). The financial responsibility provisions are self-regulating and selfenforcing. See Grant v. Allison, 616 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (D. Md. 1985). The
Motor Vehicle Administration may not "issue or transfer the registration of a
motor vehicle unless the owner or prospective owner of the vehicle furnishes
evidence satisfactory to the Administration that the required security is in
effect." MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. § 17-104(a) (1992). Failure to maintain the
required security will result in an automatic suspension of the vehicle's registration, id. § 17-106(a)(1), and the imposition of fines, id. § 17-106(e)(I).
Moreover, a person "who has knowledge that a motor vehicle is not covered
by the required security" is forbidden to drive the vehicle, id. § 17-107(a)(1);
or, if he is the owner, to "knowingly permit another person to drive it," id.
§ 17-107(a)(2). A violation of this provision is a misdemeanor. [d. § 27-IOI(a).
The violation does not give rise to civil liability, and, although the statutory
scheme is comprehensive, there is "nothing in the legislative scheme meant to
imply an independent, private cause of action against financially irresponsible
owners and operators." Grant, 616 F. Supp. at 1222.
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liability policy issued, sold or delivered8 in Maryland must include
personal injury liability coverage, property damage liability coverage,
personal injury protection, and uninsured motorist coverage. 9 These
required coverages generally mirror the Transportation Article's required security.1o Certain amounts of coverage, again mirroring the
required security under the financial responsibility provisions, are
also required. If a policy "omits or purports to exclude a particular
coverage required by law, the omission or exclusion is ineffective,
and the insurance. policy will be applied as if [it contained] the
minimum required coverage."l1 The enactment of Subtitle 35 repre-

8. The phrase "issued, sold, or delivered" has not been given any specific judicial
interpretation by Maryland courts. Each of the words presumptively has
independent meaning, but the Insurance Code suggests that "issued" and
"sold" are synonymous. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 481A (1991)
(policies "issued or delivered") with id. § 541(c)(2) (1991 & Supp. 1992) (policies
"issued, sold, or delivered") and Act of May 26, 1992, ch. 641, 1992 Md.
Laws 3749, 3754, § 2 ("issued or delivered"). The "issuing" of a policy is
clearly different than the "delivery" of a policy. See 1 GEORGE J. COUCH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW, §§ 10:1-10:2 (1959 & Supp. 1983). "Delivery"
was probably used in the 1972 statute to account for policies issued or sold
before January 1, 1973, but physically delivered after that date. See 12A
COUCH, supra, § 45:692 (2d ed. rev. 1981 & Supp. 1991) (stating construction
of statutes and policies issued under compulsory insurance law to be made in
favor of the legislature's purpose). The language was then carried over for the
same reason when uninsured motorist insurance became mandatory for policies
issued, sold, or delivered after January 1, 1975. The primary purpose of the
"issued, sold, or delivered" phrase, however, is to ensure that all policies that
become binding contracts in Maryland will be interpreted according to Maryland
law and the requirements of Subtitle 35. For a discussion of final acts that
will bind the insured and insurer to a contract, see Grain Dealers Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Van Buskirk, 241 Md. 58, 65-66, 2i"5 A.2d 467, 471-72
(1965), and Sun Insurance Office v. Mallick, 160 Md. 71; 81, 153 A. 35, 39
(1931). See also infra notes 13 & 89 (discussing choice of laws questions
regarding uninsured motorist claims).
9. A fifth coverage, collision, is optional. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541 (1991
& Supp. 1992). Personal injury protection can be waived by the first named
insured. [d. § 539(f).
10. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 314 Md.
131, 135-36, 550 A.2d 69, 71 (1988); see MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 539,
541(a), 541(c)(2) (1991 & Supp. 1992). The required security must provide, at
a minimum, for "[t]he payment of claims for bodily injury or death arising
from an accident of up to $20,000 for anyone person and up to $40,000 for
any two or more persons." MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-103(b)(1) (1992).
It must also provide a minimum of $10,000 property damage liability protection,
id. § 17-103(b)(2) (1992), as well as personal injury protection, id. § 17-103(b)(3)
(1992), and uninsured motorist coverage, id. § 17-103(b)(4) (1992).
11. 314 Md. at 135, 550 A.2d at 71; accord Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 528
A.2d 912 (1987); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 307 Md. 631, 516 A.2d 586 (1986); Jennings v. Government Employees
Ins. Co., 302 Md. 352, 360, 488 A.2d 166, 170 (1985).
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sen ted a shift from relying solely on the personal financial responsibility of motorists to provide compensation to automobile accident
victims to a recognition of public responsibility with regard to those
victims. 12 This responsibility arises from Maryland's interest in the
welfare of its citizens and in the social and economic problems
following in the wake of a serious injury. 13 Subtitle 35 is part of a
comprehensive automobile insurance scheme designed to alleviate the
state's burden of providing disability benefits to victims of motor
vehicle accidents.14 By regulating owners, operators, and insurers of

12. See Joseph P. Murphy & Ross Netherton, Public Responsibility and the
Uninsured Motorist, 47 GEO. L.J. 700 (1959) (discussing the theoretical shift
from financial responsibility to public responsibility underlying state automobile
insurance schemes).
13. In resolving a conflict of law issue, the court of appeals stated in Hutzell v.
Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1968), that
the State of Maryland has a genuine interest in the welfare of a person
injured within its borders, who may conceivably become a public
charge due to a disabling injury. The social and economic problems
following in the wake of a serious injury as they may affect the
dependents of the person injured are properly matters of public
concern.
[d. at 233, 249 A.2d at 452; accord Belcher v. Government Employees Ins.
Co., 282 Md. 718, 387 A.2d 770 (1978). In Belcher the court of appeals
rejected the appellant's position that personal jurisdiction over an absent
defendant could be acquired by attaching the insurer's obligations under the
motor vehicle insurance policy insuring that defendant. In reaching its decision,
the court noted:
Our decision today is not rendered without cognizance of the petitioners' strong public policy arguments in favor of allowing suits
against insurers in situations similar to the one presented in this case.
There is more than a modicum of appeal in their contention that the
General Assembly's action in setting up a system of compulsory
automobile insurance . . . indicates its growing belief that all those
injured while using the highways of this State should be properly
recompensed. Furthermore, citizens of Maryland will have to bear the
brunt of the expense when the injured are forced to rely on public
aid for support due to their loss of employment and concomitant
inability to pay medical bills incurred as a result of their injuries even though the insurer has collected his fees to pay for just such
occurrences and very likely has set up a reserve fund containing all
the money necessary to reimburse the injured parties.
[d. at 726, 387 A.2d at 775.
14. The insurance scheme contains three major components: compulsory motor
vehicle liability insurance, mandatory uninsured motorist coverage, and the
Uninsured Division of the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (MAIF). The
components are intended to be "complementary - when one is inapplicable
another should compensate the injured party." Donna M. Maag, Comment,
Compensation jor Victims oj Uninsured Motorist Accidents, 12 U. BALT. L.
REv. 314, 315 (1983) (citing Ralph P. Higgins, Note, Uninsured Motorist
Coverage Laws: The Problem oj the Underinsured Motorist, 55 NOTRE DAME
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motor vehicles, the insurance scheme protects the state's interest,
providing economic protection to nearly all Maryland residents. IS
Personal injury protection and uninsured motorist coverage play
lead roles in the insurance scheme. The state's desire to provide
immediate economic relief to all motor vehicle accident victims is
accomplished by personal injury protection, which provides medical,
hospital and disability benefits l6 without regard to fault,17 therefore
constituting a type of "limited no-fault" coverage.'8 Uninsured motorist insurance is specifically designed to ensure compensation for
victims of uninsured or underinsured motorists. 19 Besides filling the
1992]
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L. REv. 541, 541-42 (1980». Added to this three-tiered system is the Property

15.

16.

17.
18.
19.

and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Corporation (PCIGC), which guarantees
obligations owed to insureds of insolvent motor vehicle liability insurance
companies. PCIGC protects both claimants and insureds by providing "a
mechanism for the prompt payment of covered claims under certain insurance
policies and to avoid financial loss to residents of Maryland who are claimants
or policyholders of an insurer ... which has become insolvent." MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 504(a) (1991); accord McMichael v. Robertson, 77 Md. App.
208, 549 A.2d 1157 (1988) (discussing the PCIGC in connection with uninsured
motorist insurance).
See National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pinkney, 284 Md. 694, 399 A.2d 877
(1979), where the court of appeals noted that
under the combination of required uninsured motorist endorsements
in policies issued in Maryland and the provision for payment from
the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, the only persons injured
in Maryland not afforded protection equal to the minimum which
would be provided under an omnibus clause are those persons from
places not having the equivalent of our Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund and a few people disqualified in such instances as that
under Art. 48A, § 243H(a)(l)(i) where a claimant might have been
riding in an uninsured motor vehicle owned by him.
Id. at 704-05, 399 A.2d at 881-82. Since Pinkney, the uninsured motorist
statute has expanded the ambit of the permissible exclusions. See infra notes
341-43 and accompanying text.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539 (1991 & Supp. 1992). Personal injury protection
is also called "Economic Loss Protection." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Insurance Comm'r, 283 Md. 663, 664-65, 392 A.2d 1114, 1115 (1978).
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 540(a)(1) (1991).
Harden v. Mass Transit Admin .• 277 Md. 399, 407 n.5, 354 A.2d 817, 821
n.5 (1976).
The uninsured motorist in Maryland is most likely to live in an urban area
(68.4070); be Caucasian (65.1%); be male (76.9%); be 21 to 44 years old
(71.6%); have no points on his driving record (59.4%); and have a class "D"
license (67.4%). STEPHEN V. VERSACE, MARYLAND DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE
NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE UNINSURED MOTORIST IN MARYLAND 31 (1977).
Although Versace's study is sixteen years old. his conclusions are interesting
and, in some cases, startling. For instance, based upon a finding within his
study that the uninsured rate in Maryland was 2.8%, he concluded that "the
evidence clearly indicates that the problem of the uninsured in Maryland has
been grossly over-estimated." Id. at 31-32. But see REpORT OF THE {NSURANCE

176

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 21

gaps inherent in financial responsibility and compulsory insurance
legislation,20 uninsured motorist insurance directly furthers the state's
desire to shift the risk of loss to the private sector by providing the
injured insured with a minimum amount of compensation.
Uninsured motorist insurance was initially an optional coverage,
but became mandatory in 1975. 21 As originally designed, uninsured
motorist coverage in Maryland was supposed to place the accident
victim in the same position as if the uninsured tort feasor maintained
liability coverage in an amount equal to the minimum required
coverage under the financial responsibility laws of Maryland. The
Maryland legislature has made substantial changes to the uninsured
motorist statute since its enactment. 22 Instead of providing recovery
of the minimum required coverage, the uninsured motorist statute
now seeks to provide the victim of an uninsured motorist the opportunity. for full recovery.
This article analyzes uninsured motorist insurance in Maryland.
It discusses various topics that have been addressed by Maryland
courts and attempts to clear up the confusion surrounding the concept
of stacking of uninsured motorist coverages. Particular attention is
paid to how the nature of uninsured motorist coverage changed with

TASK FORCE OF THE HOUSE ECONOMIC MATTERS COMMITTEE (Jan. 1983) (finding
the number of uninsured motor vehicles in Maryland ranges from 90,000 to
300,(00); see also I ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
INSURANCE § 1.12 (2d ed. 1987) (estimating that 5 to 20 percent of motorists
nationwide are uninsured).
20. Winner v. Ratzlaff, 505 P.2d 606, 610 (Kan. 1973). Maryland's courts have
indicated that automobile insurance is compulsory in Maryland. See, e.g.,
Jennings v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 302 Md. 352, 360, 488 A.2d 166,
170 (1985). Technically, however, Maryland is not a true compulsory automobile
insurance state, for a vehicle owner in Maryland is not required to have an
automobile liability policy, but instead may offer another form of security.
MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §§ 17-103(a)(l)-(2) (1992). Since the usual form of
security is an automobile insurance policy, however, id. § 17-103(a)(1), and
because a self-insurer must provide the same coverage as if he maintained an
automobile liability policy, see infra note 58, Maryland may be characterized
as a de facto compulsory insurance state.
21. Act of May 15, 1975, ch. 562, 1975 Md. Laws 2716. The descriptive title for
§ 541 has always read "Required and Optional Additional Coverage." The
descriptive titles of Subtitle 35 were not merely captioqs inserted by the codifier,
but rather were part of the act. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Insurance Comm'r, 283 Md. 663, 675 n.4, 392 A.2d 1114, 1120 n.4 (1978).
The title originally referred to required liability coverage, and optional uninsured motorist and collision coverage. In 1975, uninsured motorist coverage
became a required additional coverage, but collision stayed optional. See MD.
CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-103(b)(4) (1992) (categorizing uninsured motorist
insurance as "required additional coverage").
22. As used herein, the uninsured motorist statute refers to MD. ANN. CODE art.
48A, §§ 538, 541, 543 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
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the introduction of "underinsured" motorist coverage in 1981. In
addition, this article considers several· issues that have not been
addressed by Maryland courts.24
Because any analysis of uninsured motorist insurance must focus
on both the statutory requirements and the insurance policy provisions, this article uses the 1989 Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement to the Personal Auto Policy as its primary reference point.
Earlier versions of the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement
are considered in order to highlight the new provisions of the 1989
version. 2s Moreover, the earlier versions retain their significance
despite being modified or replaced by other forms because, as one
commentator has noted, "uninsured motorist coverage provisions
figure in litigations long after revisions or new forms are introduced."26 Reference will also be made to the 1966 Standard Form,
not only because modified versions of that form continue to be used
in Maryland, but also because the substantial body of law that has
developed regarding its provisions is helpful in culling discernable
judicial trends and in construing the terms and provisions in the 1989
Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement.
1992]

II.
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THE STANDARD FORMS AND THEIR REVISIONS

In order to understand uninsured motorist insurance in Maryland, a basic appreciation of three standard insurance forms is
required: the 1966 Standard Uninsured Motorist (UM) Form, the
1977 Personal Auto Policy, and the Maryland Uninsured Motorist
Endorsement to the 1977 Personal Auto PolicyY Many judicial trends

23. See infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.

24. Topics beyond the scope of this article include contractual arbitration provisions
and procedure, property damage claims; self insurers, trial procedure, and
uninsured motorist insurance in commercial auto policies.
25. There are, for instance, significant differences between the 1987 and 1989
versions of the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement. See infra note 27
and accompanying text.
26. I WIDISS, supra note 19, § 3.1.
27. Uninsured motorist insurance in commercial automobile policies is beyond the
scope of this article; however, the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement
(ISO Form CA 21 13) to the Commercial Auto Policy (ISO Form CA 00 01)
(both created by the Insurance Services Office, see infra note 38) is similar to
the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement to the Personal Auto Policy.
There are slight differences, and, arguably, uninsured motorist coverage in a
commercial policy deserves different treatment than uninsured motorist coverage
in a personal policy. See infra note 419 and accompanying text. The Maryland
Uninsured Motorist Endorsement to the Commercial Auto Policy currently
bears a 3 90 revision mark (earlier versions: 12 87 and 5 83).
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can be understood only in connection with specific forms, and, in
reality, only in connection with a particular revision of a specific
form.28 References to a "standard policy," usually in reference to
the 1966 Standard UM Form, are, at best, misleading;29 it is "both
unwise and unwarranted to assume that any particular dispute involves the standard terms,' '30 since the language of any insurance
contract will govern as long as it does not contravene public policy.31
In no instance, however, may the policy provide less coverage than
what the statute requires. The original 1966 Standard UM Form,32
developed by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the
Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau as part of the Family Automobile
Policy,33 is no longer used in Maryland because several of its sections
have been invalidated by Maryland courts 34 or superseded by statutory
provisions. 3s Some companies, however, continue to use forms, which,
to some extent, mirror the language used in the 1966 Standard Form. 36
Although the 1966 Standard Form, as modified, continues to be
used, a growing number of insurance companies have switched to
the Personal Auto PolicyY The Personal Auto Policy was developed
in 1977 by the Insurance Services Office, a national nonprofit or28. It is unfortunate in this regard that many of the court opinions do not recite
the particular policy language at issue.
29. One commentator writes that "[s)ince 1966, there has been a wide divergence
in the forms used, as many states require certain language while voiding other
provisions. Similarly, as the trend to more readable policies gains momentum,
the traditional language is less prevalent." 3 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF
LIABILITY INSURANCE § 24.01 (1992).
30. 1 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 3.5.
31. E.g., Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 416
A.2d 734 (1980).
32. The only other commentary on uninsured motorist coverage in Maryland
follows this approach. See Maag, supra note 14. This is understandable given
the number of cases that have considered the 1966 Standard Policy.
33. See 1 WIDISS, supra note 19, §§ 3.1-.2. The form was initially developed in
1956, then revised in 1958, 1963, and, finally, 1966. See also 3 LONG, supra
note 29, § 24.01.
34. E.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 436 A.2d 465 (1981)
("consent to sue" clauses invalid).
35. The 1966 Standard Form contained mandatory arbitration provisions. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2)(iv) (Supp. 1992), provides that any uninsured
motorist insurance provision that "commands or requires the submission of
any dispute between the insured and the insurer to binding arbitration, is
prohibited and shall be of no legal force or effect." Part C of the Personal
Auto Policy also contains an arbitration clause.
36. 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.01 ("Although many insurance companies still
follow the basic provisions of the [1966) Standard Form, several insurers,
including many of the larger companies, utilize their own forms under which
provisions may differ from the Standard Form. Thus, situations may arise in
which coverage would exist under the Standard Form but not under the
applicable provisions of an individual policy, or vice versa. ").
37. [d.

1992)

Uninsured Motorist Coverage

179

ganization which drafts model forms for the insurance industry.38
The Personal Auto Policy which bears the PP 00 01 identification,
was revised several times in the 1980s,39 most recently in December
198940 by the Insurance Services Office in response to court decisions,
legislation, regulation, or perceived need by the insurance industry
for changes in coverage. 41 Part C of the Personal Auto Policy contains
the uninsured motorist insurance provisions.
The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, which bears a
PP 04 59 identification, supersedes Part C of the Personal Auto
Policy.42 It is significantly different from the 1966 UM form, but is
similar to Part C of the Personal Auto Policy. Many of the definitions
in the general definition section of the Personal Auto Policy, however, as well as many of the notice and cooperation provisions, apply
to coverage under the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement,
and care must be taken to consider the entire policy. Like the Personal
Auto Policy, the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement was
revised several times in the 1980s. 43 Although the Insurance Services
Office developed the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement
specifically in response to the Maryland uninsured motorist statute
and Maryland case law, some companies use Part C of the Personal
Auto Policy with slight modifications, excising or modifying those
portions that are not valid under Maryland law. 44
38. Insurance Services Office, Inc., is a non-profit organization that provides
statistics gathering and advisory actuarial and rating services to the property
and casualty insurance industry, as well as supplying advisory forms and
insurance manuals to the industry. Letter from John P. Salvato, Insurance
Services Office, Inc., to author Andrew Janquitto (Jan. 25, 1990) (on file with
the University oj Baltimore Law Review). Where necessary or helpful, citations
and other references herein to forms issued by, and subject to the copyright
of, the Insurance Services Office, Inc., are delineated by the term "ISO
Form .... "
39. Letter from John P. Salvato, Insurance Services Office, Inc., to author Andrew
Janquitto (Dec. 6, 1989) (on file with the University oj Baltimore Law Review);
see also 1 WIDISS, supra note 19, §§ 3.1-.2.
40. Revision dates appear on the ISO forms immediately following the identifying
form mark. Thus, the December 1989 revision bears the mark PP ()() 01 12
89. Prior versions of the Personal Auto Policy include April 1986 (4 86) and
June 1980 (6 80). In August 1983, the Personal Auto Policy was revised by
an amendatory endorsement (ISO Form PP ()() 03). Additionally, the Insurance
Services Office offers endorsement PP 01 68, to be used with the Personal
Auto Policy, which is specifically tailored to Maryland law regarding the scope
of liability insurance.
41. Letter, supra note 39.
42. In addition, the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement replaces paragraph
C.2. of Part E of the Personal Auto Policy. See supra note 40.
43. The revisions _occurred in February 1982 (2 82), June 1983 (6 83), May 1986
(5 86), December 1987 (12 87), and December 1989 (12 89). See Letter, supra
note 39; see also Letter, supra note 38.
44. The Maryland Insurance Commissioner has the authority to review all motor
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III.

THE NATURE OF UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
Uninsured motorist insurance is considered first-party coverage
by Maryland courtS.4S In reality, however, it is neither first-party nor
third-party insurance. It has aspects of both, and has been called a
hybrid form of coverage. 46 True first-party coverage is premised on
payment directly to the insured without regard to fault. Personal
injury protection falls into this category. 47 Third-party insurance, in
vehicle liability policies issued, sold, or delivered in the State of Maryland.
Section 546 of the Insurance Code states as follows:
The Commissioner shall have the authority to issue and promulgate
all necessary rules, regulations and definitions not inconsistent with
the provisions of this subtitle, and to review all policies of motor
vehicle liability insurance issued, sold, or delivered in this State to
determine whether they are in compliance with this subtitle and the
rules, regulations, and definitions promulgated thereunder.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 546 (1991); see a/so ide § 541(c)(2)(iii) (Supp.
1992) ("The coverage required under this subsection (c) shall [be] in such form
and subject to such conditions as may be approved by the Commissioner of
Insurance."). Approval by the Insurance Commissioner does not, however,
render the provision enforceable. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, 277 Md. 602, 605-06, 356 A.2d 560, 562 (1976)
(" [Although] the construction placed upon a statute by administrative officials
soon after its enactment should not be disregarded except for the strongest
and most compelling reasons, it is also true that an administrative interpretation
contrary to the clear and unambiguous meaning of the statute will not be given
effect."). Moreover, the Insurance Commissioner's approval does not require
the Motor Vehicle Administration to accept the policy as satisfying the financial
responsibility provisions. 59 Ope Att'y Gen. 451, 457 (1974).
45. E.g., Reese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 285 Md. 548, 552, 403 A.2d
1229, 1231-32 (1979) ("[UJninsured motorist coverage is in insurance parlance
'first party coverage' like collision, comprehensive, medical payments or personal injury protection, and not 'third party coverage' such as personal injury
or property damage liability insurance. "). The Court of Appeals of Maryland
has defined "a first party claim" as "the demand' an insured may make on
his or her own insurer pursuant to the terms of the insurance contract between
them," Insurance Comm'r v. Property & Cas. Ins. Guar. Group, 313 Md.
518, 525 n.3, 546 A.2d 458, 461 n.3 (1988), whereas "[aJ 'third party claim'
refers to the claim which a third party has against the insured tort-feasor."

Id.
46. ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 4.9(d) (1971).
47. See Reese, 285 Md. at 552, 403 A.2d at 1231-32. Personal injury protection is
considered "[bJasic required primary coverage." MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §
539 (1991 & Supp. 1992) (heading). The meaning of the term "primary" as
used in Maryland's statute is not the same, however, as the insurance industry's
definition. The Court of Appeals of Maryland explained as follows:
Primary coverage generally refers to the policy that first must answer
for the loss. As used [in section 538J, however, it may well have
referred to first-person as opposed to third-party coverage. In that
sense, the term would apply equally to [personal injury protectionJ,
collision and [uninsured motoristJ, but not to liability coverage.
Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund v. Sun Cab Co., 305 Md. 807, 812-13, 506 A.2d
641, 644 (1986).

1992]

Uninsured Motorist Coverage

181

contrast, premises payment to a person not a party to the insurance
contract based on the acts of the insured; liability coverage is the
typical example. 48
Unlike other first-party coverages, uninsured motorist insurance
is based on a showing of fault. In this sense it is unique, being "the
only widely marketed first-party insurance that predicates indemnification on the negligent conduct of a third party. "49 The insurer
does not pay benefits to its insured unless and until the liability of
the uninsured tort feasor is established. Moreover, the insurer has the
right to defend the insured's claim for uninsured motorist benefits
by asserting all of the defenses that the tortfeasor possesses. 50 On
the other hand, the insurer retains its identity as an insurer, and
owes the insured a duty to act in good faith.51 Uninsured motorist
claims, then, are simultaneously "quasi-adversarial" and "quasifiduciary. "52
Although the insurer stands in the shoes of the tortfeasor,
uninsured motorist insurance is not designed to benefit the tortfeasor,
though it may have that indirect effect. The primary purpose of
uninsured motorist insurance "is to assure financial compensation to
the innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents who are unable to
recover from financially irresponsible uninsured motorists."53 The
uninsured motorist statute is a remedial piece of legislation and, as
such, courts construe it liberally.54 The remedial nature of the uninsured motorist statute points to another unique aspect of uninsured
motorist insurance: "The courts have been disposed to favor the

48. See Reese, 285 Md. at 552, 403 A.2d at 1231-32.
49. Alan I. Widiss, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Observations on Litigating Over
When a Claimant is "Legally Entitled to Recover, " 68 low A L. REv. 397, 399
(1983).
50. Such defenses include: lack of negligence, contributory negligence, assumption
of the risk, extent of damages, causation, immunity, statute of limitations, and
res judicata. See Winner v. Ratzlaff, 505 P.2d 606, 610 (Kan. 1973); see also
Reese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 285 Md. 548, 555, 403 A.2d 1229,
1233 (1979) (quoting Winner). In this sense, the tort feasor becomes a fictional
insured, receiving the benefits of the insurer's defenses. See Hines v. Wausau
Underwriters Ins. Co., 408 So. 2d 772, 774 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
51. The duty of good faith is not a separate tort duty. See infra notes 518-19 and
accompanying text. Notwithstanding the duty to act in good faith, the insurer
is still able to assert whatever policy defenses it possesses: misrepresentation in
the application, failure to pay premiums, breach of duty to cooperate, and
breach of duty to notify. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
52. Henry A. Hentemann, Uninsured Motorist Coverage Claims and the Bad Faith
Issue, 55 DEF. COUNS. J. 168, 170 (1988).
53. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 157, 416
A.2d 734, 735 (1980); see infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
54. Gartelman, 288 Md. at 157, 416 A.2d at 738 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, 277 Md. 602, 356 A.2d 560 (1988».
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interests of the insureds to a greater degree than was previously true
in regard to any other insurance coverage. lOSS
Maryland's uninsured motorist statute requires that every insurance policy contain coverage for damages which "[tIhe insured is
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in an accident arising out
of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured motor
vehicle."s6 In addition, the insurance must cover damages that "[t]he
surviving relatives . . . of the insured are entitled to recover from
the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of the
death of the insured as the result of an accident arising out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle. "S7
Self-insurers must provide uninsured motorist insurance,s8 but
neither the state, S9 nor the owners of private buses or taxis,6O are
required to maintain uninsured motorist insurance. Uninsured motorist insurance is also not required for vehicles not registered for
use on a highway.61 The minimum required uninsured motorist protection is $20,000 for injury or death of anyone person in an
accident, $40,000 for injury or death of any two or more persons
per accident, and $10,000 for property damage in anyone accident. 62

55.
56.
57.
58.

59.

60.

61.
62.

1 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 3.6.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2) (Supp. 1992).
[d. § 541 (c)(2)(ii).
In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Rose, 47 Md. App. 481, 424 A.2d
160 (1981), Rose, a Baltimore City firefighter, was injured while riding on a
fire engine that was struck by an uninsured motor vehicle. The City was selfinsured. The court rejected the City's contention that it was not liable for
uninsured motorist benefits because Rose had not complied with notice requirements concerning suits against the City, stating that "the City, having
elected to act as its own insurer, was required to assume the same responsibilities
and provide the same minimum coverage as a private carrier" and could not
impose additional conditions on, or further limit the extent of, coverage which
it provided. [d. at 485, 424 A.2d at 162; accord MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. §
17-103(a)(2) (1992).
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Ouar. Co., 314 Md.
131, 550 A.2d 69 (1988); Harden v. Mass Transit Admin., 277 Md. 399, 354
A.2d 817 (1976).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 538(b) (1991), defines a motor vehicle as an
automobile and any other vehicle, including a trailer, operated or designed for
operation upon a public road by any power other than animal or muscular
power but does not include a vehicle as defined in §§ 11-105 [a bus] and 11165 [a taxi] of the Transportation Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland.
See also MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §§ 11-105, -165 (1992); Pope v. Sun Cab
Co., 62 Md. App. 218, 488 A.2d 1009 (1985), a//'d sub nom. Maryland Auto.
Ins. Fund v. Sun Cab Co., 305 Md. 807, 506 A.2d 641 (1986) (discussing taxi
exclusion).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(e) (1991 & Supp. 1992).
See id. § 541(c)(2)(i); see also MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-103(b) (1992).
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These amounts comport with the minimum amounts of required
coverage under the financial responsibility provisions,63 as well as
with the public policy embraced in Subtitle 16A of the Insurance
Code.64
Subtitle 16A creates the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund
(MAIF). MAIF serves two functions and is divided into two divisions.
The Insured Division of MAIF is the liability insurer of last resort
in Maryland. It provides "automobile insurance to those eligible
persons who are unable to obtain it in the private market. "65 In
addition to being the liability insurer of last resort, MAIF is the
statutory successor to the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund. 66
In order to make a claim against the Uninsured Division of MAIF,
"the claim [must not be] covered by a policy of motor vehicle
liability insurance. "67 If a victim has his own uninsured motorist
Section 541(c)(2) does not expressly require that insurers provide uninsured
motorist property damage coverage; most insurers, however, offer this type of
coverage. The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, for instance, provides:
We will pay compensatory damages which an "insured" is legally
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an "uninsured
motor vehicle" because of:

63.
64.

65.
66.
67.

2. "Property damage" caused by an accident.
ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C - Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Insuring
Agreement. Property damage is defined as injury to or destruction of a covered
motor vehicle or property contained in a covered motor vehicle. Id, Some
insurers, however, do not offer uninsured motorist property damage coverage.
Whether this is permissible has not been decided in Maryland. Arguably,
however, uninsured motorist property damage protection of $10,000 is mandatory. Section 541(c)(2)(v) of the Insurance Code states that in no instance
may the uninsured motorist coverage be less than the coverage afforded a
qualified person under section 243H and 243-1 of the Insurance Code. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2)(v) (Supp. 1992). Those sections require
property damage coverage of $10,000. See id. §§ 243H(a)(1)-(3), 243-I(a) (1991).
In addition, Title 17 of the Transportation Article also requires property damage
liability protection of $10,000. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17-103(b)
(1992). For consistency, the Title 17 required security, the mandatory uninsured
motorist insurance, and the compensable losses recognized by the Uninsured
Division of MAIF should be the same. Moreover, the Motor Vehicle Administration apparently interprets Title 17 and § 541(c)(2) as mandating uninsured
motorist property damage coverage. When a person seeks to become a selfinsured under Title 17, he must provide uninsured motorist coverage of $20,0001
$40,000 for bodily injury or death as well as $10,000 for property damage.
See Application for Maryland Self-Insurer (FR-l), available from the Motor
Vehicle Administration.
See MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. § 17-103(b) (1992).
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 243B, 243-1 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
Id. § 243B(a).
Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 240, 528 A.2d 912, 915 (1987).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243H(a) (1991).
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insurance, then he must pursue that coverage. 68 In this regard, the
Uninsured Division of MAIF functions as the uninsured motorist
insurer of last resort. The maximum amounts payable under the
Uninsured Division of MAIF in section 243-1 for bodily injury are
$20,000 per person and $40,000 per occurrence. 69 The maximum
amount payable for property damage is $10,000 per occurrence. 70
There are five deductions, or set-offs, from the maximum amounts
recoverable against the fund. 71
The scope of required coverage under the uninsured motorist
statute must be ascertained by cross-reference to the Uninsured
Division of MAIF. Section S41(c)(2)(v) provides that "[i]n no case
shall the uninsured motorist coverage be less than the coverage
afforded a qualified person under [MAIF] Article 48A, §§ 243H and
243-1."72 Section 243H delineates the type of claims that can be made
against the Uninsured Division of MAIF. Section 243-1 states the
amounts of required coverage. The articulation of sections S41(c)(2)
and 243H is best seen in two cases concerning hit-and-run vehicles.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Maryland
Automobile Insurance Fund,73 Daniel Saxon was injured while driving
an automobile owned by Kathleen Koegel. Saxon claimed that the
accident was caused when he was forced to take evasive action to
avoid striking another vehicle, which then fled the scene. There was
no physical contact between the Saxon vehicle and the phantom
vehicle. 74 State Farm insured the Koegel vehicle. 7s The uninsured
motorist provisions of the State Farm policy required physical contact
between the insured vehicle and a phantom vehicle. 76 Saxon made a
claim for uninsured motorist benefits, and State Farm denied coverage based on the lack of physical contact. 77
Saxon then sought recovery from MAIF, which, in turn, filed a
declaratory judgment action against State Farm, seeking a declaration
that the State Farm policy's physical contact requirement was contrary to Maryland law. 78 The trial court ruled that Saxon was covered

68. Uninsured motorist coverage is primary to any right of recovery from MAIF.

[d.
69. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243-I(a) (1991).
70. [d.
71. [d. § 243-I(b) (1991 & Supp. 1992).
72. [d. § 541(c)(2)(v) (Supp. 1992).
73. 277 Md. 602, 356 A.2d 560 (1976).
74. [d. at 602-03, 356 A.2d at 561.
75. [d. Saxon qualified as an additional insured because he was using the vehicle
with Koegel's permission. [d.
76. [d.

77. [d.
78. [d.
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by the State Farm policy, and State Farm appealed. 79 The soh:i
question before the court of appeals was the interpretation of section
S41(c)(2)'s cross-reference to sections 243H and 243_1. 80
The court first examined section 243H to determine the scope
of coverage afforded by that section. Section 243H recognizes three
different claims involving uninsured motorists. 81 Section 243H(a)(1)
establishes a qualified person's right to make a claim against MAIF
when an accident was caused by a phantom vehicle,82 but does not
contain any distinction between impact and non-impact phantom
drivers. Therefore, the court ruled that the State Farm policy provided
less coverage than section 243H(a)(1): "The aggregate of risks against
which the State Farm endorsement insures is 'less than' the aggregate
against which MAIF provides protection under § 243H, since the
former does not insure against the non-impact phantom driver who
causes an accident, while the latter does. "83 Accordingly, the court
held that State Farm's impact requirement violated section S41(c)(2)
and was void. 84
Eleven years after State Farm v. MAIF, the court of appeals
again considered the interplay of sections S41(c)(2) and 243H(a)(1).
79. MAIF petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and the court of appeals granted the
petition. [d. at 603, 356 A.2d at 561.
80. At the time of the dispute, the cross-reference to sections 243H and 243-1 was
contained in MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c). It is now contained in §
541 (c)(2)(v). For consistency herein, both the earlier and later versions will be
referred to as section 541(c)(2)(v).
81. The first type of claim involves an unidentified motorist, MD. ANN. CODE art.
48A, § 243H(a)(1) (1991); the second involves a disappearing motorist, id. §
243H(a)(2), and the third, an uninsured motorist, id. § 243H(a)(3). An "unidentified motorist" is "an owner or operator of a motor vehicle whose identity
and whereabouts are not known." MD. R. BW1(a)(5) (1992). A "disappearing
motorist" is "an uninsured owner or operator who was originally identified
but whose present whereabouts cannot be ascertained for the purpose of serving
process." MD. R. BW1(a)(4) (1992). An "uninsured motorist" is "an owner
or operator of a motor vehicle whose whereabouts are ascertainable for the
purpose of serving process, but who was uninsured at the time of the act or
omission." MD. R. BWl(a)(6) (1992).
82. Section 243H(a)(1) also covers claims caused by a stolen vehicle. It states that
the following may be made against MAIF:
Claims for the death of or personal injury to a qualified person or
for damages to property in excess of $100, arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in this State where the
identity of the motor vehicle and of the operator and owner thereof
cannot be ascertained or it is established that the motor vehicle, at
the time of the accident occurred, was in the possession of some
person other than the owner without the owner's consent and that
the identity of the person cannot be ascertained.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243H(a)(1) (1991).
83. State Farm v. MAIF, 277 Md. at 605, 356 A.2d at 562.
84. [d.
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In Lee v. Wheeler,8s Ark and Olivia Lee, Maryland residents, were
jnjured in an automobile accident in Washington, D.C., when a
vehicle driven by Marlene Wheeler swerved to avoid an unidentified
vehicle that had suddenly entered her traffic lane. 86 Wheeler's vehicle
struck the Lees' vehicle. The Lees sued Wheeler in tort. They also
sued their insurer, Pennsylvania General Insurance Company, seeking
uninsured motorist insurance as a result of the phantom vehicle's
negligence. 87 The Lees recovered against Wheeler, but their claims
against Pennsylvania General were dismissed because the insurance
policy contained a provision that required physical contact with the
phantom vehicle in order for the uninsured motorist provision to
apply. The trial court found that the physical contact requirement
was valid under District of Columbia law. 88 The Lees appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, which disagreed with the trial court and ruled that Maryland
law should apply.89 Uncertain whether Maryland courts would follow
State Farm v. MAIF and invalidate a provision requiring impact with
a phantom vehi<;le when the accident occurs outside of Maryland,
the court certified the issue to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 90
The court of appeals began its analysis in Lee with a review of
State Farm v. MAIF and section 541 (c)(2). Reaffirming its interpre85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

310 Md. 233, 528 A.2d 912 (1987).
[d. at 235, 528 A.2d at 913.
[d.
[d.
Lee v. Wheeler, 810 F.2d 303, 304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The court noted that
Maryland law applied because the policy issued by Pennsylvania General was
clearly a Maryland contract and "[tlhe fact that the accident occurred in the
District does not endow the District with an interest in the contractual relationship between the contracting parties." [d. at 305. The hybrid nature of
uninsured motorist insurance often gives rise to choice of law difficulties. See
1 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 7.15. In Maryland, the nature, validity and
construction of contracts are generally governed by the doctrine of lex loci
contractus. Under this doctrine, the interpretation and enforcement of the
policy is determined by the law of the state where the policy became a binding
contract. [d. The scope of the policy, and whether certain exclusions are
permissible, would also be governed by the law of the state where the contract
was made. An automobile insurance policy issued, sold, or delivered in Maryland is meant to comply with Maryland law. Since the insured's right to
recover uninsured motorist benefits is based on a contract theory, the law of
Maryland should thus apply. See Galford v. Nicholas, 244 Md. 275, 281, 167
A.2d 783, 786 (1961) (stating that insurer's liability under an automobile liability
policy is generally to be determined in accordance with the law of the place
where the contract was entered into, not some other jurisdiction).
90. Lee, 810 F.2d at 306. The federal appellate court noted that Reese v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 285 Md. 548, 403 A.2d 1229 (1979),
implicitly supported the Lees' position that § 541(c)(2) mandated coverage of
accidents occurring out of state, but did not find Reese conclusive. Lee, 810
F.2d at 306 n.4.
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tation of section 541(c)(2) in State Farm v. MAIF, the court rejected
Pennsylvania General's argument that section 541(c)(2) contained an
implied territorial limitation when read in conjunction with section
243H(a)(1).91 According to the court, no territorial limitation was
evident. The court then noted that sections 541(c)(2) and 234H did
not "always operate to qualify or supplement each other."92 In the
court's view, section 541(c)(2) established "a floor below which an
insurer may not go, but it [did] not establish a ceiling. "93 Given the
"broadly-protective public policy" underlying the uninsured motorist
statute, the court invalidated Pennsylvania General's physical contact
provision in order to "safeguard the integrity of the uninsured
motorist law and promote its remedial purpose of compensating the
innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents."94
91. Lee, 310 Md. at 238, 528 A.2d at 914-15. Pennsylvania General based its
argument on Mo. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243H(a)(1), which "authorize[dJ
qualified persons to present claims against MAIF for personal injuries 'arising
out of ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in this State . ..
(emphasis supplied).'" Lee, 310 Md. 233, 238, 528 A.2d 912, 914. The court
of appeals declined to rule whether § 243H(a)(I) had a residential requirement:
In our discussion of § 243H(a)(I) we have assumed arguendo, that it
does include a residential requirement with respect to claims against
MAIF. That is the way Pennsylvania General reads the law, but we
reject Pennsylvania ·General's conclusion even if the law be read that
way. We note, however, that this reading· of the statute is not
inevitable. We expressly do not decide whether it is correct.
Lee, 310 Md. at 243 n.4, 528 A.2d at 917 n.4. The federal appellate court,
however, noted that a "parsing of the statutory language suggests the possibility
that section 243H(a)(1) can apply to accidents that occur outside of Maryland."
Lee, 810 F.2d at 305-06.
92. Lee, 310 Md. at 242, 528 A.2d at 916-17.
93. [d. at 243, 528 A.2d at 917.
94. [d. The Court of Appeals of Maryland did not decide whether a physical
contact provision would apply above-and-beyond the $20,000/$40,000 required
minimum:
Pennsylvania General among other things argues that its exclusion of
non-impact phantom vehicle claims should be held to be enforceable
as to claims that exceed the statutory mandatory minimum coverage
required by Maryland law. Because that point is not encompassed
within the certified question, we decline to address it. For the same
reason, we likewise express no opinion on the issue raised by amici
in this case: whether Maryland law prohibits a physical contact requirement in uninsured motorist coverage in commercial policies as
opposed to personal policies.
[d. at 235-36 n.l, 528 A.2d at 913 n.l (citation omitted); see Royal Ins. Co.
v. Austin, 79 Md. App. 741, 558 A.2d 1247 (1989) (discussing physical contact
requirement in commercial automobile policy). In Austin, the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland decided that the phrase "hit and run" in a commercial
uninsured motorist endorsement included instances of nonphysical contact and
did not consider the validity of a physical contact requirement in a commercial
policy. [d. at 746-48, 558 A.2d at 1250.
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The court's holding in Lee is illustrative not only of the expansive
interpretation that courts give the uninsured motorist statute, but
also serves to recognize that reference to section 243H must be done
with great care. An exacting scrutiny of both section S41(c)(2) and
section 243H must be made when addressing a scope of coverage
issue. In addition, a review of all of the provisions of the uninsured
motorist statute must be made. Although they are related, sections
S41(c)(2) and 243H have different functions 9S and, as the Lee court
noted, they "do not always operate to qualify or supplement each
other."96 Therefore, section S41(c)(2) may provide for broader coverage than the minimum delineated in 243H.97 In Lee, for example,
section S41(c)(2)'s "arising out of" clause was determined to be more
. expansive than 243H(a)(2)'s "arising out of" provision. 98 The Lee
court's notion that section S41(c)(2) establishes a floor, rather than
a ceiling, then, is merely a statement that the public policy underlying
the uninsured motorist statute will give effect to more comprehensive
provisions in that statute over less comprehensive provisions in section
243H of Subtitle 16A.
Lee also reinforces the often repeated proposition that only
expressly authorized exclusions will be recognized by the courts.99
Statutory exclusions from, or limitations on, uninsured motorist
insurance must be clear and unambiguous; any doubts will be resolved
based on the underlying remedial nature of the uninsured motorist
statute. In this sense, the public policy underlying the uninsured
motorist statute acts as a limitation on the insurer's ability to contract

95. Lee, 310 Md. at 240, 528 A.2d at 916.
96. [d. at 242, 528 A.2d at 917. Nor do sections 542(c)(2) and 243-1 always

supplement each other. The permissible offsets in section 543, for example, do
not comport with the permissible offsets in section 243-1. Compare MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 543 (1991 & Supp. 1992) with id. § 243-I(b) (1991 & Supp.
1992).
97. The definition of uninsured motor vehicle in § 541(c)(I) is clearly broader than
the definition of uninsured motor vehicle in § 243L(f). Section 541(c)(I) defines
"uninsured motor vehicle" to include a vehicle with less insurance than the
injured person's uninsured motorist coverage. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §
541(c)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1992). In this way, the uninsured motorist coverage
mandated by Subtitle 35 functions as a type of underinsured motorist coverage
as well. Moreover, an "insured" under § 541(c)(2) is not necessarily the same
as a "qualified person" under § 243H. See Erie Ins. Exch. v. Reliance Ins.
Co., 63 Md. App. 612, 617-18, 493 A.2d 405,407-08 (1985).
98. In contrast to § 243H(a)(I), § 541(c)(2)'s "arising out of" clause did not
contain the prepositional phrase "in this State." See supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
99. In Lee, the court stated that "[a] corollary principle in our construction of
Art. 48A is that we will not imply exclusions nor recognize exclusions beyond
those expressly enumerated by the legislature." Lee, 310 Md. at 239, 528 A.2d
at 915.
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freely. The insurer is not restrained from contracting for coverage
beyond that contemplated by the statute; the insurer, however, has
no legal right to contract for coverage below the statutory minimum,
even if it could find a willing insured. Any provision which conditions, limits, or dilutes the unqualified uninsured motorist coverage
mandated by the statute is void and unenforceable,loo and Maryland
courts have "consistently rejected attempts by insurers, as well as
insureds and the insurance commissioner, to circumvent the plain
language of the required coverage provisions of the statutes dealing
with automobile insurance. "101 Only those policy provisions that
narrow the insurer's liability in a manner consistent with the statute
are valid.102
IV. MARYLAND'S REDUCTION UNDERINSURED
MOTORIST COVERAGE
In 1981, the Maryland legislature broadened the concept of
uninsured motorist insurance to include a type of underinsured
motorist coverage. Before 1981, an uninsured motor vehicle was
defined as a vehicle carrying no liability insurance.103 This definition

100. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 730, 436 A.2d 465, 471
(1981) (quoting with approval Barnett v. Crosby, 612 P.2d 1250, 1251 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1980».
101. [d. at 730, 436 A.2d at 471.
102. Powell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 86 Md. App. 98, 585 A.2d 286
(1991) (finding owned-but-otherwise-insured exclusion valid); c/. Lord v. Maryland Auto. Ins. Fund, 38 Md. App. 375, 381 A.2d 23 (1977) (finding territorial
limitation on personal injury protection valid).
103. Before 1981, the statute did not contain a definition of uninsured motor
vehicle, but the Uninsured Division of MAIF defined an uninsured motor
vehicle as
a motor vehicle as to which there is not in force security meeting the
requirements of Title 17 of the Transportation Article; and a motor
vehicle as to which there is in force a liability policy meeting the
requirements of that title where a receiver or conservator has been
appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction for the insurance
company issuing said liability policy.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243L(f) (1991). In addition, since 1965, the
Insurance Code has required that:
Any endorsement or provision protecting the insured against damage
caused by an uninsured motor vehicle, contained in any policy of
insurance issued and delivered in this State, shall be deemed to cover
damage caused by a motor vehicle of which the liability insurer is or
becomes insolvent or otherwise unable to pay claims, in like manner
and to like extent as for damages caused by a motor vehicle as to
which no liability insurance exists.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 481A (1991) (added by Act of April 8, 1965, ch.
375, 1965 Md. Laws 546).
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was changed in 1981 to include any vehicle insured with liability
coverage less than the amount of uninsured motorist insurance possessed by the victim. 104 At the same time, the legislature also added
section 541(c)(3), which provides that "[t]he limit of liability for an
insurer providing uninsured motorist coverage under this subsection
is the amount of that coverage less the sum of the limits under the
liability insurance policies, bonds, and securities applicable to the
bodily injury or death of the insured." lOS
The 1981 amendments, as the court of appeals noted in Hoffman
v. United Services Automobile Assoc., 106 make mandatory uninsured
motorist insurance operate as underinsured motorist coverage. I07 The
statute's definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" as including underinsured motor vehicles, however, has led to substantial confusion. lOs The nature of the semantic confusion created by the definition

104. Act of May 19, 1981, ch. 510, 1981 Md. Laws 2122 (codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1992». Section 541(c)(l) reads as
follows:
"[U]ninsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle whose ownership,
maintenance, or use has resulted in the bodily injury or death of an
insured, and for which the sum of the limits of liability under all
valid and collectible liability insurance policies, bonds, and securities
applicable to the bodily injury or death is less than the amount of
coverage provided to the insured under this subsection.
For a detailed discussion of the 1981 amendments, see Hoffman v. United
Services Automobile Ass'n, 309 Md. 167, 178-79, 522 A.2d 1320, 1325-26
(1987).
105. Act of May 19, 1981, ch. 510, 1981 Md. Laws 2122 (codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(3) (1991».
106. 309 Md. 167, 522 A.2d 1320 (1987).
107. [d. at 178-79, 522 A.2d at 1325-26. The court noted that the statutory definition
includes "what in insurance parlance is referred to as . .. 'underinsured'
motorist [coverage]." [d. at 174, 522 A.2d at 1323.
108. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. Uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist coverages are sometimes treated differently by courts. See
generally 2 WIDlSS, supra note 19, § 32.2. Since Maryland defines an uninsured
motor vehicle to be one that is either uninsured or underinsured, it appears
that Maryland courts would not treat the coverages differently. There are valid
reasons, however, for treating them differently. The injured insured has three
alternatives when pursuing a claim involving an uninsured motorist: (1) he may
sue the tortfeasor in tort, obtain a judgment and then enforce the judgment
against the uninsured motorist insurer; (2) the injured insured may sue the
uninsured motorist insurer and, as part of his case, prove that the tortfeasor's
negligence proximately caused his injuries; and (3) the injured insured may
combine the tort and contract claims in a single action. Lane v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 321 Md. 165, 170 & n.3, 582 A.2d SOl, 503 & n.3 (1990);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 736, 436 A.2d 465, 474
(1981). The right to combine the tort and contract claims when an underinsured
motor vehicle is involved is questionable, as is the insurer's right to intervene
when the claimant sues only in tort and an underinsured motor vehicle is
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of uninsured motor vehicle is best seen in Christensen v. Wausau
Insurance Co. 109
Wayne Christensen was injured in an automobile accident with
a vehicle driven by Herb Herrmann. Herrmann was insured by MAIF
under a policy that provided liability coverage of $20,000/$40,000.
Christensen's injuries and damages exceeded $20,000, and MAIF
tendered its per person policy limit in full settlement of any claims
Christensen had against Herrmann. Christensen then sued his insurance company, Wausau, to recover under insured motorist benefits.
Christensen's policy with Wausau provided uninsured motorist coverage of $20,000/$40,000 and underinsured motorist coverage of
$20,000/$40,000. Christensen paid a separate premium of six dollars
for the underinsured motorist coverage. The policy, however, did not
define underinsured motorist coverage yo
At trial, the court ruled that Christensen was not entitled to
recover anything from Wausau because he had already collected
$20,000 from Herrmann and the Wausau policy provided only $20,000
in underinsured motorist coverage. The trial court equated uninsured
motorist insurance with underinsured coverage. Christensen appealed,
and the court of special appeals reversed. The court rejected Wausau's
argument that uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist coverage
were synonymous, stating that "[t]he adoption of [Wausau's] contention would appear to make Wausau's inclusion of both terms in
the coverages . . . an exercise in futility." III The court then concluded
that Wausau's "use of the terms uninsured motorist and underinsured
motorist on the policy without a definition" created an ambiguity
that should be resolved against the drafter of the policy. JJ2
Because the Wausau policy did not contain a definition of
underinsured motorist coverage, the court sought to provide one.
Noting that "[uninsured motorist] coverage is applicable where the

109.
110.
111.
112.

involved. The insurer's right to its day in court is outweighed by the prejudice
caused by the introduction of insurance into the tort action. Compare Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 743, 436 A.2d 465, 478 (1981)
(holding that an uninsured motorist insurer who, having notice of insured's
tort action, fails to intervene, is bound by the judgment in the tort suit) with
Morris v. Weddington, 320 Md. 674, 681, 579 A.2d 762, 765 (1990) (stating
issue of insurance or lack of insurance should not be introduced at trial). In
such a case, intervention should be viewed as permissive rather than as of
right, for the insurer's interests are protected by the tortfeasor's insurance
defense counsel, who will vigorously defend his client. When a vehicle with no
insurance is involved, and the plaintiff sues only in tort, then intervention
should be as of right, for the insurer is left unprotected.
69 Md. App. 696, 519 A.2d 776 (1987).
Id. at 697-98, 519 A.2d at 777.
Id. at 699, 519 A.2d at 778.
Id. at 699-701, 519 A.2d at 779.
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vehicle involved in an accident is without insurance or is insured for
less than the liability limits required by the State law," the court
stated that under insured motorist coverage "is applicable where the
tortfeasor carries insurance which comports with the legal limits but
is inadequate to cover all of the damages incurred. "113 Since Christensen had paid an extra premium for the underinsured motorist
coverage, the court held that he could collect the $20,000 from
Wausau above and beyond the $20,000 he had collected from MAIF.1I4
The Wausau court's holding is a recognition that, generally,
uninsured motorist coverage is not synonymous with underinsured
motorist coverage. 1IS Under Maryland's statutory scheme, however,
an uninsured motor vehicle is synonymous with an underinsured
motor vehicle. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Souras,1I6 this fact
led the court of special appeals to reject the definition of underinsured
motorist coverage contained in the Wausau opinion. ll7 Souras, however, should not be read as overruling Wausau; rather it overrules
only the Wausau court's definition of underinsured motorist coverage. The decision in Wausau is fundamentally correct,1l8 and its
definition of underinsured motorist is not completely inconsistent
with the statute.
There are two different types of under insured motorist coverage:
floating and reduction. Floating underinsured motorist coverage, as
113. [d. at 700,519 A.2d at 778. The court ignored the policy definition of uninsured

114.

115.

116.
117.

118.

motor vehicle as including a vehicle with insurance that met the financial
responsibility requirements but whose applicable liability limits were less than
the uninsured motorist limits provided by the Wausau policy.
The court stated that "[w]hile many states have statutes that specifically define
UIM coverage ... the State of Maryland does not." [d. (footnote omitted).
In a footnote, the court recognized that Maryland's uninsured motorist statute
did address the concept of an underinsured motor vehicle. [d. at 700 n.l, 519
A.2d at 778 n.l.
The Wausau court rejected Wausau's position that uninsured motorist and
underinsured motorist had the same meaning under the Maryland law: '''Uninsured' clearly is not the same as 'underinsured' and '[a] court will not torture
words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for
ambiguity, and words do not become ambiguous simply because lawyers or
laymen contended for different meanings.'" [d. at 699, 519 A.2d at 778
(citations omitted) (alteration in original).
78 Md. App. 71, 552 A.2d 908 (1989).
In Souras, the court of special appeals, after adopting the Hoffman court's
statement that the 1981 amendments made uninsured motorist coverage operate
as underinsured motorist coverage, stated that the court's "indication to the
contrary in Christensen v. Wausau Insurance Co., 69 Md. App. 696, 519 A.2d
776 (1987), decided prior to Hoffman is expressly overruled." Souras, 78 Md.
App. at 76 n.2, 552 A.2d at 910 n.2.
See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 76 Md. App. 709, 716-17, 548 A.2d
lSI, 154-55 (1988) (explaining Wausau). The facts in Wausau follow a very
narrow course, and the holding must be viewed accordingly. See infra notes
121-26 and accompanying text.
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its name implies, floats on top of any recovery ,from other sources
up to the total value of the insured's injuries. If an insured's damages
exceed the tortfeasor's liability limits, then the underinsured motorist
insurer pays the difference between the injured insured's damages
and the tortfeasor's liability limits up to the underinsured motorist
policy limits.119 Floating underinsured motorist coverage focuses on
the injured insured's damages, not on the tortfeasor's liability limits.120 In contrast, reduction underinsured motorist coverage 121 focuses
on the relationship between the insured's underinsured motorist limits
and the tortfeasor's liability coverage. 122 In reduction underinsured
motorist coverage, the tortfeasor's liability coverage acts to reduce
the limit of underinsured motorist benefits. Unlike floating underinsured motorist coverage, where the injured insured's damages may
entitle him to recover the full amount of the policy, the most an
injured insured is able to recover under a reduction underinsured
motorist policy is the amount of his underinsured motorist limits
minus the amount of the tortfeasor's limits.123
Although reduction underinsured motorist coverage may cause
hardship in certain cases,l24 it is more prevalent than floating underinsured motorist coverage. 12S The type of underinsured motorist coverage created by the 1981 and 1983 amendments is reduction
underinsured motorist coverage. In this light, the Wausau decision
makes absolute sense, and the Souras court's overruling of the
119. See Elovich v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 707 P.2d 1319 (Wash. 1985); see also
Christensen v. Wausau Ins. Co., 69 Md. App. 696, 698, 519 A.2d 776, 778
(1987) (citing Elovich, 707 P .2d at 1323).
120. If the injured insured has $100,000 in floating underinsured motorist coverage
and incurs damages of $120,000 as a result of the negligence of a motorist
with liability coverage of $20,000, then the injured insured collects the $20,000
from the tort feasor and $100,000 from his underinsured motorist insurer.
121. See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.22. Rhodes uses the term "excess" underinsured
motorist coverage to refer to floating underinsured motorist. [d. The Elovich
court describes reduction underinsured motorist coverage as "decreasing layer"
coverage. Elovich, 707 P.2d at 1324.
122. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Souras, 78 Md. App. 71, 77-78, 552 A.2d 908, 91112 (1989). An issue not decided by the Maryland courts is whether the words
"valid and collectible" in § 541(c)(1) allow an insured to recover uninsured
motorist benefits when the tortfeasor has liability limits that equal the injured
insured's uninsured motorist limits, but because there are multiple claimants
the insured collects less than the tortfeasor's liability limits. See infra Part VI.
123. If the injured insured has $100,000 in reduction underinsured motorist coverage
and he incurs damages of $120,000 as a result of the negligence of a motorist
with liability coverage of $20,000, then the injured insured collects the $20,000
from the tortfeasor but only $80,000 ($100,000 minus $20,000) from his
underinsured motorist insurer.
124. In the example discussed supra note 123, the insured is not compensated fully
for his loss.
125. See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.22.

194

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 21

definition of under insured motorist coverage was unnecessary.126 All
Wausau stands for is that, since uninsured motorist coverage must
by statute include reduction underinsured motorist coverage, and
since Christensen paid the extra premium, he must have purchased
floating underinsured motorist coverage. 127 The uninsured motorist
statute, by the 1981 amendment, may operate as reduction underinsured motorist coverage, but it does not operate as floating underinsured motorist coverage. Nor, however, does the statute preclude
an insurer's offering floating underinsured motorist coverage. 128
In 1983, the public responsibility theory underlying Maryland's
insurance scheme was further embedded in Maryland law by the
addition of section 541(0, which, according to the court of appeals,
"clearly allows 'excess uninsured' or 'underinsured' motoriSt coverage
in separate policies issued by the same or another insurer." 129 The

126. The Wausau court's definition of underinsured motorist coverage is clearly a
definition of floating underinsured motorist coverage. The Souras court evidently believed that Wausau was engaged in statutory construction, but the
Wausau court did not interpret the uninsured motorist statute as requiring
floating underinsured motorist coverage; it merely interpreted the policy as
providing floating underinsured motorist coverage. See supra note 114. The
Wausau court's definition of underinsured motorist coverage, then, should not
have been overruled; however, the Wausau court's definition of uninsured
motorist coverage in light of the 1981 amendments is obviously wrong. This
fact may have influenced the Souras court.
127. The court of appeals has noted that "[olne usually gets in this life only what
he pays for. Insurance coverage is no exception." C & H Plumbing & Heating,
Inc. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 264 Md. 510, 517, 287 A.2d 238, 241-42
(1972) (quoting Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Moskios, 209 Md. 162, 177, 120 A.2d
678, 685 (1956) (Hammond, J., dissenting». In this regard, the Wausau court
noted that the trial court's interpreting underinsured motorist coverage in the
Wausau policy to mean uninsured motorist coverage
was clearly incorrect sans a specific statutory or policy definition.
Any other interpretation of underinsurance would mean that the victim
cannot recover part of the underinsurance limit he has bought and
paid for, and that portion of the limits also would be illusory. For
example, if Wayne Christensen were forced to deduct from the underinsurance limits of $20,000, the $20,000 of liability insurance
received from MAIF, his recovery would be nil and the $20,000 of
underinsurance that was purchased would be unavailable to him
notwithstanding damages which he suffered in excess of $20,000.
Christensen v. Wausau Ins. Co., 69 Md. App. 696, 701, 519 A.2d 776, 779
(1987). As a final note, the court stated that if Wausau had been more careful
in drafting its policy, the issue could have been avoided. Id.
128. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(b)(I) (1991 & Supp. 1992) (allowing
insurer to provide coverage iI). excess of the required minimum).
129. Hoffman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 309 Md. 167, 179, 522 A.2d 1320,
1326 (1987). Section 541(0 provides that "[p)olicies of insurance that have as
their primary purpose to provide coverage in excess of other valid and collectible
insurance or qualified self insurance may include uninsured motorist coverage
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court of appeals' notion that section 541(0 provides for "excess
uninsured" or "underinsured" motorist coverage is somewhat misleading. The use of "underinsured" as a synonym for "excess
uninsured," and the failure to differentiate between reduction underinsured motorist coverage and floating underinsured motorist coverage, certainly add to the confusion. Section 541(0 must be read in
conjunction with section 541(h)'s prohibition that the higher amounts
of uninsured motorist coverage may not "exceed the amounts of the
motor vehicle liability coverage provided by the policy." 130 The
court's statement, then, is best understood as a recognition that
excess liability policies, such as umbrella or catastrophe policies, 131
may provide post-1981 uninsured motorist insurance, which, by definition, includes reduction underinsured motorist coverage. Section
541(h), however, precludes the existence of policies that function
solely as "excess uninsured" motorist insurance policies. Therefore,
"excess uninsured" coverage can exist only if it is contained in a
policy providing comparable liability coverage. This comports with
the legislative design to equate uninsured motorist coverage with
liability coverage, and to encourage the public to purchase higher
amounts of liability and uninsured motorist coverage. Notwithstanding the 1981 and 1983 amendments, a person may not turn his
misfortune into a profit. The statute clearly prevents him from
recovering on "either a duplicative or supplemental basis."132
The 1981 and 1983 amendments modified the underlying purpose
of the uninsured motorist statute. Before the introduction of reduction underinsured motorist coverage in Maryland, courts uniformly
stated that the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage was to place
the insured in the same position as if the uninsured tort feasor
maintained the minimum amounts of coverage mandated by the
financial responsibility provisions of the Transportation Code. 133 In

130.
131.

132.

133.

as provided in subsection (c) of this section." MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §
541(0 (1991). Thf' statute does not require the excess policies to contain
uninsured motorist coverage but, if the policy has a step down provision, then
it would have to provide the required minimum coverage.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(h) (Supp. 1992) (added by Act of May 26,
1992, ch. 641, 1992 Md. Laws 3749, 3754).
For a discussion of the coordination of a primary automobile liability policy,
a secondary automobile liability policy, and a catastrophe policy, see United
States Fire Insurance Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 52 Md. App. 269, 447
A.2d 896 (1982).
Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, § 543(a) (1991). For definitions of duplicative and
supplemental, see Yarmuth v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 286 Md.
256, 264, 407 A.2d 315, 319 (1979), and Langston v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
40 Md. App. 414, 429-30, 392 A.2d 561, 569-70 (1978).
E.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 737, 436 A.2d 465,
474 (1981) ("[TJhe purpose of uninsured motorist statutes is 'that each insured
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light of the 1981 and 1983 amendments, the uninsured motorist
statute is now designed to place the injured insured in the same
position as if the tortfeasor maintained liability insurance in amounts
equal to the injured insured's uninsured motorist limits. The financial
responsibility provisions are no longer the benchmark; rather, the
injured insured's uninsured motorist limits are the guide. 134 Therefore,
it is no longer accurate to state that the uninsured motorist statute
is designed solely to protect victims from financially irresponsible
uninsured motorists. 135 Under the current statutory definition, a motorist may be financially responsible, yet still, by statutory definition,
"uninsured" because he is not as financially responsible as the injured
motorist.
Providing compensation to persons injured by financially responsible but inadequately insured motorists reflects the state's desire
to shift the losses associated with uninsured motorists. Reduction
under insured motorist insurance assures a full recovery for innocent
victims of motor vehicle accidents. The recovery, however, is from
the private sector, not the state, and the state's purpose of shifting
the burden of carrying victims of motor vehicle accidents on the
public welfare roles is accomplished by the additional insurance
benefits flowing to the injured insured. In this sense, both the
insurance buying public and the state are protected. The insurance
industry bears the burden, but it is able to spread the risk by adjusting
premiums. 136

v. FROM MANDATORY OFFERING OF HIGHER LIMITS
TO MANDATORY HIGHER LIMITS
The shift in design from guaranteeing a recovery to providing
an opportunity to receive a full recovery was furthered in 1989 when
the legislature placed an affirmative obligation on the insurer to offer

under such coverage have available the full statutory minimum to exactly the
same extent as would have been available had the tort feasor complied with the
minimum requirements of the financial responsibility Law."') (quoting Webb
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 479 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Mo. Ct. App.
1972».
134. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Souras, 78 Md. App. 71, 76, 552 A.2d 908, 911
(1989).
135. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
136. It is interesting to note that underinsured motorist coverage is an insurance
industry creation. The stacking of uninsured motorist coverage presented an
underwriting dilemma to the industry. In response, the Insurance Services
Office introduced the concept of underinsured motorist coverage in the 1977
Personal Auto Policy because it hoped to "restrict the effect of the court
decisions which allowed the 'stacking' of uninsured motorists insurance." 1
WIDISS, supra note 19, § 3.1. See infra notes 366, 389 and accompanying text.
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its insureds in writing the opportunity to contract for the higher
uninsured motorist limits.137 The amended statute became law on
July 1, 1989.138 Before the 1989 amendment, the uninsured motorist
statute required only that each insurer make higher limits of uninsured
motorist coverage "available" to its insureds.139 Several weeks before
the 1989 amendment became law, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland ruled in Libby v. Government Employees Insurance CO.I40
that the "shall be available" language in the pre-1989 version of
section 541(c)(2) imposed an affirmative obligation on the insurer to
notify its insured of the availability of higher uninsured motorist
limits in "a manner reasonably calculated to get the information into
the hands of [the insured]." 141 According to the court, the affirmative
duty is fulfilled when the insurer takes reasonable steps to inform
its policy holders that the additional coverage is available. 142
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Libby court rejected
the insured's argument that the court should adopt a four-part test
set forth by the Supreme Court of Minnesota,143 and adopted by
other jurisdictions. l44 The Minnesota test required that the insurer
137. Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 542, 1989 Md. Laws 3428, repealed by Act of May
26, 1992, ch. 641, 1992 Md. Laws 3749. The 1989 version provided that
"[t]here shall be offered in writing to the insured the opportunity to contract
for higher amounts than [$20,000 per person/$4O,000 per occurrence] if these
amounts do not exceed the amounts of the motor vehicle liability coverage
provided by the policy." Id. (emphasis added).
138. Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 542, 1989 Md. Laws 3428, repealed by Act of May
26, 1992, ch. 641, 1992 Md. Laws 3749.
139. The pre-1989 version of section 541(c)(2) stated that "[t]here shall be available
to the insured the opportunity to contract for higher amounts than [$20,000/
$40,000] if these amounts do not exceed the amounts of the motor vehicle
liability coverage provided by the policy." Act of May'19, 1981, ch. 510, 1981
Md. Laws 2122, 2123, repealed by Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 542, 1989 Md.
Laws 3428) (emphasis added).
140. 79 Md. App. 717, 558 A.2d 1236 (1989).
141. Id. at 726-27, 558 A.2d at 1240.
142. Id.
143. The four-part test set forth in Hastings v. 'United Pacific Insurance Co., 318
N.W.2d 849, 851-53 (Minn. 1982), requires:
(1) If the offer is made in other than face to face negotiations, the
notification process must be commercially reasonable;
(2) The insurer must specify the limits of its option coverages and not
merely offer them in general terms;
(3) The insurer must intelligibly advise the insured of the nature of
the optional coverages; and
(4) The insured must be advised that optional coverages are available
for a relatively modest premium.
144. See generally 2 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 32.4. Minnesota subsequently repealed
the mandatory offering statute when it adopted a no-fault scheme. Widiss
notes that at the time Minnesota adopted its no-fault scheme, "the Minnesota
courts had already considered a fairly substantial body of disputes involving
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make an offer in a commercially reasonable manner .145 Since the pre1989 version of section S41(c)(2) did not require the insurer to make
an offer, the Libby court refused to apply the four-part test l46 or to
decide whether the four-part test would be applicable to the amended
version of section 541(c)(2).
Underlying the Libby court's "reasonable manner" test is the
tenet that the "insured must be given sufficient information to make
an intelligent decision about optional coverages. "147 Other states have
adopted mandatory offering statutes that "require - either explicitly
or implicitly - an insurer to place the purchaser in a position to
make an informed rejection of the coverage."I48 Placing the insured
in a position to make a knowing decision lies at the foundation of
the insurer-insured relationship.149

145.

146.

147.
148.
149.

questions related to the adequacy of the offers made by insurers." He argues
that "[a)lthough these requirements are no longer applicable in Minnesota, the
doctrines developed in these decisions are certainly relevant to the consideration
of these questions in states with similar statutory requirements." [d. § 32.4
n.13.
According to the Libby court, none of the other jurisdictions had defined
"commercially reasonable." Libby, 79 Md. App. at 726, 558 A.2d at 1240. It
is obvious that the Libby court's "reasonable manner" requirement considers
insurance industry practice:
Enclosing the M-9 form [the availability notice] as a "stuffer" in the
questionnaire package was a reasonable method (a "commercially
reasonable" method) of giving notice to the insured of the available
opportunity to increase his uninsured motorist coverage. We do not
believe that the inclusion of additional "stuffers" advising the insured
of the availability of other insurance from GEICO in any way detracted from the reasonableness of the notification.
[d. at 728, 558 A.2d at 1241.
The Libby court examined § 541(c)(2) closely. Finding that there was "some
subtle but arguably significant difference between the language of the Maryland
statute" and uninsured motorist statutes from Minnesota and Tennessee, the
court concluded that the "made available" language of Minnesota's statute
and the "shall be provided an opportunity" language of Tennessee's statute
implied an "obligation to take some affirmative action specifically directed to
the insured." [d. at 726, 558 A.2d at 1240. In contrast, Maryland's language
had "a somewhat more passive connotation." [d. Also important to the court
was the legislative history of section 541(c)(2):
We find it particularly significant that, as originally introduced in the
General Assembly during its 1981 legislative session as Senate Bill 17,
the proposed act contained language to the effect that the insurer be
obligated to offer the coverage. That language was stricken out and
the statute, as passed, merely provided that an opportunity to purchase
be available.
[d. at 725, 558 A.2d at 1240.
2 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 32.5 n.13.
[d. § 32.5; see also 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.10 (stating that a waiver of
additional coverage can be made only with "knowledge of such a right and
an evident purpose to surrender it").
Cf, Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 414-15, 347 A.2d 842,

1992]

Uninsured Motorist Coverage

199

Several guidelines are discernable from the Libby court's interpretation of the pre-1989 version of section 541(c)(2). Mailing an
availability notice to the insured is a reasonable manner of getting
the information to the insured even if the insured receives but does
not read the notice. ISO The insurer is not obligated to provide a
separate and independent notice of additional uninsured motorist
coverage. Rather, it can provide the additional coverage notice along
with other notices sent out in its ordinary course of business. lSI The
insurer may not, however, intentionally attempt to obscure the information by hiding it among various stuffers. While an oral communication could satisfy the affirmative obligation under the pre1989 version of section 541 (c)(2) , the July 1, 1989, amendment
precludes oral offerings. Under the 1989 amendments, an insurer
cannot refuse to underwrite a person because he desires to contract
for higher uninsured motorist limits.ls2
Several issues were left unresolved by the Libby court. The
court, for example, did not address whether the notice requirement
was fulfilled if the insurer mailed availability information that was
not received by the insured. The mere mailing, however, would appear
to be enough. The court also did not decide whether the insurer had
the burden of proving that it fulfilled its affirmative obligation. The
holding suggests that the issue of whether the insurer notified the
insured in a reasonable manner is almost always a factual one that
must be considered on a case-by-case basis.ls3 Imposing the burden
on the insurer furthers the legislative purpose of protecting the
innocent victims of uninsured motorists. IS4

150.
151.

152.

153.
154.

854 (1975) (stating that insured has right to be fully informed of insurer's
conflict of interest over the conduct of the defense of a claim against the
insured); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 332, 236
A.2d 269, 273 (1967) (stating that insured has right to be fully informed of
the possibility of a verdict in excess of his policy limits).
Libby, 79 Md. App. at 726, 558 A.2d at 1240.
But see Tucker v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 465 N.E.2d 956, 959 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984). In Tucker, the court concluded that the notice provided to the insured
"was deficient" because it was "obscured" by being part of a letter advising
the insured of an increase in her premium. [d. at 961. The Tucker court then
adopted the Minnesota approach. [d. at 960-61.
Effective July I, 1989, personal injury protection can be waived by the named
insured. Under MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539(g)(I) (1991), "[a]n insurer
may not refuse to underwrite a person because the person refuses to waive the
[personal injury protection] coverage and benefits described under this section."
If the insurer fails to underwrite a person who refuses to waive personal injury
protection, then the insurer is subject to sanctions, including a revocation of
its certificate of authority or a fine of between one hundred dollars and fifty
thousand dollars. [d. § 539(g)(2); see id. 48A, §§ 55, 55A (1991 & Supp. 1992).
See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.11.
See id. § 24.10.
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The Libby court also did not decide whether reformation of the
policy is an appropriate remedy. ISS The trial court had apparently
treated the issue of whether the plaintiff would have purchased the
additional insurance as a factual one. IS6 A problem with this approach
is that it requires the insured to prove that he would have purchased
the higher insurance limits. This has the effect of replacing the
insured's right to knowingly choose his coverage limits with "the
right to have a fact finder later speculate about how the contemplated
decision making process would have come out."ls7 A better approach
would be to hold that the additional uninsured motorist coverage is
included as a matter of law when the insurer fails to make an
effective offer .158 This approach would follow the general rule; the
1989 changes to personal injury protection suggest that Maryland
would follow the general rule and require uninsured motorist limits
equal to the policy's liability limits.ls9

155. Libby, 79 Md. App. at 729, 558 A.2d at 1241.

156. The trial court "expressly found that if Mr. Libby had fully understood his
right to obtain the additional coverage he would have paid the extra premium
and obtained $500,000/$1,000,000 uninsured motorist coverage." Id. at 72021, 558 A.2d at 1237. As a practical matter, the insured will have little difficulty
offering evidence that he would have purchased the additional uninsured
motorist coverage, for in all but the rarest cases the only evidence bearing on
the issue will be the insured's own testimony, and it is doubtful that an insured
would testify that he would not have purchased the insurance. A person who
is not a party to the contract does not have standing to assert that the purchaser
would have purchased the higher limits. Cj. Compass Ins. Co. v. Woodard,
489 So. 2d 1157, 1158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (finding permissive user
lacked standing to object to improper procedures surrounding insured's rejection of uninsured motorist limits equal to liability limit).
157. O'Hanlon v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 522 F. Supp. 332, 336 (D.
Del. 1981), a/I'd, 681 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Arms v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 465 A.2d 360, 363 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983) (adopting the
O'Hanlon approach, and "declin[ing] to entertain any inquiry into [the insured's] probable choice had the required offer been tendered. "). The insurer's
failure to comply with the mandatory offering provision "will keep the offer
of additional coverage alive, to be elected by the insured at any time, including
after the accident." Arms, 465 A.2d at 361 (citing D'Hanlon); accord United
Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Hovanec, No. 90-1377 (Md. ct. Spec. App. May 17,
1991) (per curiam) (unreported). In Hovanec, the court ruled that reformation
was not appropriate because of a lack of mutual mistake, fraud or duress. Id.
slip op. at 10-11. The court did rule that the insured had the right to "purchase
retroactively the additional UM coverage." Id. slip op. at 11. Because Hovanec
is unreported, however, it serves neither as precedent nor as persuasive authority. See MD. R. 8-114(a).
158. 2 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 32.5; see 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.11 ("[W]here
the insurer fails to offer such coverage, additional coverage may be written
into the policy in amounts equal to the policy's liability limits.").
159. ct. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539(f)(3) (1991 & Supp. 1992) (requiring the
insurer to provide all minimum personal injury protections and benefits if the
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In the Libby case, since the named insured failed to exercise his
right to purchase higher uninsured motorist coverage, the court did
not have to consider who has the power to reject the additional
coverage. In general, the rejection must be made by the named
insured and is then binding on his resident relatives and other users
of the insured vehicle. l60 Good practice suggests that the insured be
required to reject the additional coverage in writing,161 thus providing
the insurer with a verifiable record of the offer and rejection, and
precluding the insured from later asserting that the rejection was not
made knowingly. 162
The insurer is obligated to offer the additional coverage when
the purchaser applies for the insurance. A broad reading of Libby
suggests that the insurer is also required to reiterate the offer with
each renewal package. 163 In addition, material changes in the existing
coverage during a policy period may also obligate the insurer to
renew the offer of additional coverage. l64 Subsequent offers of additional coverage must be made in a manner consistent with the
original offer, fully informing the insured of his options. Only then
is his decision to accept or reject the additional coverage voluntary
and informed.

160.

161.
162.

163.

164.

first named insured fails to make an affirmative written waiver of personal
injury protection). The fact that uninsured motorist insurance is offered in
varying amounts from the statutory minimum up to the liability limits, however,
poses a problem not faced in the context of personal injury protection.
See generally 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.10. But c/. MD. ANN. CODE art.
48A, § 539(f)(1)(iii) (1991) (making waiver of personal injury protection binding
on named insureds, all listed drivers, and "all members of the first named
insured's family residing in the first named insured's household who are 16
years of age or older").
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539(f) (1991 & Supp. 1992) (providing content
of an "affirmative, written waiver" of personal injury protection).
Even if the insured rejected the additional coverage, that rejection would be
effective only if made knowingly, a standard for which the insurer generally
bears the burden of proof. 2 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 32.5; see also 3 LONG,
supra note 29, § 24.10 ("Clearly, the burden of proving that a knowing rejection
was made, rests on the insurer, with the validity of the rejection being a
question of fact."); c/. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539 (1991) (stating that
rejection of personal injury protection must be affirmative and based on the
insured's being fully informed of the nature, extent, cost of personal injury
protection, as well as the consequences of his waiver).
At the very least, the Libby court implicitly rscognized that, even if the statute
does not require reiterating the offer with each renewal, it would constitute
good insurance practice to do so. As the facts in Libby demonstrate, GEICO's
practice of mailing the M-9 form as part of the renewal package was its saving
grace. See Libby v. Government Employers Ins. Co., 79 Md. App. 717, 727,
558 A.2d 1236, 1241 (1989) (affirming trial court's finding that GEICO
corrected any error it may have made when Libby purchased the insurance by
later including the M-9 availability form in the renewal package).
See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.11.
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Irr 1992, the General Assembly of Maryland answered many of
the questions left unresolved by Libby when it enacted Senate Bill
767 as chapter 641 of the laws of that year. 16S Chapter 641 is the
logical extension of mandatory offering of higher amounts of uninsured motorist coverage. Effective October 1, 1992, the uninsured
motorist statute requires that, with respect to private passenger motor
vehicles, the uninsured motorist coverage limits must be identical to
the liability insurance limits unless the insured affirmatively waives
the higher coverage in writing. 166 An insurer may not refuse, however,

165. Act of May 26, 1992, ch. 641, 1992 Md. Laws 3749.
166. The following language was added to the statute:
(g) (1) Unless waived by the first named insured under this
subsection, the amount of uninsured motorist coverage under a policy
of private passenger motor vehicle insurance shall be equal to the
amount of liability coverage provided under the policy.
(2) Where the liability insurance coverage under a policy or binder
of private passenger motor vehicle insurance is in excess of that
required under § 17-103 of the Transportation Article, if the first
named insured does not wish to obtain uninsured motorist benefits in
the same amount as the liability insurance coverage, the first named
insured shall make an affirmative written waiver of having uninsured
motorist benefits in the same amount as the liability coverage.
(3) (i) Before a first named insured makes a waiver under this
subsection, the first named insured must be informed in writing of
the nature, extent, benefit, and cost of the level of the uninsured
motorist coverage being waived.
(ii) A waiver made under this subsection shall be made on a form
required by the Commissioner.
(iii) The form may be part of the contract of insurance.
(iv) The form shall clearly and concisely explain in 10 point
boldface type:
1. The nature, extent, benefit, and cost of the level of the
uninsured motorist coverage that would be provided under the policy
if not waived by the first named insured;
2. That a failure of the first named insured to make a waiver
requires an insurer to provide uninsured motorist coverage in an
amount equal to the amount of the liability coverage, where the
liability insurance coverage under a policy or binder of private passenger motor vehicle insurance is in excess of that required under §
17-107 of the Transportation Article;
3. That an insurer may not refuse to underwrite a person because
the person refuses to make a waiver of the excess uninsured motorist
coverage under this subsection; and
4. That a waiver under this subsection must be an affirmative,
written waiver.
(4) Failure of the first named insured to make a[nJ affirmative
written waiver under this subsection requires an insurer to provide
uninsured motorist coverage in an amount equal to the amount of
the liability coverage, where the liability insurance coverage under a
policy or binder of private passenger motor vehicle insurance is in
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to underwrite a person because he elects not to purchase the reduced
coverage. 167
Requiring the insured to elect reduced coverage is more palatable
than requiring the insured to elect higher coverage. The result of the
insured's inaction is more protection. This "default setting" recognizes the realities of life and coincides with the legislative aim of
uninsured motorist insurance of providing a full recovery.
VI.

VALID AND COLLECTIBLE

An issue not yet decided by the Maryland courts is whether
Maryland's uninsured motorist statute allows an insured to recover
uninsured motorist benefits when the tortfeasor has liability limits
that equal the injured insured's uninsured motorist limits, but the
insured collects less than the tortfeasor's liability limits because there
are multiple claimants. An anomalous situation occurs if recovery is
denied - the claimants .would have been in a better position had
the tort feasor been truly uninsured. l68 Jurisdictions that have considexcess of that required under § 17-103 of the Transportation Article.
(5) (i) An insurer may not refuse to underwrite a person because
the person refuses to make a waiver of the excess uninsured motorist
coverage under this subsection.
(ii) A violation of this paragraph is subject to the penalties
provided under §§ 55 and 55A of this Article.
(6) A waiver made under this subsection by persons continuously
insured by an insurer or by the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund
shall be construed to be effective until withdrawn in writing.
(7) Subject to approval by the Commissioner. the waiver made
under this subsection may be made on the same form as the waiver
made under § 539(f) of this subtitle.
Act of May 26. 1992. ch. 641. 1992 Md. Laws 3749 (codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A. § 541(g) (Supp. 1992». The Act applies "only to motor vehicle
insurance policies issued or delivered on or after the effective date of this
Act." which was October 2. 1992. [d. §§ 2. 3.
167. Act of May 26. 1992. ch. 641. 1992 Md. Laws 3749 (codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A. § 541(g)(5)(i) (Supp. 1992». An insurer who violates this section
is subject to the penalties provided under Maryland Annotated Code. article
48A. sections 55 and 55A. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A. § 541(g)(5)(ii) (Supp.
1992).
168. See Porter v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co .• 475 P.2d 258. 263 (Ariz.).
modified on other grounds. 476 P.2d 155 (Ariz. 1970). See. however. Gorton
v. Reliance Insurance Co .• 391 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1978). where the Supreme
Court of New Jersey rejected this very argument:
[W]e acknowledge the oft-cited anomaly that those in the position of
these claimants would find themselves in a better position were the
tortfeasor's vehicle totally uninsured rather than underinsured. However. the objective of the legislature as we perceive it was to protect
the public from a noninsured. financially irresponsible motorist. not
one who is insufficiently insured. The protection intended is against
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ered the issue are divided. 169 In Maryland, the dispute appears to
hinge on the interpretation of the terms "valid and collectible" in
section S41(c)(1)170 and "applicable" in section S41(c)(3).171 Most
likely, the General Assembly did not consider the issue when it added
those sections in 1981.172
The court of appeals recently skirted the "amounts received"
issue in two cases involving issues similar to this situation, but in
which the plaintiffs maintained uninsured motorist coverage greater
than the liability insurance maintained by the tortfeasors. In Waters
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty CO.,173 John Waters was injured
while a passenger in a vehicle operated by Edward Schreier and
insured by Continental Insurance Company. The Schreier vehicle
crossed the center line and struck a vehicle operated by Shirley
Dunham, who was also seriously injured. The Continental policy had
a single combined liability limit of $100,000, which Waters and
Dunham divided. Dunham received $97,000 and Waters received
$3,000. Waters then made an uninsured motorist claim against his

169.

170.

171.

172.
173.

an "uninsured" motorist, not one who is "under insured." The
legislature required that a minimum level of coverage be available for
each accident when more than one person was injured. It did not
undertake to guarantee an irreducible minimum sum available to every
injured person under every set of circumstance but simply to make
available a policy offering minimum levels of coverage.
Id. at 1223-24 (citation omitted). Unlike Maryland's statute, the New Jersey
statute at the time did not incorporate underinsured motorist coverage. See
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1992). The entire purpose
of underinsured motorist insurance is to provide the insured with the opportunity for a full recovery.
See 1 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 8.22; see also Lee R. Russ, Annotation,
Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage: Recoverability, Under Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist Coverage, of Deficiencies in Compensation
Afforded Injured Party by Tortfeasor's Liability Coverage, 24 A.L.R.4th 13,
§§ 6, 7 (1983 & Supp. 1991) (discussing multiple claimants).
Section 541(c)(1) defines "uninsured motor vehicle" as
a motor vehicle whose ownership, maintenance, or use has resulted
in the bodily injury or death of an insured, and for which the sum
of the limits of liability under all valid and collectible liability insurance
policies, bonds, and securities applicable to the bodily injury or death
is less than the amount of coverage provided to the insured under
this subsection.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1992).
Section 541(c)(3) provides that the insurer's liability is "the amount of [its
uninsured motorist] coverage less the sum of the limits under the liability
insurance policies, bonds, and securities applicable to the bodily injury or
death of the insured." Id. § 541(c)(3) (1991 & Supp. 1992).
See 1 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 8.22 (noting that "most of the statutes were
based on a legislative 'model' that did not specifically contemplate this coverage
issue").
328 Md. 700, 616 A.2d 884 (1992).
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insurer, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company (USF&G), which
provided $100,000/$300,000 uninsured motorist coverage. The trial
court ruled that the Schreier vehicle was not uninsured, and Waters
appealed. The court of special appeals affirmed in an unreported
decision, holding that
it is only when the tortfeasor's limit of liability is less than
the limit of liability provided to the insured under his
uninsured motorist provision that the automobile is considered to be uninsured. The "limit of liability" is found on
the declaration page of the insurance policy; it is not calculated by factoring in settlement agreements with other
injured claimants. 174
Upon grant of certiorari, the court of appeals examined the
language and legislative history of Maryland Code Annotated, article
48A, section 541(c) and its 1981 amendment, and concluded that a
"tortfeasor is an uninsured motorist . . . whenever the amount of
uninsured motorist coverage purchased by the insured exceeds the
amount of liability insurance carried by the tortfeasor."175 Reversing
the court of special appeals, the court of appeals concluded that,
because two persons were injured in the accident, the per accident
limitation - Schreier carried $100,000 per accident coverage while
Waters carried $300,000 per accident coverage - was critical in
permitting Waters to "proceed against his uninsured motorist carrier ... for the remainder of his damages, up to the per person limit
of $100,000."176
The court of appeals followed this same reasoning in Erie
Insurance Co. v. Thompson. 177 There, Leslie Thompson was injun~d
in an accident while a passenger in a vehicle operated by Sam Lee.
Lee was also injured. Two other passengers, Alma Lee and Graham
Lee, died as a result of injuries they received. The accident was
caused by the negligence of Bernard Walker, the operator of another
vehicle, who was insured by MAIF under a policy that provided
liability coverage of $20,000 per person and $40,000 per occurrence.
Ohio Casualty Company insured Sam Lee under a policy that contained a single combined motorist limit of $100,000. Erie Insurance
Company insured Thompson under a policy with coverage limits of
$100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. Thompson, Sam Lee,
the Estate of Alma Lee, and the Estate of Graham Lee made claims

174. Waters v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., No. 153-1699, slip op. at 4
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 21, 1990) (per curiam).
175. Waters, 328 Md. at 713, 616 A.2d at 891.
176. [d. at 714-15, 616 A.2d at 891.
177. 330 Md. 530, 625 A.2d 322 (1993).
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against Walker, and MAIF paid $10,000 to each claimant. The four
claimants then sought uninsured motorist coverage from Ohio Casualty, which paid $30,000 to Thompson and the same amount to
Sam Lee, thus exhausting its limits. Thompson then turned to Erie,
contending that since she had received $40,000 ($10,000 from MAIF
and $30,000 from Ohio Casualty), she should be entitled to $60,000
of coverage from Erie. The trial court ruled in favor of Erie, and
Thompson appealed to an en bane panel of circuit court judges. The
panel reversed, and during the pendency of an appeal to the court
of special appeals, the court of appeals issued a writ of certiorari. 178
Finding the principle set forth in Waters to be controlling, the
court of appeals affirmed the decision of the en bane panel. The
court noted that, as in Waters, "the per accident limits of the other
policies applicable to the plaintiff Thompson were less than the per
accident limit of the plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage." 179
Because the amount available to the plaintiff under the other applicable policies was less than the amount available under her Erie
uninsured motorist coverage, the court found the plaintiff "entitled
to recover from Erie the difference, as long as her total recovery
[did] not exceed her damages or the $100,000 limit."180
As noted, both Waters and Thompson avoided the more difficult
issue of whether a vehicle is uninsured when its liability limits are
identical to the claimant's uninsured motorist limits but the claimant
receives less than his uninsured motorist limits because of the presence
of other claimants. As an example, consider the situation in which
the tortfeasor has a $20,000/$40,000 policy and injures four persons.
The four claimants divide the $40,000 four ways, each receiving
$10,000. One of the claimants has an uninsured motorist policy that
provides $20,000/$40,000 coverage. That claimant demands $10,000
from his or her uninsured motorist insurer, arguing that since he or
she received only $10,000 from the tortfeasor, the tortfeasor's vehicle
is uninsured. The uninsured motorist insurer counters by arguing that
the tortfeasor's vehicle is not uninsured because the liability limits
equal the claimant's uninsured motorist limits. Based upon the opinions in Waters and Thompson, it is difficult to predict how the
court of appeals will rule on this issue. The opinions contain language
supportive of both sides of the issue. For instance, upon review of
the history of uninsured motorist coverage in Maryland, the Waters
court stated the applicable limits-to-limits test four different times.
First, the court stated:

178. [d. at 533, 625 A.2d at 323.
179. [d. at 537, 625 A.2d at 325.
180. [d. at 538, 625 A.2d at 325.
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By Ch. 510 of the Acts of 1981, the General Assembly
amended § 541(c) and, inter alia, defined an uninsured
motor vehicle. The concept of "uninsured" was broadened
to include any vehicle insured with liability limits in an
amount "less than the amount of coverage provided to the
insured under this subsection. "181
Later in the opinion, the court reaffirmed the test: "The [1981J
amendments allow an insured to purchase a higher amount of uninsured motorist insurance which will become available when the
insured's uninsured motorist coverage, as well as his damages, exceed
the liability coverage of the tort feasor. "182 Still later, the court stated:
"Consequently, a tort feasor is an uninsured motorist, as defined by
§ 541(c), whenever the amount of uninsured motorist coverage purchased by the insured exceeds the amount of liability insurance carried
by the tortfeasor." 183 Finally, the court summed up its review of the
uninsured motorist statute as follows: "Under this scheme, a court
must compare the amount of liability insurance carried by the tortfeasor with the amount of uninsured motorist coverage carried by
the injured party." 184 Since, however, the Waters court was able to
find coverage by comparing a single combined limit to the per
occurrence split limit, the repeated references to the limits-to-limits
test may be treated by future courts as mere dicta. In addition, the
opinions in Waters and Thompson, particularly the latter, focus
acutely on the concept of "available coverage," leading to the
inference that when a per occurrence liability limit is divided among
several claimants, the "available" limit is what was actually received,
not that which was theoretically available. 18s

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Waters, 328 Md. at 711, 616 A.2d at 889.
[d. at 712, 616 A.2d at 889.
[d. at 713, 616 A.2d at 890.
[d. at 714, 616 A.2d at 890.
The Waters court's view that the type of uninsured motorist coverage mandated
by § 541(c) is "gap" coverage certainly suggests this conclusion, see id. at 712
n.5, 616 A.2d at 891 n.5, as does the manner in which it determined that only
$3,000 was "available" to Waters, see id. at 715 n.6, 720, 616 A.2d at 891
n.6, 893. The entire opinion in Thompson can be read as sanctioning an
amounts-received-to-limits approach in order to effectuate the legislative goal
of the uninsured motorist statute. See Erie Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 330 Md.
530, 538, 625 A.2d 322, 325 ("Because what was available under the applicable
policies, however, was less than what was available under her Erie uninsured
motorist coverage, the plaintiff under Art. 48A, § 541(c)(3), is entitled to
recover from Erie the difference, as long as her total recoveries do not exceed
her damages or the $100,000.00 per person limit. ").
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Notwithstanding this inference, the remedial nature of the Maryland uninsured motorist statute arguably supports recovery when the
amounts received by the insured are less than his uninsured motorist
coverage. 186 To the contrary, however, the language of section
541(c)(I), when read in conjunction with section 541(c)(3), suggests
that "collectible" refers to liability insurance that the insured was
entitled to collect - not what he actually collected. Both sections
refer to the "sum of the limits" of the liability insurance. 187 The
legislative history of the 1981 amendments to section 541(c) also
offers some support for the view that the method of determining an
uninsured motor vehicle is to compare "liability limits" to "uninsured
motorist limits," as opposed to comparing the "amount collected"
to "uninsured motorist limits. "188
186. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 170-71.
188. In 1981, the Maryland legislature amended section 541(c) by broadening the
definition of uninsured motor vehicle to include an underinsured motor vehicle,
thus making section 541(c) function as both uninsured and underinsured
motorist coverage. See supra notes 103-0S. These changes were proposed in
Senate Bill 17. The purpose of the amendments to section 541(c) were discussed
in an undated report by the Staff of Senate Committee on Economic Affairs:
When an uninsured motor vehicle is involved in an automobile
accident causing injury, the injuries shall be compe'nsated by the
insurance company which insures the person injured, to the limits of
the UM coverage.... Although some companies offer limits in excess
of the mandated 20/40 coverage, Senate Bill 17 mandates that all
companies offer higher limits than 20/40, e.g. 100/300.
As it stands now, if you sued a person who has insurance in the
minimal limits of 20/40 and obtained a judgment for say $50,000.00,
you would collect $20,000.00 from the guilty party and have no source
to satisfy the balance of your judgment, i.e. $30,000.00.
S.B. 17 will do this. The $30,000.00 will be paid from the injured
party's own UM coverage (if the injured party has UM in excess oj
the guilty party's liability coverage). So that if the guilty party had
20/40 and the injured party had UM coverage of 20/40 the injured
party obviously would have no source from which to collect the excess
verdict in the case mentioned above.
As it is now, under present law, if the guilty party has liability
insurance, he can never be considered an uninsured motorist and the
UM coverage of the injured party can never come into play.
S.B. 17 will change this and make available the UM coverage oj
the injured party jor the judgment in excess oj the guilty party's
liability coverage.
A case in Florida has already held this. If S.B. 17 is passed the
injured party in Maryland who finds himself in this situation will not
have to sue his UM carrier. The legislature will have anticipated such
a law suit and the UM carrier must pay the difference.
Committee Report on Senate Bill 17 (1981) (microfilmed on Department of
Legislative Reference's microfilm file, S.B. 17 (1981» (emphasis added). It is
not certain which Florida case served as the catalyst or model. Most likely it
was Williams v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 382 So. 2d 1216 (Fla.
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Additionally, an insured's ability to purchase higher uninsured
motorist limits weighs against allowing recovery when the tortfeasor's
liability limits equal the uninsured motorist limits, but the injured
insured has collected less than the liability limits because of other
claimants. 189 Nowhere in the public policy of Maryland is recovery
of a certain amount guaranteed. l90 Rather, each insured is given the
opportunity for a full recovery. By exercising his right to purchase
higher limits, the insured assures himself of a recovery. 191 Since the
insured cannot purchase uninsured motorist limits that exceed his
liability limits, the legislative aim of protecting the public is fulfilled
when the insured purchases the higher limits.192
Still, the remedial nature of the uninsured motorist statute is a
strong factor, and "valid and collectible" in section S41(c)(1) and
"applicable" in section S41(c)(3) are susceptible to different read-

189.
190.

191.

192.

1990), which discussed concepts of "uninsured" and "underinsured" motorist
coverage. But compare Jones v. Travelers Indem. Co., 368 So. 2d 1289, 1290
(Fla. 1979) (holding that an insured is entitled to underinsured motorist benefits
where the tortfeasor's policy liability limit has been partially exhausted by
payment of claims to persons other than the insured) with Holt v. State Auto.
Mut. Ins. Co., 385 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a
father, wife, and two daughters who divided the per occurrence limit provided
by a $15,000/$30,000 liability policy had no right to seek underinsured motorist
benefits from a policy that provided $15,000/$30,000 uninsured motorist insurance).
See Act of May 26, 1992, ch. 641, 1992 Md. Laws 3749.
The statutory $20,000/$40,000 split limit, see MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 17103(b) (1992), reflects a legislative understanding that not every victim of a
motor vehicle accident is entitled to $20,000. When there are more than two
victims from one occurrence, they will have to divide the $40,000 per occurrence
limit. Similarly, the Uninsured Division of MAIF does not guarantee every
person a recovery of $20,000. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243-I(a) (1991)
(guaranteeing a maximum of $20,000/$40,000). Prior to 1987, the Uninsured
Division of MAIF guaranteed a recovery to each claimant when multiple
claimants sought recovery, as section 243-I(a) then provided that "[w]here
there are three or more qualified claimants, the court or courts shall order
payments on a pro rata basis." Act of April 26, 1972, ch. 73, 1972 Md. Laws
281, 302, repealed by Act of June 2, 1987, ch. 638, 1987 Md. Laws 2959,
2960.
For example, the tortfeasor has a $20,000/$40,000 liability policy. He injures
four persons in an accident. The four persons divide the $40,000, with each
receiving $10,000. One of the claimants, who has uninsured motorist coverage
of $20,000/$40,000, then makes an uninsured motorist claim, seeking the
difference between the $10,000 he has "collected" from the tort feasor and the
$20,000 uninsured motorist limit. Another claimant has an uninsured motorist
policy that provides $50,000/$100,000. While the first claimant may be precluded from recovery if the test is "liability limit" to "uninsured motorist
limit," the second claimant under the same test would recover $30,000 from
his uninsured motorist insurer ($50,000 uninsured motorist coverage minus
$20,000 liability), thereby netting $40,000 ($30,000 uninsured motorist coverage
plus $10,000 liability he collected).
See supra notes 133-36.
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ings. 193 On other occasions, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has
ignored statutory language in order to effectuate public policy.l94 If
the concept of a full recovery is to be fulfilled, then a claimant
should be able to seek uninsured motorist benefits when he receives
an amount from the tortfeasor's liability insurance that is less than
the uninsured limit he purchased. His reasonable expectations demand
this result,195 and the state's desire to shift the loss to the private
sector would be frustrated if another result were reached. When faced
with this situation, several states have enacted provisions that define
an uninsured (or underinsured) motor vehicle as one whose liability
limit has been reduced by payments to multiple claimants to an
amount less than the insured's uninsured (or underinsured) limit. l96
If Maryland's uninsured motorist statute is eventually interpreted as
precluding recovery when the liability limits have been exhausted by
payment to multiple claimants, the General Assembly should not
hesitate to join these states in redefining the concept of an uninsured
motor vehicle. Another alternative is for the legislature to abandon
the concept of reduction underinsured motorist coverage and adopt
floating underinsured motorist coverage, which provides the insured
with a certain sum regardless of the amount of liability insurance
available to the insured. l97 Floating underinsured motorist coverage
is the next logical step in the movement toward guaranteeing a full
recovery, and the public responsibility theory underlying Maryland's
comprehensive insurance scheme demands such progression.
VII.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The "entitled to recover" language of the uninsured motorist
statute unquestionably obligates the insurer to indemnify the injured
193. But cj. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Gould, 569 A.2d 1105, 1110 (Conn.
1990) (holding that "in ordinary parlance an insurance policy would be 'applicable' if it covered any portion of a tortfeasor's liability rather than all of
it," and adding that the policies in question "did not become inapplicable
simply because the sum of their liability limits was less than was necessary to
satisfy all of the claims arising out of the accident").
194. See Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 80, 517 A.2d 730, 735
(1986) (holding that allowing a person sitting on a stool in a parking lot
attendant's booth to recover personal injury protection benefits as a "pedestrian" is consistent with the real intention of the personal injury protection
statute, "even though arguably contrary to the literal meaning of the word").
195. See 1 WIDlSS, supra note 19, § 8.22, at 406 ("An insured could reasonably
anticipate that the uninsured motorist coverage, which is a first-party insurance,
would apply in the event that injuries were caused by a negligent third party
and either no indemnification or inadequate indemnification was provided by
the tortfeasor's insurance. ").
196. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 10-4-609(4)(b) (1990); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 5.061(2)(b) (West Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206 B. (Michie 1990); W.
VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b)(ii) (1992).
197. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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insured for compensatory damages he is entitled to recover from the
tortfeasor. l98 Maryland courts have not .decided, however, whether
an uninsured motorist carrier's liability encompasses punitive damages
from the uninsured tortfeasor. The statute does not expressly permit
or prohibit the exclusion of punitive damages. An insured is "entitled" to recover punitive damages from the tort feasor if the tortfeasor demonstrated actual malice. l99 Whether the insurer's
indemnification duty extends to the punitive damages is another
matter, and persuasive arguments exist on both sides. Other jurisdictions are split,2°O and the issue is complex.
Without doubt, several conceptual problems emerge if an insured
can recover punitive damages as part of his claim against the uninsured motorist carrier. In considering punitive damages, for instance,
a jury is entitled to weigh the tortfeasor's financial ability to pay,20l
but this traditional measure is absent because the typical uninsured
is financially irresponsible. 202 This is, perhaps, merely an evidentiary
problem. If carried to its extreme, however, a conceptually more
difficult matter arises; theoretically, an insured may be able to show
that he is entitled to recover punitive damages based on the actions
of the driver of a phantom vehicle. Awarding the insured punitive
damages in such an instance is, at best, speculative. 203 Still, such
difficulties do not warrant the exclusion of punitive damages. The
198. Section 541(c)(2)(i) of the Insurance Code requires uninsured motorist coverage
for damages which the "insured is entitled to recover from the owner or
operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries." MD. ANN.
CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2)(i) (Supp. 1992). The phrase "because of bodily
injury," which appears in many liability policies in addition to uninsured
motorist endorsements, has received little attention in Maryland. See Loewenthal v. Security Ins. Co., 50 Md. App. 112, 436 A.2d 493 (1981) (providing
brief interpretation of "bodily injury" in a liability policy); see also Daley v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 312 Md. 550, 541 A.2d 632 (1988) (discussing
bodily injury in conjunction with a per person/per occurrence dispute).
199. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992)
(discussing actual malice).
200. See generally Eric Hollowell, Annotation, Punitive Damages as Within Coverage
of Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist Insurance, 54 A.L.R.4th 1186 (1987 &
Supp. 1991).
201. See Carl M. Freeman Assoc. v. Murray, 18 Md. App. 419, 427-28, 306 A.2d
548, 554, cert. denied., 269 Md. 756 (1973); see a/so MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 10-913 (1989) (providing for exclusion of evidence of financial
worth of defendant until "there has been a finding of liability and that punitive
damages are supportable under the facts").
202. Braley V. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 359 (Me. 1982); see a/so State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. CO. V. Daughdrill, 474 So. 2d 1048, 1052 (Miss. 1985)
("Imagine therefore the quantity of an award from an uninsured financial
derelict with little, if any net worth. ").
203. See, e.g., Mullins V. Miller, 683 S.W.2d 669, 673 (Tenn. 1984) (Drowota, J.,
dissenting).
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exclusion, if it exists, must be found in the purpose of the uninsured
motorist statute.
Indeed, the ultimate resolution of the punitive damages issue
may depend on what the court of special appeals has called "the
elusive creature known as 'legislative intent."'204 The primary source
of legislative intent is the language of the statute,20S but the language
of the uninsured motorist statute is hardly conclusive. "Damages"
seemingly encompasses all damages. 206 The phrase "because of bodily
injury" is arguably more restrictive, and other courts have construed
it as covering only compensatory damages. In Braley v. Berkshire
Mutual Insurance Co., 207 for instance, the Supreme Court of Maine
held that the phrase excluded coverage for punitive damages, reasoning that punitive damages are not awarded as compensation because
of bodily injury even though proof of some injury is generally a
prerequisite for an award of punitive damages. 2os According to the
court, punitive damages were awarded "'for the protection of society
and societal order' ... and to deter similar misconduct by the
defendant and others."209
The Braley court's reasoning is consistent with Maryland's view
of punitive damages. 21o If "because of" means "as a result of," then

204. McMichael v. Robertson, 77 Md. App. 208,209,549 A.2d 1157, 1158 (1988).
205. See, e.g., Insurance Comm'r v. Property & Cas. Ins. Guar. Corp., 313 Md.
458, 463, 546 A.2d 458, 463 (1988) (citing Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore,
309 Md. 505, 525 A.2d 628 (1987». A court, however, is "not limited to the
words of the statute but may consider other external manifestations or persuasive evidence, including related statutes, pertinent legislative history and other
material, that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or
goal." [d.
206. The court of appeals has noted that "[u]nfortunately terms like 'injury,' 'actual
injury,' 'damage' and 'harm' are used in different decisions, and often within
the same decision, to represent different concepts." Hearst Corp. v. Hughes,
297 Md. 112, 118, 466 A.2d 486, 489 (1983).
207. 440 A.2d 359 (Me. 1982).
208. [d. at 361. Maine's uninsured motorist statute required insurers to cover
"damages for bodily injury." The policy in question covered "damages ...
because of bodily injury." The court did not discuss whether there was any
difference between the statute's use of jor and the policy's use of because, but
the former seems more restrictive than the latter.
209. [d. at 361 (quoting Kaklegian v. Zakarian, 123 A. 900 (Me. 1924».
210. The court of special appeals has explained that:
Punitive damages are inherently different from compensatory damages
and the reasons for the award of each differ sharply. The award of
compensatory damages is an attempt to make the plaintiff whole again
by monetary compensation. In contrast, the award of punitive damages
does not attempt to compensate the plaintiff for harm suffered by
him but rather is exemplary in nature and is over and above any
award of compensatory damages. The fundamental purpose of a
punitive damage award is to punish the wrongdoer for misconduct
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punitive damages result, not from the bodily injuries, but from the'
conduct of the tort feasor. 211 Nevertheless, the exclusion of punitive
damages under Maryland's uninsured motorist statute is not a fait
accompli. At best, the phrase "damages ... because of bodily
injury" is susceptible to more than one interpretation, and there is
some indication that Maryland courts would construe it to cover
punitive damages. 212 Reading the uninsured motorist statute as a
whole suggests that punitive damages are covered. The act allows
recovery even if the tortfeasor acted intentionally. 213 Also, the absence
and to deter future egregious conduct by others.
Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 69 Md. App. 125, 137, 516 A.2d 990, 997 (1986).
Furthermore, "punitive damages may not be awarded absent compensatory
damages." Id. at 138, 516 A.2d at 997.
211. In his dissent in Mullins v. Miller, Justice Drowota wrote:
It would appear that the language of the [Tennessee] statute, "damages
... because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death,
resulting therefrom," more properly describes compensatory than
punitive damages since "because of" means "by reason of' or "on
account of." Punitive damages are not strictly speaking damages
awarded "because of bodily injury" but because of intentional, willful
or grossly negligent acts of the tort feasor .
Mullins v. Miller, 683 S.W.2d 669,673 (Tenn. 1984) (Drowota, J., dissenting).
212. In First National Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228,
232, 389 A.2d 359, 362 (1978), the court cited with favor Southern Farm
Bureau Casualty Insurance v. Daniel, 440 S.W.2d 582 (Ark. 1969). In Daniel,
the court stated:
When we consider that under our law, one cannot become legally
obligated to pay punitive damages unless actual damages have been
sustained and assessed, we find that punitive damages constitute a
sum which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages
because of bodily injuries sustained.
Daniel, 440 S.W.2d at 584 (citing Carroway v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 908 (S.C.
1965».
213. The definition of "accident" under MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 538(a) (1991),
indicates that the uninsured motorist statute requires coverage for injuries
received by an insured as a result of an assault and battery arising out of the
use, operation or maintenance of an automobile: an accident "means any
occurrence involving a motor vehicle, other than an occurrence caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured, from which damage to any
property or injury to any person results." Id. Clearly, when an insured is
assaulted, and a motor vehicle is used as the instrument of the assault, the
insured's injuries are covered. A non-vehicular assault is another matter,
however, one wherein the insured must show a close connection between the
uninsured vehicle and the intentional tort. See Elliot v. Jamestown Mut. Ins.
Co., 27 Md. App. 566, 342 A.2d 319 (1975). The majority of cases involving
intentional injuries are outside coverage because the injuries do not arise out
of the use of the motor vehicle. But cj. Frazier v. Unsatisfied Claim &
Judgment Bd., 262 Md. 115, 277 A.2d 57 (1971) (finding that injuries sustained
by mother and child when unidentified person in another automobile threw a
firecracker into their car arose in the "ownership, operation or use" of
unidentified motor vehicle).
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of a clear statutory exclusion should not be ignored. 214 If the legislature had wanted to exclude punitive damages, it could have expressly done SO.215
The structure of Maryland's comprehensive insurance scheme
manifests a clear legislative intent that all damages that can legally
be recovered under a liability policy should also be recoverable under
an uninsured motorist policy.216 Most automobile liability policies do
not exclude coverage for punitive damages. 217 An anomalous situation
arises when the liability portion covers punitive damages, but the
uninsured motorist portion does not. The insured would have been
better off had he been injured by an insured motorist. 218 The opposite

214. In St. Mary's, the court noted that "when the General Assembly has desired
to forbid protection by insurance from the equivalent of exemplary damages,
it has done so explicitly." 283 Md. at 239, 389 A.2d at 365. But see Laird v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 134 S.E.2d 206 (S.C. 1964), wherein the Supreme Court
of South Carolina held that the intent of the South Carolina uninsured motorist
statute was to cover only compensatory damages:
There is no provision in the Uninsured Motorist Statutes which, either
expressly or by implication, requires that the uninsured motorist
endorsement must insure against any and all liability. There is nothing
said or implied that the insurer would be liable for punitive or
exemplary damages. If such damages had been in contemplation of
the Legislature, it could have easily provided therefor in said statutes.
[d. at 210. The South Carolina legislature later amended the uninsured motorist
statute to require coverage for punitive damages. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 3877-30(4) (Law. Co-op. 1976) (defining damages to include both actual and
punitive damages).
215. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-399.2(a)(I) (Supp. 1992) (providing
specifically that immunity of State not waived with regard to punitive damages);
see a/so MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-104(b) (1989 & Supp. 1992)
(same).
216. Forbes v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 322 Md. 689, 709-10, 589 A.2d 944, 954
(1991) (finding uninsured motorist statute to be designed to place the injured
insured in the same position he would have been in had the tortfeasor
maintained liability insurance); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md.
721, 737, 436 A.2d 465, 474-75 (1981); cj. Mullins v. Miller, 683 S.W.2d 669,
670 (Tenn. 1984) (finding that the Tennessee legislature intended for uninsured
motorist coverage to mirror liability coverage).
217. Liability coverage for punitive damages is not addressed by either the financial
responsibility provisions or the motor vehicle casualty insurance provisions.
The Insurance Services Office does not produce any specific form excluding
punitive damages from the liability portion of the policy, thus leaving the
decision to each insurer. See·Letter, supra note 39.
218. As the Supreme Court of Tennessee explained:
It seems illogical to us, for example, that an insured motorist could
recover $10,000 in compensatory damages and $40,000 in punitive
damages if he were struck by an insured drunken driver with $50,000
limits, but that he could only recover $10,000 if he were struck by
an uninsured drunken driver, even though the insured's own policy
provides limits of $50,000 for damages caused by an uninsured mo-
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is true if uninsured motorist coverage covers punitive damages, but
liability coverage does not.219 Logic and the reasonable expectations
of the insured dictate a consistency between the two coverages, and
public policy suggests punitive damages should be covered under both
liability and uninsured motorist coverages.
Many of the courts that have rejected the availability of punitive
damages in uninsured motorist coverage have relied on public policy
considerations. The Braley court, for instance, justified its decision
by reasoning that not only was the purpose of the uninsured motorist
statute to compensate, but also that the purposes of punitive damages
(to punish the wrongdoer and to deter others) were not accomplished
if recovery does not come from the wrongdoer. 220 Other courts have
expressed similar reasoning. 221 Most of these jurisdictions also prohibit coverage of punitive damages under a liability policy on similar
grounds. 222 Maryland, however, has rejected the "lack-of-deterrence"
reasoning in regard to whether punitive damages are covered by a
liability policy. In First National Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co.,m the court of appeals considered whether a comprehensive liability policy issued to a bank covered punitive damages.
The policy provided coverage for all damages "because of injury. "224

219.

220.
221.
222.
223.

224.

torist. We do not believe that this result was envisioned or intended
by the General Assembly in requiring underwriters to offer increased
limits equivalent to those carried in liability insurance policies.
Mullins, 683 S.W.2d at 670.
See California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Carter, 210 Cal. Rptr.
140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding punitive damages not allowed under uninsured motorist coverage because such damages were excluded under liability
coverage: allowing them in uninsured motorist coverage would place the insured
in a better position under uninsured motorist coverage). Virginia evidently
allows this situation, which one commentator has called "bizarre." See Gary
T. Schwartz, A Proposal for Tort Reform: Reformulating Uninsured Motorist
Plans, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 419, 428 (1987).
Braley v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 359, 362 (Me. 1982).
E.g., Burns v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 360 N.W.2d 61 (Wis. 1984).
Mississippi is an exception, holding that punitive damages are covered by a
liability policy but are excluded by the uninsured motorist statute. See State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Daughdrill, 474 So. 2d 1048 (Miss. 1985).
283 Md. 228, 232, 389 A.2d 359, 361-62 (1978). For a detailed discussion of
St. Mary's, see Mark C. Treanor, Mischief with Malice: A Review of Liability
for Punitive Damages and the Insured's Right to Indemnity Against an Exemplary A ward, 8 U. BALT. L. REv. 222 (1979).
The court did not address the language of the liability policy because of a
procedural matter, but did state that "[i]n this instance we have examined the
policy provision in question and conclude that if the matter were properly
before us we would hold that the trial judge did not err in determining that
its provisions embraced an award for exemplary damages." St. Mary's, 283
Md. at 231, 389 A.2d at 361. Because the term "damages" was not defined
by the policy, and no specific provision excluded punitive damages, the court
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In holding that insurance coverage for punitive damages was not
against public policy, the court concluded that even though an insurer
may ultimately be responsible for paying the punitive damages, the
punitive damages award still retained its deterrent function because
the insured would pay higher premiums and would have difficulty
obtaining insurance. 225
There are, admittedly, substantial underwriting differences between liability coverage and uninsured motorist coverage. Some commentators argue that the deterrent effect of higher premiums on the
tort feasor is not present in the uninsured motorist context because
the victim, not the tort feasor , ultimately bears the cost of the higher
premiums. 226 It is true that charging higher uninsured motorist premiums to cover the risk of punitive damages does not deter uninsured
tortfeasors, and, essentially, punishes the insurance buying public as
a whole. 227 It is equally true, however, that the uninsured motorist

held that the policy covered punitive damages. The court stated as follows:
[l]nsurance companies have not shown a reluctance in the past to
write into their policies such restrictions as they deem to be in their
best interest, yet no restriction relative to the issue at bar appears in
the policy issued by [the insurer.] Surely ... these companies have
been cognizant of the fact that they might be called upon to pay an
award [of punitive damages] such as that at issue in this case. As a
consequence, they probably have considered such a possibility in
establishing rates.
Id. at 242-43, 389 A.2d at 367. Even if punitive damages could be excluded
from coverage, see supra note 215, St. Mary's suggests that punitive damages
must be specifically excluded. See supra note 223.
225. According to the court,
[i]t cannot properly be said that permitting payment of exemplary
damages by an insurance company eliminates deterrence, notwithstanding the fact the loss is thus spread across a number of policy holders
through the payment of premiums. This is so because those who are
demonstrated by experience to be poor risks encounter substantial
difficulty in obtaining insurance, a fact such persons know.
St. Mary's, 283 Md. at 242, 389 A.2d at 366.
226. See, e.g., David Leitner, Punitive Damages and First Party Automobile Liability
Insurance Coverages, 54 DEF. COUNS. J. 112, 119 (1987). Leitner argues that
the insurer's underwriting function is totally absent from the uninsured motorist
situation because the insurer cannot, by reference to the uninsured motorist,
decide the risk of loss. In the liability context, the insurer is able to judge the
risk of the insured's exposure to punitive damages by reference to the insured
and can underwrite the policy accordingly. The uninsured motorist, in contrast,
is clearly beyond the reach of the insurer's underwriting function. Neither the
insured nor the insurer control his actions, and the insurer cannot project the
risk of loss and assess higher premiums in the same manner that it would
under a liability policy. The insurer, therefore, must spread the risk of loss by
raising uninsured motorist premiums.
227. Leitner, supra note 226, at 119.
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insurer's ability to pursue the tort feasor via its subrogation right has
significant deterrent potential. 228
Several courts have suggested that the deterrent effect from the
insurer's pursuing its subrogation rights against the uninsured tortfeasor is negligible because the subrogation claim is more theoretical
than real. 229 Such criticism is unfounded, for the insurer's ability to
recover via subrogation is more real than what might be expected. 230
If anything, the presence of punitive damages increases the insurer's
ability to recover because the grossly negligent uninsured motorist
will not be able to extinguish the judgment through bankruptcy. 231
He is, therefore, not as collection proof as might be imagined.
Furthermore, every judgment against an uninsured motorist in Maryland has some deterrent effect.232 Finally, the stigma attached to
228. E.g., Hutchinson v. J. C. Penny Cas. Ins. Co., 478 N.E.2d 1000 (Ohio 1985).
The subrogation right certainly has more potential to achieve the desired
deterrence than raising the tortfeasor's premiums in the context of a liability
policy. After all, the uninsured motorist will be saddled with the judgment,
which will be significantly more than a relatively small premium hike. In his
dissent in St. Mary's, Judge Levine wrote:
It is probably true that poor risks will be required to pay higher
premiums to acquire the desired coverage and that this ostensibly will
have a slight deterrent effect. But the impact of a hike in insurance
premiums payable over the course of several months and probably
deductible for income tax purposes, plainly will be far less than that
caused by a lump sum judgment for which the defendant is solely
responsible. It is precisely the threat of sudden and severe economic
loss which lends credibility to the deterrence theory of punitive damages.
St. Mary's, 283 Md. at 249, 389 A.2d at 370 (Levine, J., dissenting).
229. E.g., Braley v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 440 A.2d 359, 363 (Me. 1982); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Daughdrill, 474 So. 2d 1048 (Miss. 1985).
230. In a 1955 letter to insurance companies, the New York Superintendent of
Insurance indicated that the New York Department of Motor Vehicles had
estimated that "33 1/3 percent recovery could be had from culpable uninsured
motorists." Calvin M. George, Answering Inquires Caused by Uninsured
Motorist, 1956 INS. L.J. 715, 718. Other courts indicate that insurance companies overrate the value of subrogation. See, e.g., Sahloff v. Western Cas. &
Sur. Co., 171 N.W.2d 914 (Wis. 1969).
231. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988) (providing that an individual debtor is not
discharged from any debt "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to
another entity or to the property of another entity"); see also id. § 523(a)(9)
(1988 & Supp. 1991) (providing that debtor cannot extinguish a judgment
arising out of his operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated). Under
the bankruptcy code, an entity includes a person. Id. § 101(15) (Supp. 1991).
In Maryland, punitive damages can no longer be based on driving while
intoxicated absent a showing of actual malice. See Komornik v. Sparks, 331
Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993).
232. If the insurer obtains a judgment against the tort feasor , the insurer, the motor
vehicle administration, upon proper application by the insurer, may suspend
the tortfeasor's driver's license and vehicle registration. MD. CODE ANN.,
TRANsP. § 17-204 (1992).
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punitive damages has some deterrent value. Thus, there is no overriding public policy in Maryland that suggests that uninsured motorist
benefits be limited to compensatory damages;233 rather there is a
stronger public policy to cover punitive damages under both liability
and uninsured motorist coverages than to exclude them.234
Although the punitive damage issue awaits judicial resolution,
recent changes in the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement
bring the issue to center stage. Until January 1988, the Maryland
Uninsured Motorist Endorsement did not expressly exclude punitive
damages. The earlier versions of the Maryland Uninsured Motorist
Endorsement mirrored the statute's provision that the insured was
legally entitled to recover "damages ... because of bodily injury."23s
The 1966 Standard Form likewise did not expressly limit the insurer's
indemnification duty.236 Beginning in January 1988, however, punitive
damages under the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement were
excluded by a separate amendatory endorsement. 237 This exclusion
was incorporated into the 1989 Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement,238 which also limits the insured's recovery to "compensatory damages" in the granting clause. 239 The 1989 Maryland

233.

234.

235.

236.

237.
238.
239.

ct. Home Indem. Co. v. Tyler, 522 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975)
("There is no public policy against an insurance company's promise to pay an
insured the amount which the insured party has become entitled to recover
because of the recklessness of some [uninsured] third party. The plaintiffs in
this case have been adjudged to be legally entitled to recover exemplary damages
from the operator of the uninsured automobile and it is the insurer's contractual
obligation to pay those exemplary damages. ").
In St. Mary's, the court suggested that public policy demanded coverage of
punitive damages, noting that the community as a whole "would be outraged
and have substantial difficulty in comprehending reasons for a holding to the
contrary." First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md.
228, 241, 389 A.2d 359, 366 (1978).
The earlier versions of the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement stated
that the insurer would pay "damages which a covered person is legally entitled
to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because
of ... [b]odily injury." ISO Form PP 04 59 02 82, I. Part C - Uninsured
Motorist Coverage.
The 1966 Standard Form states that the insurer will "pay all sums which the
insured . . . shall be legally entitled to recover as damages . . . because of
bodily injury ... sustained by the insured." Arguably, the 1966 Standard
Form's use of "all sums" is broader than the pre-1988 versions of the Maryland
Uninsured Motorist Endorsement's use of "damages." The 1989 Commercial
Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement also uses the phrase "all sums."
Letter, supra note 39. This endorsement bears a PP 04 05 1 88 identification.
The endorsement states that the insurer does "not provide Uninsured Motorists
Coverage for punitive or exemplary damages."
The granting clause in the 1989 Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement
provides that:
We will pay compensatory damages which an "insured" is legally

1992]

Uninsured Motorist Coverage

219

Uninsured Motorist Endorsement's attempt to limit the insurer's
liability to compensatory damages is its most significant provision,
but it remains to be seen whether the 1989 Maryland Uninsured
Motorist Endorsement is consistent with the statute. 240
VIII. INSUREDS
The uninsured motorist statute requires coverage for damages
which the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle" because of
1. "Bodily injury" sustained by an "insured" and caused by
an accident;
2. "Property damage" caused by an accident. Only sections
I., 2., 4., and 5., of the definition of "uninsured motor
vehicle" apply to "property damage."
The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must
arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the "uninsured motor vehicle." We will pay under this coverage only
after the limits of liability under any applicable liability bonds
or policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or
settlements.
ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C - Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Insuring
Agreement (emphasis added).
240. A policy inconsistent with the statute is void. E.g., Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 416 A.2d 734 (1980); see also supra
note II and accompanying text. Assuming that the statute does not require
coverage for punitive damages, then the specific exclusion of punitive damages
in the 1989 Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement is proper and enforceable. See supra note 239. A judicial finding that the statutory phrase "damages
... because of bodily injury" is susceptible to more than one interpretation,
however, could perhaps result in the inclusion of punitive damages if the p,olicy
fails to contain a specific exclusion. For example, despite an insurer's use of
the identical statutory language in the policy, a court may arrive at a different
result in interpreting the contract language because of the doctrine of contra
proferentum. Although the rules of statutory and contract construction are
virtually identical, the court may, under certain circumstances, construe ambiguous language in a contract against the insurer, which drafted the policy.
Thus, the identical language may result in a finding that the statute requires
coverage only for compensatory damages but that the policy provides coverage
for punitive damages because it fails to exclude them in clear and unmistakable
terms. In Mullins v. Miller, 683 S.W.2d 669 (Tenn. 1984), for example, the
court stated:
Again, if the uninsured motorist statutes themselves should be construed as not to require coverage for punitive damages as a matter of
law, it would be a very simple matter for insurance carriers to so
write their policies as to limit insurance coverage to compensatory
damages only, if permitted by the Commissioner. The present policy
contains no such limitations but obligates the insurance carrier to pay
all sums which the insured is legally entitled to recover from an
uninsured motorist. In our opinion this coverage includes awards of
punitive damages up to the policy limits.
[d. at 671; see supra note 219.
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of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries. 241 The
uninsured motorist statute also requires coverage for damages that
the insured's surviving relatives are entitled to recover under Maryland's Wrongful Death Act. 242 The statute does not define "insured,"
but does define "named insured. "243 The differentiation is significant,
revealing the intent to extend uninsured motorist coverage to the
named insured's resident relatives and permissive users of the insured
vehicle. Certainly, the interplay between the uninsured motorist statute and the Transportation Article's financial responsibility provisions
demands that omnibus insureds under the liability provisions of the
policy be covered under the uninsured motorist endorsement. 244 At
least one opinion supports this conclusion. 245 The uninsured motorist
statute, however, clearly broadens the group of persons protected
beyond omnibus insureds by requiring coverage for non-relative
passengers, not just non-relative operators. 246 The statute also im-

241. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2)(i) (Supp. 1992).
242. [d. § 541 (c)(2)(ii).
243. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 538(c) (1991) (defining "named insured" as "the
person denominated in the declarations in a policy of motor vehicle liability
insurance"). Section 539 uses "first named insured," but does not define that
term. [d. § 539 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
244. There is no express statutory requirement that an automobile liability policy
contain an omnibus provision protecting those persons operating the vehicle
with the express or implied permission of the named insured. National Grange
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pinkney, 284 Md. 694, 704, 399 A.2d 877, 882 (1979). The
requirement of an omnibus provision flows naturally, however, from the
financial responsibility provisions. Moreover, the insurance commissioner will
not approve any policy without an omnibus clause. Maryland Indem. Ins. Co.
v. Komke, 21 Md. App. 178, 180 n.3, 319 A.2d 603, 605 n.3 (1974) (citing
Mt. Beacon Ins. Co. v. Williams, 296 F. Supp. 1094 (D. Md. 1969».
245. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 43 Md. App. 413, 421
n.3, 405 A.2d 779, 785 n.3 (1979) (quoting with approval State Farm Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Reaves, 292 So. 2d 95 (Ala. 1974», a/I'd, 288 Md. 151,416 A.2d
734 (1980). In Reaves, the court stated "[w]hile we do not read the statute as
requiring every automobile liability insurance policy to include an 'omnibus
clause,' nevertheless once an automobile liability policy is issued extending
coverage to a certain class of insureds under such a clause, uninsured motorist
coverage must be offered to cover the same class of insureds." Reaves, 292
So. 2d at 99; accord Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Schneider, 58 Md. App. 690,
474 A.2d 224 (1984) (declining on procedural grounds to decide whether
someone listed as an occasional young driver on his mother's policy was
afforded uninsured motorist protection while occupying another vehicle).
246. The uninsured motorist statute does not expressly require coverage for passengers. This, however, is clearly the intent. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§
541(c)(v)(I)-(2) (Supp. 1992) (providing that passengers may be excluded under
certain circumstances, suggesting that occupants must be covered under all
other circumstances); see also id. § 543(c) (1991) (providing that a passenger's
uninsured motorist policy will apply as primary coverage when that person is
occupying a vehicle not covered by uninsured motorist insurance).
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plicitly requires coverage for persons who have derivative claims for
consequential damages as a result of bodily injuries. 247 Consistent
with the statute, the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement
specifically establishes three classes of persons' ability to recover
under the policy. 248 This classification also accounts for the surviving

247. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 54l(c)(2)(i) (Supp. 1992), states that the uninsured
motorist insurance must cover damages ''It]he insured is entitled to recover
from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily
injuries sustained in an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or
use of such uninsured motor vehicle." It does not state that uninsured motorist
insurance covers only "damages which the insured is entitled to recover from
the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries
sustained [by that insured] in an accident." The intentional ambiguity (i.e.,
"sustained" by whom?) is significant, revealing an intent to extend uninsured
motorist insurance to derivative claims. C/. Forbes v. Harleysville Mut. Ins.
Co., 322 Md. 689, 709-10, 589 A.2d 944, 948 (1991) (stating that the uninsured
motorist statute is designed to place the injured insured in the same position
he would have been in had the tort feasor maintained liability insurance). The
Maryland Endorsement granting clause is consistent with this interpretation. It
states that:
[The insurer] will pay compensatory damages which an "insured"
is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
"uninsured motor vehicle" because of:
(I) "Bodily injury" sustained by an "insured" and caused by an
accident ....
ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C - Uninsured Motorist's Coverage, Insuring
Agreement (emphasis added). The coverage of the 1966 Standard Form granting
clause is narrower:
The company will pay all sums which the insur~d or his legal
representative shall be legally entitled to recover ~ damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle because of bodily
injury sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured highway
vehicle ....
1966 Standard Form, 2 WIDISS, supra note 19, app. A, at 25 (emphasis added).
Several modified versions of the 1966 Standard Form eliminated the prepositional phrase "by the insured."
248. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has noted that "[i]nsurance policies,
like the regulations of the Internal Revenue Service, are often not the easiest
things to read and understand. Definitions tend to chase each other." Erie
Ins. Exch. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 63 Md. App. 612, 616, 493 A.2d 405, 407
(1985). The definition of "insured" under the Maryland Uninsured Motorist
Endorsement is a prime example. It reads as follows:
"Insured" as used in this endorsement means:
l. You or any "family member."
2. Any other person "occupying your covered auto."
3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover
because of "bodily injury" to which this coverage applies
sustained by a person described in l. or 2. above.
ISO Form PP 04 59 1289, I. Part C - Uninsured Motorists Coverage, Insuring
Agreement. The definitions section of the Personal Auto Policy defines "you"
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relatives entitled to recover when an insured is killed by an uninsured
motor vehicle.

A.

Clause 1 Insureds

The first class of insureds, called "clause 1 insureds," consists
of the named insured, the named insured's spouse, and members of
the named insured's household.249 Many of the terms used in defining
the boundaries of clause 1 - spouse, resident, family, household have been the subject of litigation in Maryland. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland has said that the phrase "resident of the same household" is not ambiguous. "The words themselves are clear, simple
and in general use. Put together they express a simple, homely,
familiar concept. "250 The court of appeals has also defined "household" to mean "all dwellers in a house under the common control
of one person."251 In the court of appeals' view, "family" has been
viewed as synonymous with "household. "252
The coverage granted to clause 1 insureds is personal and comprehensive: it does not run with the insured vehicle. Rather, the
policy covers clause 1 insureds in a variety of situations: when they
are occupying a vehicle insured under the policy, when they are
occupying most other vehicles, when they are riding bicycles, and
when they are pedestrians. 2S3 The two exclusions expressly authorized

249.

250.
251.
252.

253.

as the named insured and the named insured's spouse "if a resident of the
same household." ISO Form PP 00 01 12 89, Definitions. "Family member"
is defined as "a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is
a resident of your household. This includes a ward or foster child." [d.
"Occupying" is defined as "in, upon, getting in, on, out or off." [d. These
definitions are applicable to the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement.
The 1966 Standard Forni used three clauses, (a), (b), and (c) to delineate the
categories of insureds. Commentators generally follow these classifications. The
1956 Standard Form used 1, 2, and 3. In the 2/82 and 6/83 versions of the
Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, the term "insured" was replaced
by "covered person." The 6/80 version of the Personal Auto Policy also used
the phrase "covered person" in Part C.
Peninsula Ins. Co. v. Knight, 254 Md. 462, 477, 255 A.2d 55, 63 (1969).
Rydstrom v. Queen Ins. Co. of Am., 137 Md. 349, 353, 112 A. 586, 587
(1921).
Pearre v. Smith, 110 Md. 531, 534, 73 A. 141, 142 (1909) ("The word
'family' ... has a variety of meanings according to the connection in which
it is used, and it should be so construed in each case as to give it the
significance appropriate to its use .... The words 'family' and 'household'
are often interchangeably used. "). But see Hicks v. Hatem, 265 Md. 260, 267,
289 A.2d 325, 328 (1972) ("[T]he use of both of the words 'family' and
'household' in the [household] exclusionary clause leads us to believe that they
were not intended to be used in a synonymous fashion.").
See generally 1 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 4.2.
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by section S41(c)(2) limit the comprehensive coverage extended to
clause 1 insureds. 254

B.

Clause 2 Insureds
Under the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, "clause

2 insureds" are all persons "occupying" an insured motor vehicle.2SS

This includes both non-resident relative operators and non-relative
resident passengers. 256 Whether a person is occupying a vehicle is
important not only in determining coverage, but also in deciding
priority of coverage. 257 The judicial treatment of occupancy, more
than any other issue, with the exception of stacking of coverages,258
demonstrates the remedial nature of uninsured motorist coverage.
Courts have endeavored to provide uninsured motorist benefits to an
innocent victim, either by contorting the concept of "occupancy,"
or by employing the doctrine of contra proferentum.
Maryland's uninsured motorist statute does not define "occupying. "259 The Personal Auto Policy defines "occupying" as "in,
upon, getting in, on, out or off" an automobile. 260 The definition
has not received much judicial treatment. The 1966 Standard Form
definition - "in or upon, entering into or alighting from" - did,
however, receive attention from the courts. 261 In particular, the words
"in or upon, entering into or alighting from" are not synonymous;
each is meant to broaden the ambit of coverage in some respect.
Some courts have found the 1966 Standard Form definition ambig254. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2)(v)(I), (2) (Supp. 1992).
255. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text. Persons claiming as clause 2
insureds must be occupying an insured vehicle under the policy. See Erie Ins.
Exch. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 63 Md. App. 612, 616, 493 A.2d 405, 407 (1985)
(finding passenger in vehicle operated by non permissive user not occupying an
insured vehicle).
256. Resident relative operators and passengers would qualify under clause I.
257. See infra notes 431, 436 and accompanying text.
258. See infra notes 365-66 and accompanying text.
259. See Dejarnette v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 299 Md. 708, 475 A.2d 454 (1984).
In Dejarnette, the court noted that
neither occupy [n]or use is contained in the definition section of the
[uninsured motorist] statute. Neither are they defined in the Transportation Article section II-WI, et seq. "We have repeatedly stated
that where the legislature has chosen not to define a term used in a
statute, that term should, .. . be given its ordinary and natural
meaning." By not defining these words in the statute, there is nothing
to indicate the legislature "intended to express a technical meaning."
Id. at 717, 475 A.2d at 458-59 (citations omitted). Some state statutes do define
occupying, but the definitions usually mirror the 1966 Standard Form definition.
See 2 No-Fault and Uninsured Automobile Insurance § 24.10(3)(b)(i) (1993).
260. ISO Form PP 00 01 12 89, Definitions.
261. See I WIDISS, supra note 19, § 5.2.
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uous. More precisely, the word "upon" is usually the most troublesome part of the definition.262 Neither the Personal Auto Policy
definition, nor the 1966 Standard Form definition has been given a
specific construction by the Maryland courts;263 nor is it certain
whether the Maryland courts would deem it ambiguous. 264 Courts in
other jurisdictions have approached the issue of occupancy in various
ways. The most definite test requires physical contact between the
victim and the insured vehicle. 265 It is an imperfect, often capricious
guide, and has thus been implicitly rejected by the Court of Appeals
of Maryland. 266
In Goodwin v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 267 Raymond
Goodwin drove his wife, Mildred, and five passengers - Effie and
Webster Cooper, Marie and Earl Kronau, and Virginia Blum - to
a wedding reception in his vehicle.268 Mr. Goodwin parked his vehicle
262. In Michigan Mutual Insurance Co. v. Combs, 446 N.E.2d. 1001 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1983), the court held that the meaning of "upon" a vehicle was to be
liberally construed. As such, the court found that Michael Combs, who was
helping his brother, Cannon, fIx Cannon's car, which Cannon had parked on
the side of the road, was "occupying" Cannon's vehicle when he was working
on the distributor of the motor and only his knees rested on the bumper. In
so holding, the court rested its decision on the policy of contra proferentum,
finding that the phrase "upon" a vehicle was ambiguous. The Combs court
specifically rejected the "physical contact" rule, and adopted the "reasonable
relationship" test, stating that it is the claimant's relationship with the insured
automobile that determines whether the claimant was "upon" the automobile
so as to have been "occupying" it for purposes of coverage. Id. at 1006.
Similarly, in Manning v. Summit Home Insurance Co., 623 P.2d 1235 (Ariz.
Ct. Ap·p. 1980), the court held that a person standing fIve feet from the rear
of the insured vehicle, but helping the insured put snow chains on the tires,
was "upon" the vehicle, and, therefore, an insured under the uninsured
motorist provision of the policy. The Manning court, like the Combs court,
found that the term "upon" was ambiguous and construed the policy against
the drafter. Id. at 1238.
263. But see infra notes 267-81 and accompanying text.
264. Maryland courts have consistently held that language in insurance contracts
must be given its customary and normal meaning. Dejarnette v. Federal Kemper
Ins. Co., 299 Md. 708, 717, 475 A.2d 454, 460-61 (1984). Moreover, when the
language in an insurance policy is plain and unambiguous, there is no room
for construction. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542, 545, 365 A.2d
1000, 1003 (1976).
265. 2 No-FAULT AND UNINSURED MOTORIST AUToMoBnE INSURANCE § 24.10(3)(b)(i)
(1993).
266. Cf. Contrisciane v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 459 A.2d 358, 360 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1983) ("The decedent was 'using' the motor vehicle when he left his passenger
in the vehicle to go and exchange information with [the other driver] and the
police offIcer and must, therefore, be found to have been 'occupying' the
vehicle at that time. Any other interpretation of the term 'occupying' would
be in derogation of and repugnant to the Uninsured Motorist Act. ").
267. 199 Md. 121, 85 A.2d 759 (1952).
268. Id. at 123, 85 A.2d at 760.
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on a one way street with the driver's side to the curb.269 After the
reception, the seven individuals started to return to the parked vehicle,
but Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Cooper and Mr. Kronau were detained. 270
Mr. Goodwin gave the keys to Mrs. Blum, who returned to the
vehicle with the other women.271 Mrs. Blum unlocked the right front
door and was reaching inside the car to unlock the back door, when
another automobile sideswiped the Goodwin vehicle and struck all
four women.272 At the time of impact, Mrs. Goodwin was standing
behind Mrs. Blum, holding the right front door open. 273 Mrs. Cooper
had her hand on the handle of the right rear door, waiting for Mrs.
Blum to unlock it, and Mrs. Kronau was standing behind Mrs.
Goodwin. 274
The women made claims under the medical payment provision
of Mr. Goodwin's automobile policy,275 which provided coverage for
bodily injury caused "'while in or upon, entering or alighting from'"
the insured automobile. 276 Goodwin's insurer, Lumbermen's, denied
coverage, arguing that the women were not occupying the vehicle at
the time of the accident. 277 The trial court held in favor of the
insurer,278 but the court of appeals reversed,279 ruling that all four
women were occupying the vehicle at the time of the accident. 280
After conceding that the women were neither "in" nor "alighting
from" the vehicle, the court wrestled with the meanings of "upon"
and "entering." The court stated that:
A technical approach to the problem necessarily leads to difficulty.
Viewed in such a light, a person might have to be actually partly in,
or upon, the car before he could be considered to be entering it. But
he is covered not only when "in" or "upon", but also while
"entering." The terms are not synonymous, although sometimes two
of them may cover the same situation. A person getting in might be
completely inside the car. In that case, he would be both "entering"
and "in." On the other hand, he might be partly in and partly out,
in which case he would be covered by the word "upon", and also

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 124, 85 A.2d at 760.
at 125, 85 A.2d at
at 124, 85 A.2d at
at 125, 85 A.2d at
at 122, 85 A.2d at
(quoting policy).
at 127, 85 A.2d at
at 123, 85 A.2d at
at 132, 85 A.2d at
at 125, 85 A.2d at

760.
760.
760.
760.
762.
760.
764.
761.
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might be covered by the word "entering," or by the word "alighting," depending on which way he was going. 281 The court then ruled
that Mrs. Blum, who had unlocked the front door with the key and
was reaching in to unlock the rear door catch, was "upon" as well
as "entering into" the car. The other women, the court held, were
all "entering into" the car. 282
It is clear that the Goodwin court did not consider actual physical
contact to be determinative. 283 Mrs. Kronau, for example, was not
touching the vehicle at the time of the accident, yet she was still
covered under the policy. The opinion makes clear that two factors
are necessary for a person to qualify as an occupant. First, the
person must be in close proximity to the vehicle. Second, the person
must intend to use the vehicle as a passenger or a driver.
The Goodwin approach is consistent with the majority of states
that have considered the issue. The Goodwin two-factor test is,
however, essentially a restatement of the "intended use" test employed by other courtS.284 The "intended use" test, unfortunately,
can be as inflexible as the "physical contact" test. 28S Since the
281. [d. at 131, 85 A.2d at 763-64. The court's treatment of "upon" as meaning
"actually partly in" suggests that the word has a narrow meaning. But see
infra note 284.
282. According to the court, the women "had all completed their approach to the
car, they were not coming up to it with the purpose of entering it, they had
reached it, and they were actually engaged in the process of getting in."
Goodwin, 199 Md. at 131, 85 A.2d at 763-64.
283. In his concurring opinion, Judge Henderson wrote "I accept the court's rather
broad interpretation of the word 'entering,' as used in the policy, to cover the
case of Mrs. Kronau, who was certainly not touching the parked automobile
but had finished her approach to it." [d. at 133-34, 85 A.2d at 765 (Henderson,
J., concurring).
284. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bristow, 150 S.E.2d 125
(Va. 1966). In Bristow, the court held that the plaintiff, who was struck by
an uninsured vehicle while assisting another driver whose car had stalled, was
not "occupying" the stalled vehicle because he did not intend to use the stalled
vehicle as a passenger or driver. At the time of the impact, the plaintiff was
standing in front of the open hood of the stalled car and had his hands on
the engine wiring. According to the court, the word "upon" in an occupancy
provision must be read in relation to the word it defines ("occupying") and
to the other words in ·the provision ("in," "entering into," and "alighting
from") in which it is found. As the court stated:
Within the purposes contemplated here, a person may be said to be
"upon" a vehicle when he is in a status where he is not actually "in"
or is not in the act of "entering into or alighting from," the vehicle,
but whose connection therewith immediately relates to his "occupying"
it.
[d. at 128.
285. See Mondelli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 475 A.2d 76,79 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1984) (Petrella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
rev'd, 506 A.2d 728,731 (N.J. 1986) (adopting the dissenting opinion of Judge
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Goodwin decision nearly forty years ago, a third approach has gained
considerable acceptance. This approach is broader than the "physical
contact" and "intended use" tests, and requires only a reasonable
connection between the putative insured and the vehicle. 286
Courts embracing the "reasonable connection" standard examine
a variety of factors. The requirement of actual physical contact and
intended use are the two most important factors, but are not by
themselves conclusive. Rather, the courts balance the totality of
circumstances and decide the issue of occupancy on a case-by-case
basis.287 Given the remedial nature of Maryland's uninsured motorist
statute, the Maryland courts should not hesitate to adopt the more
liberal "reasonable connection" test. 288
C.

Clause 3 Insureds

The third class of insureds under the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement includes any person who is entitled to recover
damages because of "bodily injury" to a clause 1 or 2 insured.289
Clause 3 is specifically designed to bring under coverage those persons, such as a parent or a spouse, who have derivative claims
because of injuries received by a person who qualified as an insured
under clause 1 or 2.290 Maryland courts have not had the opportunity
to consider the scope of clause 3, and there is substantial difference
over its interpretation in other jurisdictions. 291 There is general agreement, however, that clause 3 provides a right of recovery under the
policy to parents who suffer economic damages because of bodily
injuries sustained by their minor children, or to a spouse who suffers

286.
287.
288.

289.
290.
291.

Petrella). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Petrella concluded that the test for
occupancy should not require "immediate use":
Many situations could arise where a person might be "upon" the
vehicle lawfully, although not "immediately" using it or intending to
use it for transportation, for example, repairing it, lashing baggage
to the top of the vehicle even though it was not intended to be used
that particular day or perhaps by that person as means of transportation.
Id. at 82.
See 2 No-Fault and Uninsured Automobile Insurance § 24.10(3)(b)(i) (1993).
See id. (noting that courts have also employed several other tests, including
the reasonable proximity test and the highway-or-vehicle oriented test).
But see Breard v. Haynes, 394 So. 2d 1282, 1284 (La. Ct. App.) ("While the
public policy is to extend uninsured motorist coverage so far as reasonable,
nevertheless, we believe that the insurer has the right to require at least a
'physical relationship' with the insured vehicle. "), cert. denied, 399 So. 2d 598
(La. 1981).
See ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C - Uninsured Motorists Coverage,
Insuring Agreement.
See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.32.
See id.
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economic damages because of bodily injuries sustained by the other
spouse. A historical basis exists for this interpretation. The 1956
Standard Form (predecessor to the 1966 Standard Form) defined
insured to include "any person, with respect to damages he is entitled
to recover jor care or loss oj services because of bodily injury to
which the endorsement applies. "292
Several courts have extended the scope of clause 3 beyond the
1956 Standard Form's "care and loss of services" language to include
non-economic losses. Indeed, one commentator argues that persons
such as "parents, guardians, executors, and administrators" as well
as "persons who pay the medical bills of an injured person, or suffer
damages that result from a wrongful death, are entitled to indemnification as 'clause 3' insureds."293 In Maryland, the breadth of
clause 3 is limited considerably by substantive legal rights. The first
question that must be addressed in evaluating clause 3 claims is
whether the clause 3 putative insured is legally entitled to recover
those damages under the law.
Under current Maryland law, for instance, a parent is entitled
to compensation for medical expenses and loss of services incurred
as a result of injuries sustained by the parent's minor child. 294 Such
a claim falls squarely within clause 3. A loss of consortium claim is
another claim that would be covered under clause 3. 295 Several
292. I WIDISS, supra note 19, § 6.1 n.2 (emphasis added). The terms of the 1966
Standard Form are not as explicit, but should be read in light of the 1956
Standard Form. [d. n.l. Widiss adds that" [i]n light of both the literal meaning
of the present 'clause (c)' and the terms of its precursor, it seems clear that
'clause (c)' means persons such as a parent or spouse are entitled to recover
for consequential damages including medical expenses or loss of services under
the uninsured motorist coverage." [d.
293. [d. § 6.1.
294. See Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961) (finding infant's
cause of action for his own personal injuries to be separate and distinct from
his parent's cause of action for medical expenses and lost services). The
pecuniary value of these services in modern society is questionable. Cf. Gaver
v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 32, 557 A.2d 210, 218 (l989) (noting that a minor
child is entitled to solatium damages under the wrongful death act because
"the 'pecuniary loss' rule, if strictly applied, could result in no recovery at all
if the victim was an unproductive member of society, very old or young, or
disabled").
295. A loss of consortium claim is clearly a "derivative" claim in the sense that it
derives from bodily injury to one spouse. In most jurisdictions, a consortium
claim falls within the ambit of clause 3. See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.20.
Maryland's theoretical view of a loss of consortium claim as a joint claim
brought by husband and wife presents a semantic hurdle to coverage. See
Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247 Md. 95, 114, 231 A.2d 514, 525 (1967). The
joint nature of a loss of consortium claim seemingly excludes the non-physically
injured spouse from coverage under a strict reading of clause 3 because the
non-physically injured spouse cannot bring the loss of consortium claim by
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derivative claims which would come under clause 3 in other jurisdictions, however, are not recognized in Maryland at the present time.
In Maryland, a minor child would not be able to recover for
loss of parental society and affection because of non-fatal injuries
to a parent;296 nor would a parent be able to recover for loss of filial
relations because of non-fatal injuries to a minor child. 297 Arguably,
a spouse may be entitled to recover for the loss of services resulting
from bodily injury to a physically injured partner, as well as for the
value of nursing services that the spouse renders to the physically
injured partner. 298 The law is somewhat uncertain as to whether "loss
of services" and "nursing service" claims are separate and distinct
from a loss of consortium claim. 299 If such a claim exists separate

296.
297.
298.
299.

herself. That is, the non-injured spouse is not a person entitled to consortium
damages because of bodily injuries to her spouse. Nevertheless, a more appropriate reading is to allow the consortium claim. The intent of the statute is to
extend coverage in this manner, and Maryland's view of a loss of consortium
claim indicates that, even though the claim is a joint action for damage to the
marital entity, its underlying purpose "is to compensate the individual persons
who form that relationship for the personal injury which they both sustain."
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 355, 363 A.2d 955, 965 (1976).
In contrast, a non-married cohabitant would not be a person entitled to recover
under a loss of consortium claim. See Gillespie-Linton v. Miles, 58 Md. App.
484, 495, 473 A.2d 947, 953 (1984). The "per person" limit would apply to
the physically injured spouse's claim and to the joint loss of consortium claim
because there is only one bodily injury. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Cornelsen,
272 Md. 48, 51, 321 A.2d 149, 150 (1974); Daley v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n,
312 Md. 550, 559, 541 A.2d 632, 636 (1988); see also Pacific Indem. Co. v.
Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 302 Md. 383, 403 n.3, 488 A.2d 486, 496 n.3
(1985) (discussing single liability limit to bodily injury of child and derivative
claim of parent).
Gaver, 316 Md. at 33, 557 A.2d at 218 (refusing to recognize the child's right
to a parental consortium claim, leaving it to the legislature to recognize the
claim).
See Schatz v. York Steak House, 51 Md. App. 494, 500,444 A.2d 1045, 1048
(1982).
See Coastal Tank Lines v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113 A.2d 82 (1955) (holding
that wife could not recover for loss of services, but whether husband could
recover was not decided).
But see Edmonds v. Murphy, 83 Md. App. 133, 165-70, 573 A.2d 853, 86871 (1990) (concluding, after lengthy disC\1ssion, that "in this day and age
'consortium' includes both pecuniary and nonpecuniary components which can
be the subject of loss"), afl'd, 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992) (without
discussing the consortium issue); see also Note, Maryland Prescribes Joint
Action for Negligently Caused Loss 0/ Consortium, 27 MD. L. REV. 403, 415
(1967) ("[TJhe loss of services of a wife or an unemployed husband to the
marital entity are still recoverable. Damage to the 'service' element of consortium is somewhat easier to quantify than the other elements, since specific
evidence of the replacement value of the spouse's services can frequently be
submitted to the court or jury. ").

230

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 21

from the loss of consortium, then it falls within clause 3. 300 Regardless
of where the claim falls, the per person, not the per occurrence,
limit applies. This is true of all clause 3 claims; they are derivative
claims involving a single bodily injury.
A more troublesome clause 3 issue is whether a bystander
recovery action would also give rise to a derivative action under
clause 3 or to a separate action. The significance is important because
of the limit of liability clause. In Maryland, a person can recover
for emotional distress and shock caused by witnessing the injury or
death of a close relative, if the person seeking recovery is in the zone
of danger. 301 Arguably, a bystander recovery claim is not derivative;
it is a direct and separate claim for bodily injuries, which would
invoke the "per occurrence" limits under the policy.302 If this is the
case, then the bystander bringing a claim must qualify as an insured
under either clause 1 or clause 2.303 Conceptually, the better view is

300. A better view is that the loss of services and the value of the nursing care are
part of the physically injured spouse's claim. See, e.g., Plank v. Summers, 203
Md. 552, 562, 102 A.2d 262, 267 (1954) (allowing injured party to recover
value of medical and hospital services furnished gratuitously to the injured
party); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 cmt. f (1977). If the
loss of services and value of nursing care claims fall within the injured spouse's
claim, then the deprived spouse is not a person who. is legally entitled to
recover those damages under Clause 3.
301. Compare Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933) (allowing
recovery to father who was in zone of danger) with Resavage v. Davies, 199
Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952) (denying recovery to mother who witnessed death
of her two children from a place of safety).
302. In Daley v. United Services Automobile Assoc., 312 Md. 550, 559, 541 A.2d
632, 636 (1988), the court of appeals applied the "per person" limit to parents'
solatium damage claim arising from the death of their child. The court refused
to adopt the parents' argument that the "per occurrence" limit should apply
based on Employers Casualty Insurance Co. v. Foust, 105 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1972) because
[t]he theory of [bystander] liability upon which Foust is based was
not alleged against Dyer by the Daleys. Instead, the Daleys pleaded
a statutorily created claim for solatium damages based on the theory
that Dyer's negligence had caused the death of their son. The Daleys
never asserted that Dyer, by his negligence, had breached a duty owed
to each of the Daleys which proximately caused them emotional
distress and resulting physical injuries.
Daley, 312 Md. at 559, 541 A.2d at 636. It is unlikely, however, that the
bystander suffered a "bodily injury" within the meaning of the policy. The
emotional trauma, though it may manifest itself in a tangible way, was not a
bodily injury. But see Loewenthal v. Security Ins. Co., 50 Md. App. 1I2, 436
A.2d 493 (1981) (holding that a general liability insurance policy with coverage
for "bodily injury" gave rise to a duty to defend a claim for pain, suffering,
and mental anguish).
303. The problem does not arise if the person injured as the direct result of physical
impact is a clause I insured and the bystander is also a clause I insured (e.g.,
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that a bystander recovery action falls under clause 3 to which the
"per person" limit would apply. 304
One of the most difficult clause 3 issues was addressed indirectly
by the court of appeals in 1991. In Forbes v. Harleysville Mutual
Insurance Co., 30S the court ruled that the uninsured motorist statute
required coverage for wrongful death claims. Forbes was a monumental decision because, in 1988, the court of special appeals had
ruled in Globe American Casualty Co. v. Chung306 that wrongful
death claims were not covered by the uninsured motorist statute.
Chung caused considerable unrest in the legal community, and from
it sprang Forbes and the 1991 amendments to section 541(c)(2).307
In Chung, Bo Hyun Chung was killed on July 11, 1983, as a
result of the negligence of Barbara Ann Orejuela, an uninsured
motorist. At the time of the accident, Chung was insured by Globe
American Casualty Company. The policy had a $20,000/$40,000
uninsured motorist bodily injury limit. Chung was survived by his
wife, four adult children, and one minor child. Chung's widow and
minor child 308 brought a wrongful death action against Orejuela.
Judgment was entered on June 21, 1984, against Orejuela and in
favor of Chung's widow and minor child. 309 Chung's widow was
awarded $250,000 compensatory damages and $250,000 punitive damages. In addition, Chung's minor child was awarded $100,000 compensatory damages, plus $100,000 punitive damages. 310 Chung'S widow
and minor child then sought satisfaction of the judgment under the
uninsured motorist provision of the Globe policy. Globe paid the per

304.
305.
306.
307.

308.

309.

310.

members of the same household). If, however, the person injured as the direct
result of physical impact is a clause 2 insured, then the bystander would be
able to recover only under his own policy, if at all.
The Daley court stated that "[slolatium injuries, as any other consequential
injuries, are subject to the each person limit." Daley, 312 Md. at 560, 541
A.2d at 636 (emphasis added).
322 Md. 689, 589 A.2d 944 (1991).
76 Md. App. 524, 547 A.2d 654 (1988), vacated, 322 Md. 713, 589 A.2d 956
(1991).
Following the court of special appeals decision in Chung, the court of appeals
granted certiorari in that case and also granted certiorari in Forbes, and another
case, Ray v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 322 Md. 751, 589
A.2d 975 (1991). The court of appeals issued its opinion in Chung on May
10, 1991, the same day it issued the Forbes opinion. Four days later, the court
issued the Ray opinion.
The adult children probably had no compensable damages under Maryland's
Wrongful Death Act. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-904(d)
(1989) (providing that a minor child is entitled to both pecuniary losses and
solatium damages as a result of the death of a parent).
The opinion lists June 21, 1985, as the date of the judgment, but the chronology
of events suggests that June 24, 1984, is the correct date.
Chung, 76 Md. App. at 528, 547 A.2d at 655. The award of punitive damages
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person liability limit under the policy ($20,000), and, on August 21,
1984, Chung's widow executed a release.
On April 29, 1985, Chung's adult son, acting as the personal
representative of Chung's estate, instituted a survival action against
Globe under the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy. Globe
denied liability on the ground that it had fulfilled its contractual
obligations by paying the $20,000, and, in fact, had been released
from any further obligations under the policy. Chung's estate and
Globe filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On July 13, 1987,
the trial court denied Globe's motion for summary judgment and
granted the estate's motion, ruling that the estate had a valid survival
claim under the policy. The parties entered into a consent judgment,
and an appeal was taken. 311
On appeal, the court of special appeals first considered the scope
of the language "because of bodily injury," contained in section
S41(c)(2). It then considered the breadth of the Globe policy's granting clause.312 Focusing on the policy language that required Globe to
pay "all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be
legally entitled to recover as damages," the court considered the
differences between survival and wrongful death actions. 3J3 Posing
the question as "which type of claim, if not both, is referred to by
the statutorily required Uninsured Motorist provision of liability
policies in Maryland,"314 the court decided that

311.

312.

313.

314.

in the wrongful death action was improper. See Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe
Co., 267 Md. 149, 159-60, 297 A.2d 721, 727. (1972) (overruled on other
grounds by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992».
Chung, 76 Md. App. at 530-31, 546 A.2d at 657. The parties entered into the
consent judgment with the understanding that the appeal would follow. [d.
After the decision by the court of special appeals, the court of appeals granted
certiorari, then vacated the decision on the ground that an appeal from a
consent judgment was not appropriate. Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. Chung, 322
Md. 713, 716-17, 589 A.2d 956, 957 (1991).
The granting clause required the insurance company
[t]o pay all sums which the insured or his legal representative shall
be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator
of an uninsured highway vehicle because of bodily injury or property
damage, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured highway vehicle ....
Chung, 76 Md. App. at 532, 547 A.2d at 657 (quoting policy). The court
however, ignored the definition of bodily injury. See infra note 315 and
accompanying text.
[d. at 532-41, 547 A.2d at 658-62. The court also rejected the estate's claim
that the "per occurrence" limits applied to the survival action, citing Daley v.
United Services Automobile Assoc., 312 Md. 550, 541 A.2d 632 (1988), for
the proposition that "solatium damages in a wrongful death action ... were
not bodily injuries independent of the injury to the child." Chung, 76 Md.
App. at 541, 547 A.2d at 657.
Chung, 76 Md. App. at 541, 547 A.2d at 662.
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[t]here can be no question but that the reference is to the
survival claim and not the wrongful death claim. The policy
provision itself refers to "the insured or his legal representative." The thing that "the insured or legal representatives"
is entitled to recover is "damages ... because of bodily
injury." As the case law has made indisputably clear, surviving relatives in a wrongful death action have no claim
for the bodily injury of the insured. Theirs is a new action
based exclusively on death.31S
The court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding "the clear
terms of both the controlling statute and the Uninsured Motorist
provision of the policy itself to limit the coverage to 'the insured or
his legal representative' for the bodily injuries suffered by the insured. "316 The Chung court's holding, that the uninsured motorist
statute did not require coverage for wrongful death claims, seriously
misconstrued the language and intent of the uninsured motorist
statute. Read as a whole, the uninsured motorist statute indicated
very clearly an intent to extend coverage to claims arising because
of the death of an insured.3I7
The holding in Chung was unfortunate for another reason. In
considering the breadth of coverage under the Globe policy, the court
of special appeals failed to consider the entire policy. The policy, a
modified version of the 1966 Standard Form, used three clauses, (a),
(b), and (c), to designate the classes of insureds. 318 A clause (c)
insured was defined as "any person, with respect to damages ...
entitled to recover because of bodily injury to which this insurance
315. Id. The court found support for its holding in the uninsured motorist statute:
Any conceivable doubt in this regard is dissipated by reference to
[section 541], which mandates the Uninsured Motorist coverage. There
the reference is only to "the insured . . . because of bodily injuries
sustained." There is no mention made of either legal representatives
or surviVing relatives. The inclusion of the term "or legal representatives" in the Uninsured Motorist endorsement itself is nothing more
than a recognition that a survival action would be available on behalf
of the injured "insured" provided for by § 541.
Id. The court also justified its holding by noting the purpose of the uninsured
motorist statute was to compensate injured motorists, "not to provide a fund
for the benefit of any person not party to the contract who might have some
alleged cause of action against an uninsured motorist." Id. (quoting In re
Estate of Reeck, 488 N.E.2d 195, 199 (Ohio 1986) (Holmes, J., dissenting».
But see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
316. Chung, 76 Md. App. at 532, 547 A.2d at 657.
317. See Forbes v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 322 Md. 689, 589 A.2d 944 (1991)
(holding that the legislature's intent was for uninsured motorist coverage to be
broad, and thus include wrongful death claims).
318. Record Extract at 57, Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. Chung, 76 Md. App. 524, 547
A.2d 654 (1987) (No. 87-1581).
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applies sustained by an insured under (a) or (b) above."319 Under
the additional definitions section of the Globe policy, "bodily injury"
was defined as "bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death,
sustained by an insured under (a) or (b) of the Persons Insured
provision. "320 Under this definition, the claimants in the wrongful
death action certainly qualified as clause (c) insureds because they
were persons entitled to recover damages in case of bodily injury,
which by policy definition included death as sustained by Bo Hyun
Chung, who was a clause (a) insured.321
In short, the Chung court not only misread the statute, but it
misread the policy as well. The court of appeals also fell partially
into this trap in Forbes when it ignored the language of the policy,
and concentrated instead on the statute. The Harleysville insurance
policy defined "covered person" as:
1. You [the named insured] or any family member.
2. Any other person occupying your covered auto.
3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to
recover because of bodily injury to which. this coverage
applies sustained by a person described in 1 or 2 above. 322

As in Chung, the wrongful death claimants were clause 3 insureds
persons legally entitled to recover damages because of bodily
injury (which by definition included death) to a clause 1 or 2 insured.
Therefore, the Forbes court could have reached its decision without
ever considering the statutory requirements. The policy clearly extended coverage to the wrongful death claimants. Perhaps the Forbes
court ignored the policy language in order to settle the issue. A
ruling based solely on the policy language would have generated
future litigation based on the statutory language.
The Forbes court also focused on the statute because the attorneys for Harleysville argued that the deceased did not qualify as a
clause 1 or 2 insured. The deceased, Carol Forbes, separated from
her husband, Robin, on August 4, 1984, and moved into an apartment with Delbert Dean. Three weeks later, on August 27, 1984,
Robin and Carol Forbes's two minor children, George and Connie,

319. [d.
320. [d. (emphasis added).
321. Similarly, wrongful death claims would be covered by the 1989 Maryland
Uninsured Motorist Endorsement. The 12189 version of the Personal Auto
Policy defines "bodily injury" in the general definitions' section as "bodily
injury, sickness or disease, including death." ISO Form PP 00 01 12 89,
Definitions. This definition is applicable to Part C-Uninsured Motorists Coverage and to the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, which supersedes
Part C.
322. Forbes, 322 Md. at 703, 589 A.2d at 951.
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moved into the apartment. On September 22, 1984, Carol Forbes
was killed and George and Connie were injured in a motor vehicle
accident while passengers in a vehicle owned and operated by Dean.
The accident was Dean's fault. He was uninsured. Robin Forbes,
individually and as parent and next friend of George and Connie,
sued Dean and Harleysville. The complaint contained five counts.
The first two counts sought compensatory damages for George and
Connie for the injuries they sustained. Counts three, four and five
were wrongful death claims brought by Robin, George and Connie.
The trial court held that the wrongful death claimants could not
recover under the Harleysville policy because Carol Forbes was not
an "insured" under the policy. Robin Forbes, individually and on
behalf of his children, appealed to the court of special appeals. While
the appeal was pending, the court of special appeals issued its decision
in Chung. Robin Forbes petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which
the court of appeals granted.
After deciding that the uninsured motorist statute required coverage for wrongful death claims, the court of appeals turned its
attention to the issue of Carol Forbes's insured status under the
Harleysville policy. The court noted in passing that a "strong argument could be made that Carol Forbes was a 'named insured' for
the purposes of uninsured motorist coverage regardless of the definitions in the insurance policy. "323 Assuming that she was not a
"named insured," the court ruled that she qualified as Robin Forbes's
resident spouse. 324 As an alternative holding, the court ruled that the
minor children's wrongful death claims were within the mandatory
uninsured motorist coverage, regardless of Carol Forbes's status as
an insured under the policy. According to the court
[i]t is true that certain language in Art. 48A, § 541(c)(1)
and (3), refers to "death of the insured." . . . [T]his language merely reflects the General Assembly's contemplation
that wrongful death claims are covered by the uninsured
motorists provisions and that, when an insured is killed in
a motor vehicle accident with an uninsured tortfeasor, the
statutory beneficiaries are entitled to wrongful death benefits
under the mandatory uninsured motorist coverage. We do
not believe, however, that the language of § 541(c)(l) and
(3) means that the deceased must always be an "insured"
under the particular language of the insurance policy.
The basic coverage language of § 541 (c) is set forth in
paragraph (2) and requires coverage "for damages which
the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator
323. Id. at 702, 589 A.2d at 950.
324. See id. at 703-08, 589 A.2d at 951-53 (discussing definitions of family).
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of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries
[including death] sustained in an accident arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured motor
vehicle." The Forbes children's wrongful death claims
squarely fall within this statutory language even if their
mother at the time of the accident was not an "insured"
under the language of Harleysville's policy. The children
are "insureds" under the Harleysville policy. Under Maryland's wrongful death statute, the children are legally entitled to damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
motor vehicle because of the death of their mother sustained
in an accident arising out of the operation of the uninsured
vehicle. In fact, a judgment against the owner and operator
of the uninsured vehicle has been recovered on their behalf.
The claims of the insured children clearly are embraced by
the critical coverage language of § S41(c)(2).
Moreover, the purpose of the uninsured motorist statute
supports coverage of the children's wrongful death claims
without regard to Carol Forbes's status under the language
of the insurance policy .... [T]he purpose of the statutorily
mandated uninsured motorist coverage is to put the insured
(including the insured children) in the same position as they
would have been if the tort feasor had maintained liability
insurance. If the tort feasor in this case had maintained
liability insurance, the children's wrongful death claims would
have been paid up to the limits of that liability coverage.
Since the tortfeasor failed to have liability insurance, and
since the children did have uninsured motorist coverage,
their claims should similarly be covered up to the limits of
the uninsured motorist insurance.32S
The Forbes holding that the uninsured motorist statute requires
coverage for wrongful death claims is unquestionably correct. The
public responsibility theory underlying Maryland's insurance scheme
demands coverage for wrongful death claims. The state has a significant interest in protecting not only those individuals injured by
uninsured motorists, but also their dependents. 326 The intent of the
uninsured motorist statute is to provide uninsured motorist benefits
to all persons who could have recovered tort damages had the
tortfeasor maintained liability insurance.327 The court's decision that
325. [d. at 708-10, 589 A.2d at 953-54 (citations omitted).
326. See supra note 13.
327. Widiss notes:
Even if the uninsured motorist statute is not phrased in terms of
requiring coverage for "bodily injury ... including death resulting
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Carol Forbes was a resident of Robin Forbes's household is debatable, but hardly shocking given the nature of the separation. However, the court's "alternative holding," that the uninsured motorist
insurance had to cover the wrongful death claims even if Carol
Forbes was not an insured under the policy, is questionable in many
respects.
In one sense, probing the depths of the "alternative holding"
of Forbes is unnecessary in light of the amendments to section
541 (c)(2). In the 1991 legislative session, while Forbes was pending
before the court of appeals, House Bill 1112 was proposed to amend
section 541(c)(2). That bill was eventually enacted as Chapter 625 of
the Laws of 1991, and it became law on July 1, 1991.328 Section
541(c)(2), as amended, reads:
In addition to any other coverage required by this
subtitle, every policy of motor vehicle liability insurance
issued, sold or delivered in this State after July 1, 1975,
shall contain coverage in at least the amounts required under
Title 17 of the Transportation Article, for damages, subject
to policy limits, which:
(l) -The insured is entitled to recover from the owner
or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily
injuries sustained in an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured motor vehicle;
and
(2) The surviving relatives, as defined in § 3-904 of the
Courts Article, of the insured are entitled to recover from
the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because
of the death of the insured as the result of an accident
arising out the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle.329
therefrQm," recovery should be available to the insured or a legal
representative if there is a right in that state to recover for wrongful
death.
1 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 6.2 n.1; see also 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.21
("Today, the vast weight of authority supports wrongful death recoveries. The
prevailing theory being that the intent, whether contractual or statutory, is to
provide insurance which would place the innocent victim and his dependents
in the same position which they would have been in had the adverse vehicle
been covered by liability insurance. ").
328. Act of May 24, 1991, ch. 625, 1991 Md. Laws 3421.
329. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2) (1991 & Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
A wrongful death claim is, nevertheless, subject to the single per person limit,
not the per occurrence limits, see Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. Chung, 322 Md.
713, 717 n.2, 589 A.2d 956, 958 n.2 (1991), and, as a practical matter, many
survival actions will exhaust the per person policy limit, "leaving little, if any,
funds available for a derivative claim, such as loss of consortium or wrongful
death," 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.21.
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In dear and unmistakable terms, the uninsured motorist statute
requires coverage for wrongful death claims. In equally clear terms,
it requires that the deceased be insured under the policy. To this
extent, then, Chapter 625 invalidates the Forbes "alternative holding"
as of July 1, 1991.
Because the Forbes court was construing the pre-1991 version of
the uninsured motorist statute, however, the "alternative holding" is
arguably valid in a pre-1991 setting. Whether the court of appeals
will re-examine its "alternative holding" in light of Chapter 625
remains to be seen. The legislative history of House Bill 1112 reveals
the difficult issue the court would face in such a situation. As
proposed, House Bill 1112 was designed "[f]or the purpose of
requiring a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance to provide
coverage for damages which the surviving relatives of the insured are
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle because of the death of the insured. "330 After the first reading,
the House Committee on Economic Matters changed the purpose
paragraph to reflect that the bill was "clarifying" that motor vehicle
policies had to contain such coverage. 331 This version was then sent
to the Senate, which,' earlier in the legislative session, had passed
Senate Bill 626.332 Similar to House Bill 1112, Senate Bill 626 was
designed to amend section 541(c) to require coverage for wrongful
death claims.
After reviewing House Bill 1112, the Senate Finance Committee
made two amendments to the bill to conform it to Senate Bill 626. 333
The first amendment rejected "clarifying" and reinstated "requiring." The second amendment made changes to the wording of the
bill itself.334 The senate version was then sent to the House, but the
House refused to accept the amendments. 335 The Senate refused to
330. MD. HOUSE J., 1991 Sess. 801-02 (reprinting the purpose clause of H.B. 1112
and noting the first reading of H.B. 1112 in the House of Delegates on
February 14, 1991).
•
331. Id. at 1500 (reprinting amendments to H.B. 1112, as adopted by the House of
Delegates on March 19, 1991).
332. See MD. SENATE J., 1991 Sess., 1469 (noting S.B. 626 read for the third time
and passed by Senate on March 20, 1991).
333. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF 1991
(1991) (noting that the amendments make H.B. 1112 identical to S.B. 626).
334. MD. SENATE J., 1991 Sess., 1900-01 (reprinting amendments to H.B. 1112 as
adopted by Senate on March 30, 1991).
335. MD. HOUSE J., 1991 Sess., 2288-89 (reprinting Senate amendments to H.B.
1112 and noting that on April 1, 1991, House of Delegates adopted motion
not to concur in the Senate Amendments); see also MD. SENATE J., 1991 Sess.,
2452-53 (reprinting message from House of Delegates notifying Senate that
House of Delegates refused to concur in Senate amendments to H.B. 1112,
and noting the appointment of certain House of Delegates members to conference committee if the Senate elects to form same).
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recede from its proposal, and the dispute was sent to a conference
committee. 336 What resulted from the committee was an obvious
compromise: the Senate's first amendment (to the purpose paragraph)
was adopted; its second amendment was rejected. 337 House Bill 1112
was then enacted into law as Chapter 625. The Governor vetoed
Senate Bill 626 because it became redundant once House Bill 1112
was signed into law. 338
Without question, the difference between "clarifying" and "requiring" is significant. If Chapter 625 clarified the original intent of
the legislators, then the Forbes "alternative holding" is not valid in
a pre-1991 setting. It does not, however, necessarily follow that the
Forbes "alternative holding" is valid in a pre-1991 setting, because
the "requiring" version of the purpose paragraph was adopted.
House Bill 1112 was proposed because of the decision reached by
the court of special appeals in Chung. 339 The conflict over "clarifying" or "requiring" occurred before the decision in Forbes. The
General Assembly focused on the larger issue of mandating uninsured
motorist insurance to cover wrongful death claims, not on the smaller
issue of whether the deceased had to be an insured under the policy.
But, in deciding that the uninsured motorist statute should cover
wrongful death claims, the General Assembly required that the deceased had to be an insured under the policy. Both the Senate and
the House agreed on this important point, which should not go
unnoticed. It is also important to note that the 1991 amendments,
when read into section 541(c)(2), require every policy of motor vehicle
liability insurance issued, sold, or delivered in Maryland after July
1, 1975, to contain coverage for wrongful death claims. This is not
a retroactive piece of legislation, and it could not be.340 Rather it is
336. See MD. HOUSE J., 1991 Sess., 2626-28 (reprinting conference committee report

on H.B. 1112); MD. SENATE J., 1991 Sess., 2603-05 (same).
337. See MD. HOUSE J., 1991 Sess., 2626-28 (indicating House of Delegates adopted

conference committee report on H.B. 1112 on April 4, 1991); MD. SENATE J.,
1991 Sess., 2603-05 (indicating Senate adopted conference committee report on
H.B. 1112 on April 7, 1991).
338. See 1991 Md. Laws 3903-04 (Governor's veto message for S.B. 626).
339. See undated Floor Report for House Bill 1112, maintained by the Department
of Legislative Reference, Annapolis, Maryland.
340. Statutes are presumed to operate prospectively, see, e.g., Washington Suburban
Sanitary Comm'n v. Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 560,
520 A.2d 1319, 1321 (1987), but there is no absolute bar to retrospective
application. See, e.g., Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602, 607, 471 A.2d 730, 733
(1984). The presumption for prospective application can be rebutted by a clear
expression to the contrary in the statute, see, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Hearn, 242 Md. 575, 582, 219 A.2d 820, 824 (1966). Although the 1991
amendments to section 541(c)(2) can be viewed as containing such a clear
expression of retroactivity, a retroactive application would probably be unconstitutional. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall ... pass any ...
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a clear sign that the General Assembly's 1991 amendment was designed to clarify the original intent, notwithstanding the use of
"requiring" in the purpose paragraph. This may explain the willingness of the house to compromise: it obviously felt that the debate
over "clarifying" or "requiring" in the purpose paragraph was
inconsequential in light of the clear message in the amendment itself.
IX.

PERMITTED EXCLUSIONS

Maryland's uninsured motorist statute explicitly permits only two
exclusions from coverage: the "owned-but-uninsured" exclusion and
the "named-driver" exclusion. 341 No other exclusions are expressly
permitted. The court of appeals has repeatedly stated that "where
the Legislature has required specified coverages in a particular category of insurance, and has provided for certain exceptions or exclusions to the required coverages, additional exclusions are generally
not permitted. "342 Despite this principle, the court of special appeals
has upheld the validity of a third exclusion - the "owned-butotherwise-insured" exclusion. 343

A.

The Owned-Bul-Uninsured Exclusion

Section 541(c)(2)(v)(I) allows insurers to exclude from coverage
the named insured and his resident relatives "when occupying, or
struck as a pedestrian by ,an uninsured motor vehicle that is owned
by the named insured or a member of his immediate family residing
in his household. "344 From the insurer's standpoint, the exclusion
limits its potential exposure by preventing the extension of uninsured
motorist coverage to a second or third vehicle when the insured has

341.
342.

343.
344.

Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... "); c/. Dryfoos v. Hostetter,
268 Md. 396, 404, 302 A.2d 28, 32-33 (1973) ("[W]hatever a sovereign power
may authorize in prospect, it may adopt and validate in retrospect, so long as
there is no interference with vested rights or contractual obligations .... to);
accord Hearn, 242 Md. at 582-83, 219 A.2d at 824 (stating statute cannot
apply retroactively to affect insurer's substantive contractual rights).
See Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 528 A.2d 912 (1987); see also infra parts
IX. A. (discussing the "owned-but-uninsured" exclusion) and IX. B. (discussing
the "named driver" exclusion).
Gable v. Colonial Ins. Co., 313 Md. 701, 704, 548 A.2d 135, 137 (1988); see
also Larimore v. American Ins. Co., 314 Md. 617, 622, 552 A.2d 889, 891
(1989) (quoting Gable, 313 Md. at 704, 548 A.2d at 137); Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 314 Md. 131, 141, 550 A.2d
69, 74 (1988) (quoting Gable, 313 Md. at 704, 548 A.2d at 137).
See infra part IX. C.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 54l(c)(2)(v)(1) (Supp. 1992); see Provident Gen.
Ins. v. McBride, 69 Md. App. 497, 518 A.2d 468 (1986) (discussing the ownedbut-uninsured exclusion), cert. denied, 309 Md. 326, 523 A.2d 1013 (1987).
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paid a premium based on his owning only one vehicle.
More
importantly, the exclusion furthers Maryland's comprehensive insurance scheme by encouraging "the owner of an uninsured motor
vehicle to become insured by imposing upon him the penalty of
exclusion from coverage for failure to obtain insurance. "346
Bringing resident relatives within the exclusion is a fairly recent
legislative invention. Originally, the uninsured motorist statute did
not contain an express owned-but-uninsured exclusion. 347 The section
merely provided that the coverage could not be less than that afforded
a qualified person under section 243H. Section 243H(a)(1)(i) provided
a specific exclusion only when the injured insured was occupying a
vehicle he owned. This exclusion did not extend to resident relatives
occupying the uninsured vehicle because the purpose of encouraging
financial responsibility was "not furthered by penalizing other insured
persons who cannot obtain insurance for uninsured motor vehicles
which they do not own. "348 The owned-but-uninsured exclusion in
section S41(c)(2) was broadened by the legislature in 1982 to include
resident relatives. 349 Extending the ambit of the owned~but-uninsured
exclusion to resident relatives recognizes that the insurer has a significant interest in being able to assess risks and determine premiums
in accordance with the risks. In this sense, the -exclusion balances
the public policy that victims should be entitled to recover uninsured
motorist benefits with the interests of the insurer. 350
345

345. See Powell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 86 Md. App. 98, 107, 585
A.2d 286, 290 (1991); see also 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 4.42(1).
346. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 154, 416
A.2d 734, 736 (1980). See Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund v. Hamilton,
256 Md. 56, 60, 259 A.2d 303, 305 (1969), wherein the court stated as follows:
The legislature apparently concluded that if this irresponsible group
were excluded from coverage, its members and future potential members might be induced to become insured so that they might qualify
for coverage. If this legislative optimism proved sound, the number
of uninsured vehicles - the evil that produced the statute - would be
lessened.
[d.

347. See generally Gartelman, 288 Md. at 151, 416 A.2d at 734 (discussing the
owned-but-uninsured exclusion without the resident relative extension).
348. [d. at 154, 416 A.2d at 739.
349. Act of May 19, 1981, ch. 573, 1981 Md. Laws 2321.
350. The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement incorporates the owned-butuninsured exclusion in two ways. First, it specifically states that the insurer
does not provide uninsured motorist coverage for any clause 1 insured while
"while 'occupying' or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by such person
which is not insured for this coverage under this policy." ISO Form PP 04 59
12 89, I. Part C - Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Exclusions A. 1. Second, the
endorsement's definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" states that an uninsured
motor vehicle does not include "any vehicle or equipment owned by or
furnished or available for regular use of the named insured or a member of
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B.

The Named Driver Exclusion
Section S41(c)(2)(v)(2) allows insurers to exclude coverage for
"[t]he named insured, members of his family residing in the household, and all other persons having other applicable automobile insurance and occupying, or struck as a pedestrian by, the insured
motor vehicle operated or used by a person excluded from coverage
under section 240C-l of this article."351 Section 240C-l(a)(1) allows
an insurer to exclude nearly all coverage when a vehicle is operated
by a named excluded driver. 352 Under this section, the named driver
is excluded from liability, collision, personal injury protection and
uninsured motorist coverage. Additionally, the owner of the vehicle,
the owner's family members, and the named excluded driver's family
members are also excluded from that same coverage when a covered
vehicle is operated by a named excluded driver. Non-resident relative
passengers, however, are excluded from personal injury protection
and uninsured motorist coverage only if such coverage is available
under another motor vehicle insurance policy. 353 The named driver
exclusion, like the owned-but-uninsured exclusion, balances the insurer's interests with the public policy of affording uninsured motorist
benefits to those injured by the negligence of others. 354 Making

351.
352.
353.

354.

his household." [d. The validity of excluding coverage when the insured is
operating a vehicle furnished or available for his regular use is questionable.
In Provident General Insurance Co. v. McBride, 69 Md. App. 497, 518 A.2d
468 (1986), cert. denied, 309 Md. 326, 523 A.2d 1013 (1987), the court of
special appeals upheld the "owned by a named insured" portion of the
provision, but did not address whether the insured who is using an uninsured
motor vehicle "furnished or available for ... regular use" but not owned by
him or a family member may be excluded from coverage. [d. at 504, 518 A.2d
at 472.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c)(2)(v)(2) (1991).
[d. § 240C-l(a)(I) (1991).
The Maryland Insurance Code, § 240C-l(a)(l) states as follows:
The policy may be endorsed to specifically exclude all coverage for
any of the following when the named excluded driver is operating the
motor vehicle(s) covered under the policy whether or not that operation
or use was with the express or implied permission of a person insured
under the policy:
(i) The excluded operator or user;
(ii) The vehicle owner;
(iii) Family members residing in the household of the excluded operator
or user or vehicle owner; and
(iv) Any other person, except for the coverage required by sections
539 and 541(c)(2) of this article if such coverage is not available under
any other automobile policy.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 240C-l(a)(1) (1991).
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 305 Md. 614, 505 A.2d 1338 (1986).
For a recent case treating the named driver exclusion, see Sykes v. Nationwide
Insurance Co., 327 Md. 261, 608 A.2d 1242 (1992).
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uninsured motorist benefits available to certain passengers who lack
personal uninsured motorist coverage comports with the statute's
purpose of protecting persons from economic harm caused by uninsured motorists and concomitantly recognizes the insurer's underwriting concerns. 3SS
C.

The Owned-But-Otherwise-Insured Exclusion

The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement contains an
express "owned-but-otherwise-insured" exclusion. 3s6 Other policies
contain an implicit "owned-but-otherwise-insured" exclusion: the
definitions in the policy, when read together with the coverage grant,
act as an exclusion. 3S7 The "owned-but-otherwise-insured" exclusion
should not be confused with the "owned-but-uninsured" exclusion. 3S8
The "owned-but-otherwise-insured" exclusion excludes coverage when
an insured is injured while an operator or passenger in a vehicle that
is owned by him or a family member but insured by another motor
vehicle insurer.
In Powell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,m
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland upheld an express "ownedbut-otherwise-insured" exclusion. Kenneth Powell was injured by an
uninsured motorist while driving his wife's car, a Nissan insured by
State Farm. The State Farm policy covering the Nissan had $20,0001
$40,000 in uninsured motorist coverage. At the same time, State
Farm insured a motor vehicle owned by Kenneth Powell under a

355. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 305 Md. 614, 505 A.2d 1338 (1986).
356. The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement states that the insurer does
not provide uninsured motorist coverage for any clause 1 insured "while
'occupying' or when struck by, any motor vehicle owned by such person which
is not insured for this coverage under this policy." ISO Form PP 04 59 12
89, I. Part C-Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Exclusions A. 1.
357. One policy currently used in Maryland incorporates the "owned-but-otherwiseinsured" exclusion through the definition of "bodily injury" and "insured
auto." The coverage grant provides: "We will pay damages for bodily injury
and property damage caused by an accident which the insured is legally entitled
to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that vehicle." GEICO, Family
Automobile Insurance Policy, Section IV - LOSSES WE PAY at 32. "Bodily
injury" is defined as "bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death,
sustained by you, your relatives or any other person occupying an insured auto
with your consent." [d. Section IV-DEFINITIONS 4(c) at 30. An insured
vehicle includes an auto operated by the named insured, see id., but excludes
"an auto owned by or furnished for the regular use of an insured." [d. Section
IV -DEFINITIONS 4(c)(iii) at 30.
358. See generally supra part IX. A. (discussing the "owned-but-uninsured" exclusion).
359. 86 Md. App. 98, 585 A.2d 286 (1991).
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different policy.360 The State Farm policy covering Kenneth Powell's
automobile had $100,000/$300,000 in uninsured motorist coverage.
That policy contained the following exclusion:
"THERE IS NO COVERAGE:
2. FOR BODILY INJURY TO YOU . .. WHILE OCCUPYING ... A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU,
YOUR SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE, and which is not
insured under the liability coverage of this policy.' '361
Powell sought uninsured motorist benefits from both the State Farm
policy covering the Nissan and the State Farm policy covering his
vehicle. The trial court held that he was limited to the $20,0001
$40,000 limit under the policy covering the Nissan.
The court of special appeals affirmed. First, the court found
that the exclusion was consistent with the uninsured motorist statute.
"To permit such an exclusion will encourage families to obtain
coverage for all of their vehicles and thus maximize compliance with
the purpose of the statute. "362 In contrast, the court found that
Powell's position would lead to an absurd (and undesirable) result:
To hold as appellant also urges, i.e., that his wife's vehicle
was not uninsured because it was covered under another
policy, would be to permit an owner to buy excess coverage
under one policy for one vehicle at a relatively small premium and coverage under a separate policy for his other
vehicles at a lesser cost, and have the excess coverage of
the first policy apply to the vehicles covered under the
subsequent policies. 363
.
As an alternative holding, the court reasoned that even if the exclusion was invalid, the result would not change: "If the policy exclusion
at issue were to be determined to be in conflict with the statute, it
would only be in conflict as to the minimum required coverage, i.e.,
$20,000/$40,000. As to any excess coverage it would be a valid
exclusion. "364
360. Evidently. the Powells were newlyweds and had not coordinated the insurance
on the two vehicles. [d. at 109, 585 A.2d at 291.
361. [d. at 100, 585 A.2d at 287 (quoting policy) (alterations in Powell).
362. [d. at 108, 585 A.2d at 291.
363. [d. at 110, 585 A.2d at 291 (footnote omitted).
364. [d. at 113, 585 A.2d at 293. Powell is questionable on several grounds.
Numerous states, perhaps the majority, have ruled that the "owned-but-otherinsured" exclusion is invalid unless the applicable uninsured motorist statute
expressly permits it. See, e.g., Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co., 697 P .2d 684 (Ariz.
1985); Harvey v. Travelers Indem. Co., 449 A.2d 157 (Conn. 1982). Maryland's
uninsured motorist statute does not expressly permit the exclusion.
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STACKING

Of all the uninsured motorist issues that have been addressed
by Maryland courts, the issue of "stacking" of coverage has generated perhaps the most confusion. 365 Stacking in essence enables a
claimant to recover a higher amount for one vehicle when it is
insured on a policy covering multiple vehicles so as to obtain maximum amount payable for all vehicles. Certain judicial habits in the
drafting of opinions have contributed to the confusion. 366 The difference between intrapolicy and interpolicy stacking,367 and the fact
that several of the stacking cases have involved both intra policy and
interpolicy issues, has compounded the problem. Finally, section
541(c)(l)'s definition of uninsured motor vehicle as including an
under insured motor vehicle has certainly fueled the controversy by
indicating that underinsured vehicles are the same as uninsured
vehicles. 368
Reconciling the Maryland stacking cases is difficult, if not impossible. 369 While many of the cases can be understood only in

365. Section 543(a) of the Maryland Insurance Code prevents a person from recovering uninsured motorist or personal injury protection benefits "from more
than one motor vehicle liability policy or insurer on either a duplicative or
supplemental basis." MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 543(a) (1991); see Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542, 365 A.2d 1000 (1976) (discussing stacking
of personal injury protection benefits).
366. Opinions that lack reference to the pertinent statutory and policy provisions
are certainly troublesome guides. Moreover, courts sometimes view the stacking
issue as being only a matter of statutory construction and have not considered
the insurance contract provisions. Other courts have taken the opposite approach, and still others have mixed the two inquiries (what does the statute
require and what does the policy provide) into one inquiry.
367. Intrapolicy stacking involves aggregating the coverages within a single policy.
Interpolicy stacking involves aggregating the coverages from two or more
policies.
368. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
369. In Hoffman v. United Services Automobile' Assoc., 309 Md. 167, 522 A.2d
1320 (1987), the court of appeals struggled to reconcile Travelers Insurance·
Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542, 365 A.2d 1000 (1976), Yarmuth v. Government
Employees Insurance Co., 286 Md. 256, 407 A.2d 315 (1979), and Rafferty v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 303 Md. 63, 492 A.2d 290 (1985), and admitted that
"[w]hile there is language in those opinions which may seem to support USAA's
position [that interpolicy stacking is prohibited], it was written in a different
context." Hoffman, 309 Md. at 177, 522 A.2d at 1324-25. The court then
explained that "the language of § 543(a) supports a construction of the section
whereby an additional recovery under the required minimum uninsured motorist
coverage of a second policy is precluded, but a recovery under the optional
excess underinsured motorist coverage of a second policy is not precluded."
[d. (emphasis added).
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relationship to the statute in effect at the time of the accident, or
because of particular policy language, a few of them cannot be
reconciled on either basis. Reconciliation is also not possible merely
on the basis that the 1981 amendments changed the nature of
uninsured motorist coverage. If the cases are to be reconciled at all,
it must be done on the basis that the courts' treatment of the issue
of stacking evolved in conjunction with the shift in public policy
brought about by the 1981 amendments.
The issue of stacking uninsured motorist coverages first appeared
in dicta in a case concerning the stacking of liability coverages. In
Oarr v. Government Employees Insurance Co. ,370 Charlene Daugherty
was involved in an accident with Judith Oarr. Daugherty was insured
by Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) under a
policy that provided $20,000/$40,000 liability coverage. Two vehicles
were listed on the policy. Daugherty was driving one of them. Oarr
sued Daugherty, and a consent judgment of $40,000 was entered
against Daugherty. GEICO paid $20,000 to Oarr, but then Oarr filed
a declaratory judgment action against GEICO, alleging that GEICO
was liable for the other $20,000 because of an ambiguity in the
policy.371 Oarr also contended that since Daugherty had paid two
separate premiums for the two vehicles, the liability coverages should
stack.
The court quickly disposed of Oarr's second argument, noting
that Maryland law did not require stacking. Without such a requirement, the court held that the terms of the policy would control, and
that stacking would be allowed only if "the policy provides for it,
not because the law requires it."372 The court then turned its attention
to the GEICO policy language. 373
370. 39 Md. App. 122, 383 A.2d 1112 (1978).
371. [d. at 124, 383 A.2d at 1113. Two issues were presented to the court: whether
the policy was ambiguous, and whether stacking should be allowed because
the insured had paid separate premiums for two separate vehicles. In response
to the second question, the court noted that
[tlhe second issue, as framed, may be disposed of rather quickly. We
are aware of no provision of Maryland law, nor any regulation of
the Insurance Commissioner, that would require a policy insuring
more than one vehicle to provide for the "stacking" of liability
coverage. In the absence of such a supervening requirement, therefore,
the terms of the policy will control. Thus, if there is to be "stacking",
it will be because the policy provides for it, not because the law
requires it.
[d. at 124, 383 A.2d at 1113-14 (footnote omitted).
372. [d. at 124, 383 A.2d at 1114.
373. The court stated that "[tlo determine whether Ms. Oarr is entitled to recover
the other $20,000 from GEICO, we must therefore look solely to the insurance
policy to see what limit of liability has been expressed therein. Consequently,
the second issue will be treated as part of the first." [d. at 124, 383 A.2d at
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Relying on cases that permitted stacking of uninsured motorist
benefits, Oarr contended that the GEl CO policy was ambiguous
because there was a contradiction between the limit of liability
provision and the policy's separability clause. 374 Although the limit
of liability provision clearly indicated that the insurer's liability was
limited to $20,000 per person,375 the separability clause arguably
allowed the stacking of the $20,000 per person liability coverage for
each insured automobile, giving a total protection of $40,000 per
person. 376 In Oarr's view, this created an ambiguity that should have
been construed against the insurer. The court disagreed, and distinguished the uninsured motorist stacking cases relied on by Oarr:
It is not necessary for us to determine whether we would
follow this line of reasoning with respect to the "stacking"
of medical payment and uninsured motorist coverages, and
we expressly decline to make such a determination. That
issue is not before us in this case. Suffice it to say that
there is a clear and decisive distinction between [medical
payment and uninsured motorist] coverages, on the one
hand, and the liability coverage at issue here, on the other,
which makes the rationale underlying the "stacking" of the
former, even if we were to adopt it, inapplicable to the
latter. 377

In the court's view, liability coverage was automobile based. In
contrast, uninsured motorist coverage was person based. 378 The court

374.
375.

376.

377.
378.

1114. The Oa" court's statement that the "second issue shall be treated as
part of the first" may have created confusion over the analytical approach a
court must take in determining the stacking issue in an uninsured motorist
context. What the Oarr court meant was that the second issue would be
answered by a review of the policy because there was no statute permitting or
prohibiting stacking.
[d. at 125-26, 383 A.2d at 1114.
The provision stated as follows:
Regardless of the number of automobiles or trailers to which this
policy applies, the limit of bodily injury liability stated in the declarations as applicable to 'each person' is the limit of the company's
liability for all damages, including damages for care and loss of
services, arising out of the bodily injury sustained by one person as
the result of anyone occurrence.
[d. at 126, 383 A.2d at 1114 (quoting policy).
The separability clause stated that "[w)hen two or more automobiles are insured
hereunder, the terms of this policy shall apply separately to each." [d. (quoting
policy). Garr argued that this provision provided Daugherty with $40,0001
$80,000 worth of liability coverage, not $20,000/$40,000. [d. at 126-27, 383
A.2d at 1115.
[d. at 129, 383 A.2d at 1116.
The court noted that
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therefore held that the separability clause did not allow stacking of
liability coverage. Moreover, since the insurer had clearly indicated
that its liability was limited to the amount in the declaration regardless
of the number of automobiles to which the policy applied, the court
held that the policy was not ambiguous. 379
Seven months after Oarr, the court of special appeals once again
had the opportunity to consider stacking of uninsured motorist
coverage in Langston v. Allstate Insurance CO. 380 The Langston court
was obviously influenced by the Oarr court's treatment of intrapolicy
stacking. 381 In Langston, Lawrence Langston was injured as a result
of the collision between an uninsured motorist and a motorcycle on
which he was a passenger. The motorcycle was insured by a Universal
Underwriters Insurance Company policy that provided $15,000 in
uninsured motorist insurance. 382 Langston recovered the $15,000, then

379.

380.
381.

382.

[u]nlike the medical payment and uninsured motorist coverages, this
undertaking [liability coverage for owned vehicles] is directly related
to and requires the involvement of, one of the vehicles specifically
mentioned in the policy ... for which a specific premium is charged.
Both the coverage and the premiums charged for it are therefore
attributable to those described vehicles. This coverage is automobile,
rather than person, based. It is clearly insurance on the vehicle and
is not in the nature of a personal accident policy.
[d. at 130, 383 A.2d at 1117.
The court noted the following:
In this policy ... the insurer has made a special effort to make clear
that the limit of its liability is as stated in the declarations. The "limit
of liability" clause states that regardless of the number of automobiles
to which the policy applies, the limit is as so stated. No clearer
expression of intent is needed.
[d. at 130, 383 A.2d at 1118 (footnote omitted).
40 Md. App. 414, 392 A.2d 561 (1978).
The Langston court noted that
Judge Wilner, writing for this Court in Oarr v. Government Employees
Ins. Co., "expressly" declined to consider the issue put to us in this
appeal. Judge Wilner did, however, refer in [note] 9 to a number of
cases, including those cited in the present opinion, that permitted
"stacking. "
[d. at 428 n.8, 392 A.2d at 569 n.8 (citation omitted).
The procedural history of the case is complicated. Lawrence Langston, a
Maryland resident, was injured in the accident while attending school in Florida.
Langston recovered the $15,000, then brought an arbitration proceeding against
Allstate in Florida pursuant to the terms of the policy. Meanwhile, Allstate
brought a declaratory judgment action in Maryland. Allstate then sought to
stay the arbitration proceeding by filing a complaint for injunction and a
motion of temporary stay. Langston filed a counterclaim, and opposed the
motion to stay. The court denied the motion to stay and the arbitration hearing
was held. The arbiters made an award of $40,000 subject to a judicial
determination of the amount of the applicable policy limits.
Langston contended that he was entitled to $40,000; Allstate contended
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sought to recover under a policy issued by Allstate to his mother.
The Allstate policy insured two vehicles, with an uninsured motorist
limit for each vehicle of $20,000 per person, $40,000 per accident.
The mother's policy also contained a limit of liability clause.
On appeal, Allstate argued that section 543(a) prohibited interpolicy "stacking or pyramiding" of coverages. 383 The court avoided
the question, however, stating, "£w]e shall not answer that question
because as we see it neither 'stacking nor pyramiding' is involved. "384
In refusing to address the principal question, the court first noted
that section 543(a) did not apply to intrapolicy stacking, only to
interpolicy stacking. 38s Second, the court observed that in actuality
Langston was neither seeking to stack nor to pyramid his recovery,
defining both of those terms as "the recovering by a claimant 'several
times over for his injuries. "386 Noting that section 543(a) forbids
"duplication of benefits" or recovery on a "supplemental basis,"
the court defined duplication of benefits as "payment in full twice
or more for the same claim" and recovery on a supplemental basis
as "securing remuneration over and above the recovery from an
uninsured motorist of all that the claimant is legally entitled to
recover. "381
Recognizing that Langston's personal injuries and damages far
exceeded the $40,000 he maintained Allstate owed him under the
policy, the court concluded that he was neither trying to duplicate
nor supplement his recovery. Rather, he was trying only to recover

383.
384.
385.

386.
387.

that he was entitled to $5,000 - the difference between the $15,000_ received
from Universal Underwriters and the $20,000 per person liability limit of the
Allstate policy. Langston then moved for summary judgment in Florida. At
the same time, Allsiate moved for summary judgment in Maryland. The Florida
court granted Langston's motion, and Allstate _appealed. The Maryland court
granted Allstate's motion and Langston appealed. The Florida appellate court
reversed the trial court's decision, deciding that Allstate's filing the declaratory
judgment action in Maryland divested Florida of jurisdiction to determine the
issue. Id. at 419-20, 392 A.2d at 562-65; see also Allstate v. Langston, 358
So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 1978) (discussing the Florida appeal).
Langston, 40 Md. App. at 428, 392 A.2d at 569.
Id.
The court noted the following:
Allstate fails to note that this section only applies when there is "more
than one motor vehicle liability policy or insurer .... " (Emphasis
supplied.) Since there is only one motor vehicle liability policy covering
the Langston vehicles and since Allstate is the only insurer from whom
recovery is sought under section 541 of Article 48A, Section 543(a)
of that article is not apposite to the present case.
Id.
Id. at 429, 392 A.2d at 569 (citing WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST
COVERAGE (1969».
Id. at 429-30, 392 A.2d at 569-70.
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his full loss and was not trying to make a profit by recovering more
than the total loss.
Having decided that section 543(a) did not prevent Langston
from aggregating coverages within the policy. the court concluded
that "in Maryland the payment of a premium for uninsured motorist
insurance on each of two or more separate motor vehicles permits
recovery on each. but only to the extent of one full recovery for any
loss sustained by the insured." 388 The court based its decision largely
on the insured's reasonable expectations. In the court's view. the
insured paid a double premium for the uninsured motorist coverage
and reasonably expected that he would obtain double coverage. 389
Given the remedial nature of the uninsured motorist statute and the
extent of Langston's injuries. the court felt compelled to allow
Langston to recover from Allstate.
The court also ruled that Langston was entitled to recover the
full $40.000 from Allstate. and that Allstate was not entitled to offset
the $40.000 with the $15.000 paid by Universal Underwriters. 390 In
so doing. the court specifically rejected the application of Allstate's
"other insurance" clause.391 resting its decision on McKoy v. Aetna

388. [d. at 436, 392 A.2d at 573.
389. The Langston court quoted at length from Sturdy v. Allied Mutual Insurance
Co., 457 P.2d 34 (Kan. 1969). In Sturdy, the insured paid a separate premium
on each of his two cars. While operating one vehicle, he sustained injuries as
a result of the negligence of an uninsured motorist. The policy provided
$10,000/$20,000 for each vehicle and contained a separability provision identical
to the one in the Allstate policy insuring Langston. The Sturdy court noted
that if the insurer had intended
to restrict the limit of liability to $10,000 in one policy where more
than one automobile is covered, this could have been very easily
accomplished in plain, unmistakable language .... We are accustomed to purchasing insurance which follows the person in units or
multiples, with the premium fIxed by the insurer accordingly ....
When we pay a double premium we expect double coverage. This is
certainly not unreasonable but, to the contrary, is in accord with
general principles oj indemnity that amounts oj premiums are based
on amounts oj liability.
Langston, 40 Md. App. at 433-34, 392 A.2d at 571-72 (quoting Sturdy, 457
P.2d at 41-42) (emphasis added in Langston).
390. Langston, 40 Md. App. at 425, 392 A.2d at 567.
391. The Allstate policy's "other insurance" clause provided as follows:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an
automobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance under this
coverage shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar
insurance available to such insured and applicable to such automobile
as primary insurance, and this insurance shall then apply only in the
amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the
applicable limit of liability of such other insurance.
[d. at 426, 392 A.2d at 568 (quoting policy).
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Casualty & Surety CO.392 In McKoy, because of an ambiguity between
the limit of liability provision and the granting clause in the injured
insured's policy, the Court of Appeals of Maryland allowed an
injured insured to collect $20,000 in uninsured motorist coverage
when the tort feasor had $10,000 in liability coverage. McKoy, like
Langston, was an attempt by the court to provide a full recovery to
a seriously injured insured. The Langston court went further than
the McKoy court, however, by implying that public policy supported
a full recovery by Langston. 393
The Langston court's interpretation of section S43(a) was quickly
disapproved by the court of appeals in Yarmuth v. Government
Employees Insurance CO. 394 Yarmuth did not overrule Langston .
. Indeed, although Langston has been disapproved by the court of
appeals on at least three occasions,39S it has not been expressly
overruled. 396 The dissatisfaction arising from Langston comes not
from its decision that intrapolicy stacking is allowed,397 but from
dicta that has been used by others to support the premise that
interpolicy stacking of minimum required coverage is allowed.
The dispute in Yarmuth arose out of a collision between a
tractor trailer operated by Fred Kile, an uninsured motorist, and an
automobile driven by Albert Starr. The collision resulted in the deaths
of Starr, his wife, and their son. A daughter, Hillary, survived. The
392. 281 Md. 26, 374 A.2d 1170 (1977).
393. The Langston court stated as follows:
Some courts have held that the "other insurance" clause of motor
vehicle liability policies was generally valid and not repugnant to the
statute requiring uninsured motorist coverage. They have taken the
view that "the statute was not designed to provide the insured with
greater insurance protection than would have been available had the
insured been injured by a person having a policy containing the
minimum required statutory limits." The decisions adopting the "other
insurance" clause reasoning are in conflict with [McKoy v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 281 Md. 26, 374 A.2d 1170 (1977)], wherein
the court of appeals implicitly rejected that approach and refused to
follow the view that the "other insurance" clause limited the insured's
right of recovery to the amount he could obtain from the uninsured
motorist.
Langston, 40 Md. App. at 431, 392 A.2d at 570 (citations omitted).
394. 286 Md. 256, 407 A.2d 315 (1979).
395. Howell v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 305 Md. 435, 438-39, 505 A.2d 109, 111
(1986); Rafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 303 Md. 63, 72, 492 A.2d 290, 295 (1985);
Yarmuth v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 286 Md. 256,265 n.3, 407 A.2d
315, 319 n.3 (1979).
396. The Rafferty court expressly declined to overrule Langston. Rafferty, 303 Md.
at 72, 492 A.2d at 295.
397. But see Hoffman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 309 Md. 167, 183, 522 A.2d
1320, 1327-28 (1987) (rejecting the "pay double premiums, expect double
coverage" reasoning in Langston).
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automobile operated by Starr was owned and insured by his employer,
Motorola, Inc. Zurich Group Insurance Companies issued a policy
covering this vehicle which provided uninsured motorist benefits of
$20,000/$40,000. At the time of the accident, Starr owned a Maryland-registered 1971 Dodge automobile which was insured under a
policy issued by GEICO. This policy also provided uninsured motorist
benefits of $20,000/$40,000. 398
Zurich paid its $40,000 to the claimants,399 who then sought an
additional $40,000 in uninsured motorist benefits under the GEICO
policy insuring Starr's 1971 Dodge. GEICO argued that section 543(a)
barred recovery. The claimants, in turn, contended that the prohibition against duplicative or supplemental recovery of uninsured
motorist benefits in section 543(a) did not bar their interpolicy claim
and should allow them to recover under the GEICO policy since they
did not seek more than full indemnification for their injuries. They
relied on the Langston court's interpretation of "supplemental."400
The Yarmuth court disagreed with both the claimants' argument
and the Langston definition of "supplemental." After defining supplemental as an attempt "to fill the deficiencies in the uninsured
motorist coverage of the primary policy by claiming under a second
policy, "401 the court then addressed the claimants' interpretation of
section 543(a). The court concluded that
[this interpretation] would result in an unwarranted judicial
enactment of an amount of uninsured motorist coverage
that is greater than the minimum statutory limits as specified
by the General Assembly. This would give a victim of an
uninsured motorist greater insurance protection than would
be available if he had been injured by an insured motorist
having only the minimum required liability insurance.402
In a footnote, the court of appeals stated that its conclusion "makes
evident our disagreement with a contrary construction placed upon
section 543(a) in dicta by the court of special appeals in [Langston]."403

398. Yarmuth, 286 Md. at 258-59, 407 A.2d at 316.
399. The claimants consisted of the personal representatives of the decedents' estates
and the guardians of Hillary Starr.
400. See supra notes 386-87 and accompanying text.
401. Yarmuth, 286 Md. at 264, 407 A.2d at 319. The Yarmuth court agreed with
the Langston court's definition of "duplicative." [d.
402. [d. at 265, 407 A.2d at 319 (footnote omitted).
403. [d. at 265 n.3, 407 A.2d at 319 n.3. The Yarmuth court also indicated that
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542, 365 A.2d 1000 (1976), was
apparently not brought to the attention of the Langston court. Yarmuth, 286
Md. at 265 n.3, 407 A.2d at 319 n.3.
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In rejecting the claimants' position, the Yarmuth court gave
effect to GEICO's "other insurance" provision, which was· similar
to the excess provision in the Allstate policy that insured Langston. 404
Relying on a case that had interpreted section S43(a) in connection
with a personal injury protection claim,40s the court held that GEICO's "other insurance" provision was consistent with the uninsured
motorist statute. 406 In the court's view, "other insurance" clauses in
the uninsured motorist context were valid as long as they neither
reduced the injured insured's total recovery below the statutory
minimum nor violated the public policy established by section S43(a).407
Yarmuth's treatment of stacking should be understood in light
of the uninsured motorist statute then in effect. At that time, the
statute did not allow for underinsured motorist coverage. The court's
holding that interpolicy stacking of uninsured motorist benefits was

404. The provision stated as follows:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying a motor
vehicle not owned by the named insured, the insurance under this
amendment shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar
insurance available to such automobile as primary insurance, and this
insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit of
liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability for
such other insurance.
Yarmuth, 286 Md. at 260, 407 A.2d at 317.
405. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542, 365 A.2d 1000 (1976).
406. Yarmuth, 286 Md. at 264-65, 407 A.2d at 319.
407. [d. at 265,407 A.2d at 319. There are three general types of "other insurance"
clauses: (I) the escape clause; (2) the excess clause; and (3) the pro-rata clause.
See Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bankers Ins. Co. of Pa., 244 Md. 392, 223
A.2d 594 (1966). For a general discussion of coordination of "other insurance"
clauses in liability policies, see Continental Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 71 Md. App. 148, 524 A.2d HO, cert. denied, 310
Md. 491, 530 A.2d 273 (1987). The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement
contains an anti-stacking provision, an excess-escape clause, and a pro-rata
clause:
If there is other applicable similar insurance available under more
than one policy or provision of coverage:
l. Any recovery for damages for "bodily injury" sustained by
an "insured" may equal but not exceed the higher of the
applicable limit for anyone vehicle under this insurance or
any other insurance.
2. Any insurance we prOVide with resp~ct to a vehicle you do
not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance
but only to the extent that the limit of liability under this
policy exceeds the limit of such other collectible insurance.
3. We will pay only our share of the loss. Our share is the
. proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all
applicable limits.
ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C-Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Other
Insurance.
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not allowed if the insured had collected the statutory minimum was
consistent with the statutory purpose of placing the injured insured
in the same position as if the uninsured tort feasor maintained the
minimum amounts of coverage mandated by the financial responsibility provisions section of the transportation code.408 Under the pre1981 statute, if the policy which provided secondary coverage had
the same limits as the policy which provided primary coverage, then
the injured insured was prohibited by section 543(a) from recovering
under the secondary policy. If the primary policy's uninsured motorist
limits were less than the required minimum, then the injured insured
was able to look to a second policy providing the required minimum
to make up the difference between the first policy's limits and the
second policy's limits.409 The insured, however, was not able to
recover more than the statutory minimum even if the secondary
policy provi<;led additional coverage. 410 This situation was rectified by
the 1981 amendments. However, the change in the statute's basic
design resulting from the 1981 amendments was ignored in the next
stacking case.
. In Rafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co. ,411 Maureen Rafferty and
two other women were killed in a January 9, 1982, automobile
accident with an uninsured motorist. Rafferty was a passenger in an
automobile driven by Laura Berg and insured by State Farm under
a policy that provided uninsured motorist insurance of $50,0001
$100,000. At the time, Rafferty was insured by Allstate with uninsured motorist benefits of $20,000/$40,000. The Allstate policy insured three vehicles. State Farm divided its per occurrence limit of
$100,000 equally among the estates of Rafferty and the two other
women. 412 Rafferty's estate then sought uninsured motorist benefits
408. See supra notes 56, 62 and accompanying text.
409. In Rafferty v. Allstate Insurance Co., 303 Md. 63, 492 A.2d 290 (1985), the
court noted that
[tlhe estate contends that § 543(a) is "not a per se prohibition against
recoveries under more than one policy." With this we agree, but we
believe the instances in which more than one policy may be utilized
are limited to those in which the primary insurer's uninsured motorist
coverage is less than the statutory minimum. For example, given the
facts of this appeal, had the primary insured been from out of state
and purchased coverage for less than the Maryland statutory minimums, then Ms. Rafferty's estate could have recovered from Allstate
up to the $20,000 minimum.
Id. at 72, 492 A.2d at 295; see also Parsons v. Erie Ins. Group, 569 F. Supp.
572, 581 (D. Md. 1983) (stating that under § 543(a), the combined recovery
under two policies cannot be greater than the $20,000 statutory minimum).
41'0. But see McKoy v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 281 Md. 26, 374 A.2d 1170 (1977);
Langston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 40 Md. App. 414, 392 A.2d 561 (1978); see also
infra notes 392-93 and accompanying text (discussing Langston).
411. 303 Md. 63, 492 A.2d 290' (1985).
412. Each estate received $33,333.33. The opinion is not clear whether Berg was
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from Allstate, contending that the $20,000 per person limit should
be stacked, entitling it to insurance totalling $60,000. The estate then
demanded $26,666.67 from Allstate - the difference between
$33,333.33 recovered from State Farm and the $60,000 total aggregated coverage under the Allstate policy.4J3 Allstate denied coverage,
and the trial court ruled that the estate was not entitled to recovery
under the Allstate policy. The estate filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari and Allstate filed a cross-petition. The court of appeals
granted both petitions. On appeal, the court decided that the estate
could not recover under the Allstate policy, holding that when the
primary policy contains uninsured motorist benefits in an amount
equal to or greater than the required $20,0001$40,000 minimum, then
the injured insured may not collect under a second policy. 414
Rafferty may be one of those cases that reached the correct
result for the wrong reason. If Rafferty is understood as a rejection
of intrapolicy stacking, then the decision makes sense on interpolicy
stacking grounds. 41S The court, however, expressly declined to rule
on the intrapolicy issue and based its decision on the prohibition of
interpolicy stacking under section S43(a).416 Rafferty also cannot be
understood as resting on specific contractual provisions. The opinion
did not refer to any provision in the Allstate policy that prohibited
stacking, nor, in fact, did the court refer to any provision of the
Allstate policy at all. 417 In many ways, Rafferty is simply atavistic,
reflecting pre-1981 thinking in a post-1981 context. 4I8

413.
414.

415.

416.

417.

one of the women killed in the collision. The facts suggest that she was. The
other woman is not identified.
Rafferty, 303 Md. at 66, 492 A.2d at 292.
[d. at 71-72, 492 A.2d at 294. Since State Farm had provided coverage in
excess of the statutory $20,000/$40,000 minimum, the estate could not recover
under the Allstate policy. See also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Benton, 278 Md. 542,
365 A.2d 1000 (1976) (stacking of required minimum personal injury protection
benefits not allowed).
If the court had rejected intrapolicy stacking, then the second uninsured
motorist policy provided only $20,000 per person, or less than the $33,333.33
collected by the insured under the first uninsured motorist policy. Interpolicy
stacking of the required minimum coverage under the second policy is not
allowed under either the pre- or post-1981 uninsured motorist statute. See
supra note 402 and accompanying text. Hoffman v. United Services Automobile
Assoc., 309 Md. 167, 183, 522 A.2d 1320, 1328 (1987), implies that Rafferty
must be understood as a rejection of intrapolicy stacking. See infra note 429
and accompanying text.
Rafferty, 303 Md. at 67, 492 A.2d at 292-93. The court, however, seemed
receptive to intrapolicy stacking:
While we comprehend the estate's theory that it is entitled to $60,000
coverage because Mr. Rafferty paid premiums for $20,000 coverage
on each of his three cars, we believe § 543(a) requires us to hold that
when more than one insurance policy is at issue, as is clearly the case
here, recovery must be limited to the statutory minimum.
[d. at 71, 492 A.2d at 294.
In a footnote, the court mentioned that the other insurance clause in the
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Because the Yarmuth and Rafferty decisions did not address
intrapolicy stacking, the Langston notion of intrapolicy stacking
survived. In Howell v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co. ,419 however,
the court of appeals held that intrapolicy stacking of uninsured
motorist benefits in a commercial fleet policy was not allowed in
Maryland. Howell involved a commercial fleet policy that covered
nineteen vehicles and had a limit of liability of $50,000 for anyone
accident. Howell was severely injured in a November 13, 1982,
collision with an uninsured motor vehicle. At the time, Howell was
driving one of nineteen vehicles owned by his employer. Howell
argued that since his employer paid separate premiums for each of
the nineteen vehicles, he was entitled to a total coverage of $950,000
in uninsured motorist benefits ($50,000 x 19). The court rejected this
argument, noting that the limit of liability clause provided the following: '''Regardless of the number of covered autos, insureds, claims
made or vehicles involved in the accident, the most [the insurer] will
pay for all damages resulting from anyone accident is the limit of
UNINSURED MOTORISTS INSURANCE shown in the declarations. "'420 Based on the clear terms in the limit of liability clause,
the court held that the most that Howell could recover was $50,000.
The facts in Howell were so peculiar that the court rested its
decision partly on the concept that absurd results should be avoided. 421
Nevertheless, Howell signalled the end of the judicial infatuation
with intrapolicy stacking. 422

Allstate policy made the State Farm policy primary because Rafferty was
occupying a non-owned vehicle. [d. at 66 n.2, 492 A.2d at 292 n.2. The court
did not, however, mention that the other insurance clause provided that the
Allstate policy afforded excess coverage to a policy on any non-owned vehicle.
If Rafferty is understood as a rejection of intrapolicy stacking, then the other
insurance clause in the Allstate policy would have prevented Rafferty from
recovering under the Allstate policy. See supra note 407.
418. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
419. '305 Md. 435, 505 A.2d 109 (1986).
420. [d. at 443, 505 A.2d at 113 (quoting policy).
421. [d. at 442-43, 505 A.2d at 113. After finding no ambiguity in the contract,
the court indicated that "[i]f, however, there were an ambiguity, the doctrine
of absurd results would prevail." [d. at 443, 505 A.2d at 113.
422. Arguably, intrapolicy stacking is still viable today. Howell and Hoffman do
not stand for the proposition that intrapolicy stacking of uninsured motorist
benefits is not allowed under any circumstances in Maryland. Rather, they
stand for the proposition that intrapolicy stacking was not allowed given the
language of the policies in question. If Langston is understood as allowing
intrapolicy stacking under the particular policy in question, then intrapolicy
stacking is still viable. The 1989 Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement
seeks to prevent intrapolicy stacking in several ways. First, the endorsement
specifically limits the insurer's liability to the amount shown on the declaration
sheet. Second, the endorsement provides that the insurer's limit of liability is
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Seventeen days before the decision in Howell was filed, the court
of special appeals in Gunn v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 423 ruled
that intrapolicy stacking was still viable. Judge Wilner, the author
of the Oarr opinion, wrote the opinion in Gunn. In 1982, James
Gunn, his wife, and his sister-in-law were severally injured in an
accident with an uninsured motor vehicle. Gunn was insured by
Aetna under a policy that provided a combined single limit of $50,000
per accident. Three vehicles were insured under the policy. Gunn and
the two other claimants demanded $150,000 from Aetna. The trial
court ruled in favor of the insurer, and the claimants appealed. 424
Guided by the fact that Langston had been disapproved but never
overruled, the Gunn court held that the claimants were entitled to
the $150,000. 425 After the Howell opinion was filed, the court of
special appeals withdrew the Gunn opinion, and, on April 15, 1986,
filed a short per curiam decision, reversing its earlier decision and
ruling that the claimants were not able to stack the limits.426 The
claimants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the court of
appeals denied. 427
One year later, the court of appeals completed the rejection of
intrapolicy stacking as a means of providing a deeper pocket of
recovery for a seriously injured insured. In Hoffman v. United
Services Automobile Ass'n,428 the court held that intrapolicy stacking
in a family automobile policy was not allowed. Oddly enough, the

423.
424.

425.
426.

427.
428.

the most the insurer will pay regardless of the number of insureds, claims
made, vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations, or vehicles involved in
the accident.
.
No. 85-718 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 15, 1986), cert. denied, 307 Md. 83,
512 A.2d 377 (1986).
.'
Lynn Mathias, Recovery Under Multi-Auto Policy Is Not "Stacking," DAILY
RIle., Feb. 27, 1986, at 4.
Id.
The opinion, in its entirety, read as follows:
On February 11, 1986, we filed an Opinion in this case in which we
concluded that our earlier decision in Langston v. Allstate Ins. Co.
remained valid and that the Circuit Court for Prince George's County
had erred in declining to act in accordance with it. Seventeen days
later, in an unrelated case, Howell v. Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co.,
the Court of Appeals made clear that Langston was not the law, and
indeed adopted a view completely opposite to that expressed in Langston. We thereupon recalled our February 11, Opinion. It follows that
our earlier decision in this case cannot stand. For the reasons set
forth in Howell, we conclude that the judgment below should be
affirmed.
Gunn, No. 85-718, slip op. at 1 (citations omitted).
Gunn v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 307 Md. 83, 512 A.2d 377 (1986).
309 Md. 167, 522 A.2d 1320 (1987). The question of stacking was certified to
the court of appeals by the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut. See infra note 431.
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Hoffman court did not even address Langston. As in Howell, the
Hoffman court relied on the limit of liability clause in the policy in
deciding that intrapolicy stacking was forbidden. The court went one
step further, however, rejecting the "pay double premiums, expect
double coverage" reasoning in Langston. Concluding that the double
premium was justified because the added vehicle increased the insurer's risk, the Hoffman court noted that the insurer, "by insuring
two vehicles, had greater passenger and mileage exposure than if it
had insured only one. The premium on the second vehicle, therefore,
was not illusory but paid for the increased risk of added passengers
and miles. "429
While completing the rejection of intrapolicy stacking, Hoffman
embraced the concept of interpolicy stacking by ruling that section
543(a) did not apply to underinsured motorist coverage. 430 Hoffman
was decided after Rafferty, but the facts giving rise to the coverage
issue occurred before the facts giving rise to the dispute in Rafferty.
In this respect, Hoffman is the opposite of Rafferty, representing
post-1981 thinking in a pre-1981 context. The accident giving rise to
the coverage dispute in Hoffman occurred in July 1980. Kenneth
Hoffman and his wife, Sandra, were seriously injured in an automobile accident while they were passengers in an automobile driven
by Richard Whelan. Sandra Hoffman died as a result of her injuries.
The driver of the other vehicle was Richard Nowakowski. At the
time of the accident, the Hoffmans were insured by United Services
Automobile Association (USAA), under a policy which provided
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage of $300,000 per person/$500,000 per accident. Whelan was insured by Hanover Insurance
Company under a policy containing uninsured and underinsured
motorist coverage of $50,000/$100,000. Nowakowski was insured by
Travelers Insurance Company with liability coverage of $20,000/
$40,000.
Kenneth Hoffman, individually and as personal representative
of his wife's estate, sued Nowakowski. Whelan also brought suit
against Nowakowski. An agreement was reached among the parties,
and the insurance limits from the policies were apportioned among
the claimants. The estate of Sandra Hoffman received $20,000 from
Nowakowski's liability coverage and $30,000 from Whelan's underinsured motorist coverage ($50,000 per person limit minus the $20,000
paid by Travelers). Kenneth Hoffman received $5,398 from Travelers
and $8,389 from Hanover. Hoffman, again acting individually and
as personal representative of his wife's estate, then sued USAA to
obtain underinsured motorist benefits under the policy. USAA argued
429. Hoffman, 309 Md. at 182-83, 522 A.2d at 1327-28.
430. [d. at 177, 522 A.2d at 1325.
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that section 543(a) prevented Hoffman from stacking the USAA
policy on top of what he had received from Travelers and Hanover.
The court rejected USAA's position, ruling that Hoffman could
collect from USAA because it was underinsured motorist coverage.431
Although the accident in Hoffman occurred before Maryland's
uninsured motorist statute was amended to include, by the definition
of uninsured motor vehicle, reduction of underinsured motorist coverage,432 Hoffman clearly indicates that interpolicy stacking is allowed
in Maryland, but that normal rules involving interpretation of policies
and coordination of "other insurance" clauses apply. In this regard,
the stacking of policies in an underinsured motorist context is really
not a true stacking (a mere aggregation of the coverage limits of
each policy), but, rather, a coordination of the coverage limits in
which the injured insured is entitled to coordinate the coverage limits
up to the highest limit provided by the policies. 433 The Hoffman
court's treatment of interpolicy stacking results in the fundamental
concept that the injured insured's total potential recovery is the
amount of the highest underinsured motorist coverage of the policies
involved. 434
431. The Hoffman opinion did not address the manner in which the USAA coverage
would be stacked. Since Hoffman and his wife had both received bodily
injuries, the $500,000 per occurrence limit would have applied. Had all the
policies been issued in accordance with Maryland law, then the estate would
have recovered in this fashion: It had already collected $20,000 from Travelers
(the per person liability coverage) and $30,000 from Hanover (the difference
between Hanover's $50,000 underinsured motorist coverage per person limit
and the $20,000 per person liability limit in the Travelers policy). Assuming
the estate could prove damages of at least $300,000, then it would have been
entitled to $250,000 from USAA ($300,000 per person underinsured motorist
limit minus $50,000 received from Travelers and Hanover). This provided the
estate with a total potential recovery of $300,000 - the highest limit provided
by the policies. Because the Hanover policy had been issued in accordance
with Connecticut law, the coordination of the policies was slightly different.
After the Court of Appeals of Maryland answered the certified question
presented by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut,
the district court in Connecticut considered the coordination of the Travelers,
Hanover, and USAA policies with respect to Mr. Hoffman's individual claim.
Because Connecticut law required intrapolicy stacking, the court found that
the Hanover policy, which insured two vehicles, actually provided $100,000 per
person, not $50,000. Hoffman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 671 F. Supp.
922, 925 (D. Conn. 1987).
432. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
433. The estate's total potential recovery was the amount of the highest coverage
limit provided by the three policies (the $300,000 provided. by USAA). See
infra note 436. The estate was not entitled to merely add up the coverages
($20,000 plus $50,000 plus $300,(00) because of the "other insurance" clauses.
See supra note 407. This assumes that the polices offered reduction underinsured
motorist insurance, not floating underinsured motorist insurance.
434. If, for example, the USAA policy in Hoffman had provided only a $50,000
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In many ways, the decision in Hoffman shifted the focus from
whether policies can be coordinated to how the policies should be
coordinated. 43s Because an insured is often protected by several layers
of insurance at the same time, the dispute over which policy provides
the primary coverage is significant. 436
Confusion over the coordination of policies remains, however.
Recently, the court of special appeals, in Schuler v. Erie Insurance
Exchange,437 erroneously noted that when a person is covered by two
automobile policies providing uninsured motorist coverage, he may
choose which policy he wants to cover him, because, under Rafferty,
he is precluded from recovering under two policies. In Schuler,
Thomas Schuler was injured when he was struck by an uninsured
motorist. At the time of the accident, Schuler was standing beside
his 1983 Camaro, which was insured by a MAIF personal liability
policy with uninsured motorist limits of $20,000/$40,000. Schuler's
wife, Lena, owned a 1980 BMW, which was insured by an Erie
commercial liability policy with uninsured motorist limits of $100,000/
$300,000. Lena Schuler was the general manager of Rainbow Hair
Designers, a Maryland corporation. The Erie policy was purchased
by Sylvan Nahamani, who the court describes as the "owner" of

per person underinsured motorist coverage limit rather than a $300,000 limit,
then the estate would not have been able to collect anything from USAA
because the "other insurance" clause would have prevented such a recovery:
The estate had already received $50,000 ($20,000 from Travelers and $30,000
from Hanover), which was the limit of the USAA policy. Simply put, the
estate's total potential coverage in this scenario would have been $50,000, the
highest coverage limit of the three policies involved. Again, this assumes that
the polices offered reduction underinsured motorist insurance, not floating
underinsured motorist insurance.
435. For a discussion of one such coordination, see Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.
v. Bragg, 76 Md. App. 709, 716-17, 548 A.2d 151, 154-55 (1988).
436. In Hoffman, the Travelers policy provided primary liability coverage; the
Hanover policy provided primary underinsured motorist coverage because the
Hoffmans were passengers in the vehicle insured by Hanover; and the USAA
policy provided secondary underinsured motorist coverage. If the USAA policy
had provided primary underinsured motorist coverage (e.g., the Hoffmans were
occupying their own vehicle at the time of the accident), then Hanover would
not have had to contribute anything because the USAA policy would have
exhausted the Hoffmans' potential coverage. The uninsured motorist statute
does not expressly contain any provision for priority of coverages, but MD.
ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 543(c) (1991) provides that a passenger's uninsured
motorist policy will apply as primary coverage when that person is occupying
a vehicle not covered by uninsured motorist insurance, suggesting that a
passenger's policy ordinarily applies as a secondary layer of coverage. The
"other insurance" provision in the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement
is consistent with this implication. See supra note 407.
437. 81 Md. App. 499, 568 A.2d 873 (1990).
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Rainbow Hair Designers. Rainbow Hair Designers was the named
insured under the policy. 439 The BMW was listed on the Erie policy,
and Rainbow Hair Designers paid the premiums. Evidently, this was
one of the benefits of Lena Schuler's employment. 440
Thomas Schuler made a claim for uninsured motorist benefits
under the Erie policy because it provided higher limits than his
policy. The court noted that this election would have been proper
had Schuler been covered by both the MAIF and Erie policies. 441
Fortunately, the court correctly held that Schuler was not covered
by the Erie policy. Thus, the court was prevented from allowing
Shuler to practice what it had erroneously preached. 442 The court's
438

438. Rainbow Hair Designers was actually a corporation. Id. at 509 n.6, 568 A.2d
at 878 n.6.
439. The Erie policy obligated Erie to pay "damages that the law entitles you or
your legal representative to recover from the driver or owner of an uninsured
motor vehicle." Id. at 506, 568 A.2d at 875 (quoting policy). The policy
defined "you," "your," and "named insured" as the subscriber, the subscriber's resident spouse, and others named in item 1 of the declarations. "Subscriber" was defined as the person who signed the application for the policy.
The policy listed Rainbow Hair Designers as the named insured. The policy
also extended uninsured motorist protection by a provision entitled "Others
We Protect":
(1) Any Relative, and
(2) Anyone else, while occupying any auto we insure ...
(3) Anyone else who is entitled to recover damages because of bodily
injury to any person protected by this coverage.
Record Extract at 16, Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch., 81 Md. App. 499, 568 A.2d
873 (1990) (No. 89-451); see also Schuler, 81 Md. App. at 507, 568 A.2d at 875.
440. Schuler, 81 Md. App. at 501 n.2, 568 A.2d at 874 n.2.
441. The court stated as follows: "That [Schuler] may make this election between
the two carriers is supported by the holding in Rafferty v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
303 Md. 63, 492 A.2d 290 (1985). By statute, a recovery from one carrier
precludes a recovery against the other." Schuler, 81 Md. App. at 501, 568
A.2d at 875; see supra notes 411-14 and accompanying text (discussing Rafferty).
442. In holding that Thomas Schuler was not covered by the Erie policy, the court
arrived at the correct result. The court stated as follows:
If Rainbow Hair Designers had intended to include the owners of the
five cars as named insureds it could have done so simply by including
the named individuals under the named insured portion of the declaration sheet in the policy. Having failed to do so, we conclude that
Rainbow did not intend to extend this additional protection to the
owners of the insured cars. As we see it, to hold otherwise would
require us to rewrite the Erie policy.
Schuler, 81 Md. App; at 508, 568 A.2d at 878. Nevertheless, the fact that
Lena Schuler owned the BMW but Erie insured it under a policy where Lena
Schuler was not listed as a named insured, coupled with a misunderstanding
of the concept of "occupying," caused notable confusion. Erie contended that
Lena Schuler and her husband were covered by the policy only when they were
occupying the BMW or one of the other listed automobiles. The court rejected
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view that an insured may make an election when covered by two
policies ignores the "other insurance" clauses in the policies, and
misunderstands the concept of "occupying." Had Schuler been covered by both the MAIF and Erie policies,443 then the "other insur-

Erie's position:
We find no support for the proposition that one must be either a
driver or a passenger in the BMW for coverage to apply. Pedestrian
injuries are covered [under the policy) since the only exclusion from
UM coverage is where the uninsured vehicle is owned by the insured
or by a relative.
Assuming that [Lena Schuler) had been struck as a pedestrian in
the course of her travels in the BMW, coverage would apply. This is
so because she obviously uses her car with the knowledge and consent
of her employer. This does not mean, however, that had she, rather
than [her husband], been struck while standing beside [her husband's]
Camaro that the Erie policy would provide UM coverage to her.
[d. at 507, 568 A.2d at 877. If the court had considered the definition of
"occupying" in the Erie policy, then it would have realized that the uninsured
motorist coverage would have applied to Thomas Schuler and Lena Schuler
only if they had been "occupying" the BMW. The Erie policy defined "occupying" as "in or upon, getting into or getting out of." Record Extract at
8, Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch., 81 Md. App. 499, 568 A.2d 873 (1990) (No. 89451). If the Schulers were not "occupying" the BMW, then the uninsured
motorist coverage would not apply to them because they did not qualify as
clause 1 insureds, despite the fact that Lena Schuler owned the vehicle.
Under the clear terms of the policy, Thomas Schuler did not qualify as the
named insured (Rainbow Hair Designers), the subscriber (Nahamani), the
subscriber's resident spouse or relative, or a person named in the declarations.
He therefore, did not qualify as a clause 1 insured; nor did he qualify as a
clause 2 insured because he was not occupying the BMW (or another insured
vehicle under the policy) at the time of the accident. Moreover, contrary to
what the court noted, Lena Schuler would not necessarily have qualified for
uninsured motorist benefits under the Erie policy had she been struck "as a
pedestrian in the course of her travels with the BMW." As a pedestrian, she
. would have qualified as a clause 2 insured only if she been "occupying" the
BMW within the definition of that phrase. That is, she would have been
entitled to coverage only if she had been "in or upon, getting into or getting
out of" the BMW (or, for that matter, any of the other insured vehicles under
the policy). In this regard, the court misunderstands that the status of being a
pedestrian overlaps with the definition of "occupying." That is, a person can
be a pedestrian (a person on foot) but still be "occupying" a·vehicle within
the definition of that term under a[n) uninsured motorist policy (e.g., a person
who has just stepped out of a vehicle and is standing next to it with the door
open is a pedestrian but is still occupying the vehicle). See supra notes 259-88
(discussing the concept of "occupying"). For a discussion of the concept of
being a "pedestrian" for purposes of personal injury protection, see Tucker
v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 308 Md. 69, 517 A.2d 730 (1986).
443. Thomas Schuler, as the named insured under the MAIF policy, clearly qualified
as a clause 1 insured. Lena Schuler was also named as a named insured.
Appendix to Appellee's Brief at 39, Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch., 81 Md. App.
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ance" provIsions in the policies would determine the priority of
coverage. If Schuler was not "occupying" the Camaro within the
definition of that term in the MAIF policy444 at the time of the
accident, then the MAIl<' and Erie policies would have provided prorata coverage. On the other hand, if Schuler had been "occupying"
the Camaro, then the MAIF policy would have provided primary
coverage and the Erie policy would have provided excess coverage. 44'
The notion that Schuler would be able to recover from only one
policy, and that he could choose which policy based on the limits of
liability, defeats the underwriting basis of the "other insurance"
clause.
499,568 A.2d 873 (1990) (No. 89-451). As clause 1 insureds, they were protected
under the MAIF policy even if they were not "occupying" the Camaro. See
infra note 444.
444. The opinion states that Schuler was standing next to his Camaro. It does not
discuss whether he was "occupying" the Camaro within the definition of that
term in the MAIF policy. The MAIF policy defined "occupying" as "in or
upon or entering into or alighting from." Appendix to Appellee's Brief at 39,
Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch., 81 Md. App. 499, 568 A.2d 873 (1990) (No. 89451).
445. The MAIF policy contained the following "oth!!r insurance" provision:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying a highway
vehicle not owned by such insured, this insurance shall apply only as
excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to such
insured and applicable to such vehicle as primary insurance, and this
insurance shall then only apply in the amount by which the limit of
liability of this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of
such other insurance.
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has
other similar insurance available to him as applicable to the accident,
the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable
limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and the
company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to
which this insurance applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears
to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and
such other insurance.
Appendix to Appellee's Brief at 40, Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch., 81 Md. App.
499, 568 A.2d 873 (1990) (No. 89-451). The Erie policy contained the following
"other insurance" provision:
Bodily Injury-if anyone we protect has other similar insurance that
applies to the accident, we will pay our share of the loss. Our share
will be the proportion the limit of protection of this insurance bears
to the total limit of liability of all applicable insurance. Recovery will
not exceed the highest limit available among the applicable policies.
For bodily injury to anyone we protect while occupying a motor
vehicle you do not own, we will pay the amount of the loss up to
the applicable limit(s) shown on the Declarations for one auto, less
the amount paid or payable by other insurance.
Record Extract at 2, 17, Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch., 81 Md. App. 499, 568
A.2d 873 (1990) (No. 89-451).
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Hoffman, unlike Schuler, clearly indicates a greater appreciation
of the functions of insurance underwriting. The rejection of intrapolicy stacking is a tacit admission that intra policy stacking assails
the foundation of the insurance industry.446 In contrast, interpolicy
stacking (i.e., interpolicy coordination of policies through their "other
insurance" provisions) comports with the underwriting function.
Indeed, the insurance industry introduced the concept of underinsured
motorist coverage to forestall intrapolicy stacking. 447 More importantly, Hoffman reflects an awareness that the insurance-buying
public benefits by interpolicy stacking. In this regard, Hoffman
embraced the end sought by the Langston court - a full recovery
by the insured - but rejected the Langston court's means - intrapolicy stacking.
XI.

THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION OFFSET

The public policy of providing a full recovery to an injured
insured is also evident in the workers' compensation offset provision
contained in the uninsured motorist statute. Section 543(d) enables
the insurer to offset its liability by deducting workers' compensation
benefits actually received by the insured seeking uninsured motorist
benefits. It provides as follows: "Benefits payable under [personal
injury protection and uninsured motorist coverage] shall be reduced
to the extent that the recipient has recovered benefits under workers'
compensation laws of any state or the federal government."448
446. See Maag, supra note 14, at 331 ("To allow intra-policy stacking is unfair to
the insurance company because liability would be increased and the company
would be unable to clearly assess the risk so as to reflect it in the price of the
premium. ").
447. See supra note 136.
448. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 543(d) (1991 & Supp. 1992). When a person is
eligible for both personal injury protection and uninsured motorist coverage,
the workers' compensation recovery is deducted from the aggregate of personal
injury protection and uninsured motorist coverages. See Revis v. Maryland
Auto. Ins. Fund, 322 Md. 683, 688, 589.A.2d 483, 485 (1991). In Revis, the
insured had $2,500 in personal injury protection and $25,000 in uninsured
motorist coverage. He collected $11,061.71 in workers' compensation benefits,
then made a claim for uninsured motorist and personal injury protection
benefits. MAIF agreed to pay $13,938.29 (the difference between the $25,000
uninsured motorist and the workers' compensation award). MAIF refused to
pay any personal injury protection, claiming, in essence, that it could deduct
the workers' compensation recovery twice - once from the uninsured motorist
and once from the personal injury protection. The court ruled that MAIF's
refusal was invalid and that Revis was entitled to the $2,500 in personal injury
protection:
Under the express terms of §§ 539(a) and 541 Revis was entitled to
$27,500 in PIP and UM payments had he not filed a workers'
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Section 543(d), like section 543(a), is designed to prevent double
recovery.449 As section 543(d) clearly states, the workers' compensation offset applies only if the insured has recovered the compensation
benefits .. The court of appeals has construed "has recovered" to
mean actual receipt. 450 Accordingly, if the insured is entitled to
workers' compensation benefits but does not make a claim, the
uninsured motorist insurer is not entitled to offset the compensation
that the insured would have received or is likely to receive in the
future. The "has received" standard is much different than the
comparable standard in Subtitle 16A for required reductions from
claims against the Uninsured Division of MAIF.451
Maryland courts have not decided whether an employee is barred
by the exclusivity provision of Maryland Workers' Compensation
Act from making an uninsured motorist claim against his employer's
automobile insurer. 452 Logically, the employer's immunity does not
extend to the uninsured motorist insurer. 453 A conceptually more
compensation claim.

449.

450.
451.
452.

453.

Considering the language of § 543(d), the statutory scheme in which
it appears, and the purpose of the General Assembly in enacting that
comprehensive statutory scheme, we hold that the § 543(d) reduction
of PIP and UM benefits by any workers' compensation recovery is
to be applied to the total benefits due the insured under the PIP and
UM coverages provided in the policy. Where the workers' compensation recovered by the insured is less than the total of the amounts
due the insured under the PIP and UM coverages, the insured is
entitled to the difference. Thus, the circuit court erred in permitting
MAIF to deduct the workers' compensation recovery twice, first from
the UM benefit and then from the amount due Revis under his PIP
coverage.
[d. at 688, 589 A.2d at 485.
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 283 Md. 663, 67475, 392 A.2d 1114, 1120 (1978). For other cases involving the workers'
compensation deduction, see Revis, 322 Md. at 675, 589 A.2d at 483; Gable
v. Colonial Insurance Co., 313 Md. 701, 548 A.2d 135 (1988); Hines v.
Potomac Electric Power Co., 305 Md. 369, 504 A.2d 632 (1986); Smelser v.
Criterion Insurance Co., 293 Md. 384, 444 A.2d 1024 (1982).
Gable, 313 Md. at 704, 548 A.2d at 136-39 ("The language of § 543(d) shows
a legislative intent to provide offsets only from workmen's compensation
benefits actually received and not for future benefits. ").
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243-I(b)(5) (1991 & Supp. 1992) ("has received
or is likely to receive").
The situation often arises when the employee is injured by an uninsured motorist
while the employee is operating or occupying a company-owned vehicle. The
exclusivity issue also arises with regard to no-fault benefits. See 2A ARTHUR
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 71.24(e) (1989).
In Boris v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 515 A.2d 21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986),
Charles Boris was injured by an uninsured motorist while driving a company
truck. He filed a workers' compensation claim, then sought recovery under his
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difficult issue arises when the employer is self-insured. Since the selfinsured employer must provide the same benefits available under an
insurance policy, however, it would appear that the injured worker
would not be barred. 4s4 The offset provision in section 543(d) reflects
a legislative intent that the injured worker's uninsured motorist claim
be excluded by the availability of workers' compensation benefits
only to the extent necessary to avoid a double recovery. 4SS To hold
that an injured worker is restricted to filing a workers' compensation
claim and to pursuing the uninsured motorist, from whom he will
undoubtedly not be able to collect even if he obtains a judgment, is
inconsistent with the public policy of providing a full recovery to

employer's automobile fleet policy with Liberty Mutual. Liberty Mutual was
both the workers' compensation insurer and the automobile liability insurer
for Boris' employer. In turn, Liberty Mutual denied uninsured motorist coverage to Boris based on the exclusivity provision of Pennsylvania's workers'
compensation act. The Boris court rejected Liberty Mutual's position, stating
that
the employer's freedom from suit under the Workers' Compensation
Act does not logically extend to the carrier of uninsured motorist
benefits. The injured employee who seeks such coverage asserts only
that he was injured at the hands of some third party who was not
adequately insured. The employer cannot be implicated in such wrongdoing in the slightest.
[d. at 24.
454. See Hines v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 305 Md. 369, 377-79, 504 A.2d 632,
636-37 (1986). In that case, Hines, an employee of Potomac Electric Power·
Company (PEPCO), was injured by an uninsured motorist while driving a
PEPCO vehicle. The vehicle was self-insured by PEPCO. Hines made a
workers' compensation claim and received approximately $35,000 in benefits.
He then made personal injury protection and uninsured motorist claims against
PEPCO. The exclusivity issue was not addressed, but the holding suggests that
the exclusivity provision of Maryland's workers' compensation act would not
bar an employee's claim.
455. C/. Perkins v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 799 F.2d 955, 962 (5th Cir. 1986).
Because Mississippi lacked a set-off provision in its uninsured motorist statute,
the Perkins court concluded that a workers' compensation claim was the
exclusive remedy. The Perkins court also rested its decision on the fact that
Perkins, who had been injured while a passenger in his employer's vehicle and
as a result of the co-employee driver's negligence, was not legally entitled to
recover damages from the co-employee driver. The driver was uninsured; he
did not have his own personal auto policy, and he was not covered by his
employer's automobile policy because of a "co-employee" exclusion. However,
the driver was entitled to tort immunity because the Mississippi workers'
compensation statute barred suits between employees. As Perkins demonstrates,
the issue of the injured employee's right to recover uninsured motorist benefits
from the employer's insurer often arises in other states when a company vehicle
becomes uninsured because the employee-driver is excluded by a co-employee
clause in the employer's motor vehicle liability policy. In Maryland, co-employee
exclusions are invalid. See Larimore v. American Ins. Co., 314 Md. 617, 626,
552 A.2d 889, 893 (1989).
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victims of uninsured motorists. 4s6 Uninsured motorist insurance and
workers' compensation benefits provide separate and distinct types
of coverage, but workers' compensation benefits certainly do not
fully compensate the injured worker. 4S7
Consistent with the concept of a full recovery, section 543(d)
also implicitly prevents the workers' compensation insurer from asserting a lien on the uninsured motorist benefits received by the
injured employee. Subtitle 9 of the Maryland Workers' Compensation
Act, addressing liability of third parties, is the successor to section
58 of Article 101.458 Section 9-901 preserves the injured worker's
right to sue "a person other than an employer" when that person is
liable for the employee's injury or death.4s9 Section 9-902 preserves
the compensation insurer's right to recoup the amount of the workers'
compensation award in two ways. First, under section 9-902(a), the
workers' compensation insurer can bring a claim against the "third
party who is liable for the injury or death of the covered employee."460 This must be done within two months after the Workers'
Compensation Commissioner has made the award. 461 If the workers'
compensation insurer does not bring the action within the two month
period, then the employee is allowed to sue the third party,462 and
the workers' compensation insurer holds a statutory lien on the thirdparty settlement. 463 The language and legislative history of Subtitle 9
clearly preserve the workers' compensation insurer's right to any
monies recovered by the injured worker from a third-party tortjeasor,464 but it is doubtful that Subtitle 9 could, without some strain,
456. In Boris v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 515 A.2d 21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986),
the court held that denying a worker the right to uninsured motorist benefits
"would be contrary to the voluminous case law demanding broad applicability
of the Uninsured Motorist Act." Id. at 25.
457. The Boris court found significant the fact that workers' compensation benefits
do not provide for pain and suffering, but uninsured motorist coverage does.
See id. The fact that the employer paid two premiums for two different types
of insurance coverage is also significant. Often, both workers' compensation
insurance and uninsured motorist insurance is provided to the employer by the
same insurer. Even this factor, however, would not provide an exclusivity
defense to the uninsured motorist insurer. While the injured employee's uninsured motorist action may coincidentally be against the same insurer that was
his employer's workers' compensation insurer, the uninsured motorist action
is not against the insurer in its capacity as workers' compensation insurer.
Instead, it is against the insurer in its capacity as uninsured motorist insurer.
458. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. §§ 9-901 to -903 (1991 & Supp. 1992)
(Revisor'S Notes); see also id. Tables of Comparable Sections.
459. Id. § 9-902.
460. Id. § 9-902(a).
461. See id. § 9-902(c).
462. Id.
463. See id. §§ 9-902(e), (0; see also id. § 9-903.
464. The second report of the Commission to Study Maryland's Worker's Compen-
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be interpreted as allowing a workers' compensation insurer to assert
a lien against uninsured motorist benefits flowing to the injured
worker. 46s The majority of other jurisdictions that have considered
the issue have determined that the workers' compensation insurer has
no right to assert a lien on the uninsured motorist benefits.466
The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement contains a workers' compensation offset provision and an anti-subrogation exclusion.
The offset provision is contained in the "Limitation of Liability"
section, which provides that
any amounts otherwise payable for damages under [uninsured motorist coverage] shall be reduced by all sums:
2. Paid or payable because of the "bodily injury" under
any of the following or similar law:
a. workers' compensation law; or
b. disability benefits law. 461
The anti-subrogation provision operates as an exclusion:
This coverage shall not apply directly or indirectly to benefit:
sation Laws and the Operation of the State Industrial Accident Commission
referred to tort actions: "The Study Commission believes that the fact that
disability or death resulted under circumstances giving rise to an action against
a third party tortfeasor, should not operate, under any circumstances, to
decrease the benefits properly allowable under Article 101." Brocker Mfg. &
Supply Co. v. Mashburn, 17 Md. App. 327, 333, 301 A.2d 501, 504 (1973)
(quoting study commission) (emphasis added).
465. Although it could be argued that under Subtitle 9 an uninsured motorist insurer
is a third person, the reference to "joint tort-feasors" in MD. CODE ANN.,
LAB. & EMP. § 9-901(2) makes it clear that Subtitle 9 is designed to preserve
the employee's common law right to proceed against a third-party tortfeasor
for personal injuries. An uninsured motorist action is a contract action.
Moreover, the reference to "damages" in Subtitle 9 is another clear indication
that the type of action contemplated by that section is a tort action. Uninsured
motorist benefits are not "damages"; they are first-party coverage benefits
that compensate the injured insured for damages he is legally entitled to recover
from the uninsured motorist. Cf. 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 483, 487 (1976) ("Similar
to a workmen's compensation award, an insurer's payment of economic loss
benefits approximates an award of previously fixed compensation, as distinguished from damages.") (citing Hurt v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers'
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 175 Md. 403, 2 A.2d 402 (1938».
466. Larson states that "[a] comparatively recent problem in double recovery
presents the question of whether a[n] insurer that has paid compensation
benefits should have a lien upon the proceeds of the claimant's private uninsured
motorist policy. At this writing, the almost unanimous holding disfavors any
such lien." 2A LARSON, supra note 452, § 71.23(a).
467. ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C-Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Limit of
Liability. The reduction does not apply if the tort feasor's vehicle has liability
insurance. See id. This is so because the compensation insurer can satisfy its
lien from the tortfeasor's liability policy.
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Any insurer or self-insurer under any of the following
similar law:
workers' compensation law; or
disability benefits law.
Any insurer of property.468

The offset provision tracks section S43(d).469 The anti-subrogation
provision is designed "to prevent subrogation by a workers' compensation or disability benefits insurer to the insured's right against
the uninsured motorist. "470 Although Maryland courts have not addressed the validity of the anti-subrogation provision, other states
have upheld it.47 1 In these states, the validity of the offset provision
is of utmost importance. If the offset provision is valid, then the
anti-subrogation provision is also valid. 472 In Maryland, the uninsured
motorist statute permits an offset, and it is therefore inescapable that
the anti-subrogation provision precludes the workers' compensation
insurer from asserting a lien on the uninsured motorist benefits
received by the injured worker.
Likewise, the workers' compensation insurer would not have a
right to the uninsured motorist benefits withheld by the uninsured
motorist insurer. The offset provision and the anti-subrogation clause
are mutually constitutive opposites; the latter is valid because the
former is valid. 473 Together, they seek to provide a full recovery and
prevent a double recovery. Underpinning both workers' compensation
and uninsured motorist coverage is the concept that the injured party
should not receive double recovery for his loss. This prohibition is
accomplished by allocating the loss between the workers' compensation insurer and uninsured motorist insurer. 474 Certainly, from an
468. ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C-Uninsured Motorist Coverage, Exclusions,

B.
469. The offset provision, however, refers to amounts "paid or payable." This
conflicts with § 543(d)'s reference to "has recovered." See supra note 448.
470. See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.42(2).
471. See generally id.
472. Larson notes that "if the offset is valid, the question whether the compensation
insurer has a lien against the proceeds of the uninsured motorist policy is
quickly answered, since there are no such proceeds left after the offset that
can be identified with the compensation insurer's lien." 2A LARSON, supra
note 439, § 71.23(c). He concludes that "[t]he issue of such an insurer's lien,
then ... can arise only in two situations: When no such offset exists, or when
such an offset has been found void." [d. This conclusion "is even more
obviously true if the clause forbidding that any of the proceeds of the policy
should inure to the benefit of the compensation insurer is found valid." [d. §
71.23(c) n.44.
473. Larson notes that the anti-subrogation clause is valid in those cases where the
workers' compensation offset is valid. [d. § 71.23(b).
474. In this way, the workers' compensation insurer shares the total loss with the
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administrative standpoint, the uninsured motorist offset, in combination with the elimination of the workers' compensation lien on the
uninsured motorist benefits, is the most efficient means of assuring
that the injured motorist will not enjoy a double recovery.47S
The overriding policy of providing a full recovery to the injured
insured also enables the injured insured to seek additional workers'
compensation benefits after he has recovered from the uninsured
motorist insurer. Section 9-903 of the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act ordinarily allows a workers' compensation insurer to offset
future compensation benefits by the amount of the judgment received
by the injured worker from a third-party tortfeasor. 476 Since the
uninsured motorist insurer is not a third-party tortfeasor, and the

uninsured motorist insurer. The workers' compensation insurer would be subrogated along with the uninsured motorist insurer against the uninsured motorist. The injured insured's tort action against the uninsured motorist is exactly
the type of action against a "third person" contemplated by Subtitle 9. It also
preserves the uninsured motorist insurer's subrogation right, as well as the
workers' compensation insurer's subrogation right. See 61 Op. Att'y Gen. 483,
489 (1976) ("[I]f the claimant acts upon his right to make claim against the
person allegedly responsible for the accident, safeguarded by Article 48A,
Section 542, then the hospital lien will attach to any sums of money which he
collects in judgment, settlement, or compromise of his claim .... ").
475. Cj. Gray v. State Rds. Comm'n, 253 Md. 421, 429, 252 A.2d 810, 815 (1969);
Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment Fund Bd. v. Salvo, 231 Md. 262, 189 A.2d 638
(1963). At the time of these two cases, the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment
statute contained a provision eliminating the workers' compensation lien where
a payment from the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund had been reduced
by amounts received through workers' compensation. The lack of a corresponding provision for a workers' compensation offset, however, rendered the lien
prohibition ineffective. Thus, in Salvo the court denied the Fund the right to
reduce its payment by the amount of Salvo's workers' compensation award,
and in Gray, the court upheld the Workmen's Compensation Commission's
determination that Gray's workers' compensation insurer was entitled to credit
for the amount Gray had received from the Fund.
The current uninsured motorist statutory scheme is in one sense the
opposite of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Act that was the subject of
the disputes in Salvo and Gray. Unlike the current uninsured motorist statute,
which contains a workers' compensation offset, thus denying the workers'
compensation insurer the right to subrogation against the uninsured motorist
insurer and placing the primary payment obligation upon the workers' compensation insurer, the statutory scheme at the time of Salvo and Gray placed
primary payment responsibility upon the Fund.
In noting that after the time of Gray's accident, the Unsatisfied Claim
and Judgment statute had been amended to provide for a reduction in Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund payments by the amount of workers' compensation awards (consequently activating the lien prohibition), the Gray court
commented that the amended procedure "presents a more orderly method of
preventing a double recovery, while conserving the assets of the Unsatisfied
Claim and Judgment Fund."
476. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMF. § 9-903(b) (1991).
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uninsured motorist benefits are not an amount recovered by the
injured worker in a suit against a third-party tortfeasor, section 9903's credit does not apply.477 Although it is designed to preclude
double recovery, section 9-903 was not designed to prevent the injured
worker from obtaining a full recovery. 478 Similarly, the uninsured
motorist statute seeks to balance the desire to provide a full recovery
and the need to prevent a double recovery. A person, however, can
recover both workers' compensation and uninsured motorist benefits
and still not be fully compensated. Therefore, an injured worker
who has received both workers' compensation and uninsured motorist
benefits should be able to reopen the workers' compensation claim
if he can show that he has not been compensated fully.479

477. It is clear that, if the uninsured motorist insurer is not a third party in §§ 9901 or 9-902, then the uninsured motorist benefits are not "the amount"
received by the injured employee in § 9-903. The cases dealing with the credit
provision in section 58 refer to monies received by the injured worker from a
third party tortfeasor. See, e.g., Brocker Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Mashburn, 17
Md. App. 327, 301 A.2d 501 (1973).
478. See Mashburn, 17 Md. App. at 339, 301 A.2d at 506. The Mashburn court
stated as follows:
We think it clear that the intent of the 1957 amendment was, in
essence, that an injured employee may, by the combined result of his
compensation claim and a proceeding against a negligent third party,
recover more than he could recover under the Act, but he can never
recover less. If he were to receive less from the third party than he
is entitled to receive under the Act, he may "reopen the claim ...
to recover the difference between the amount ... received [from the
third party] ... and the full amount of compensation which would
be ... payable" under Art. 101. A reading of the Study Commission's
Report, together with the 1957 enactment can, in our opinion, lead
to no other reasonable interpretation.
The construction placed upon § 58 by appellants would deprive
the appellee of benefits under the Act by limiting recovery to the
amount obtained from the negligent third party (less any sum he is
called upon to reimburse the employer-insurer), and would almost
certainly discourage third party actions by other claimants where there
is a possibility, such as here, of large future medical payments and
thereby defeat the will of the General Assembly.
[d. at 337, 301 A.2d at 506.
479. Fundamental fairness, however, and the general prohibition against a double
recovery will preclude the worker from securing additional workers' compensation benefits if the commissioner decides that the worker will recover twice.
Thus, despite the lack of a specific statutory provision supporting the credit,
the workers' compensation insurer is protected. In this sense, the workers'
compensation insurer's credit is not absolute. The workers' compensation
insurer, however, is protected and may avoid future compensation payments
depending on the resolution of the "double recovery" issue by the compensation
commissioner.
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NOTIFICATION AND COOPERATION DUTIES

The hybrid nature of uninsured motorist insurance creates numerous notification and cooperation problems between the insured
and the insurer. The Personal Auto Policy and the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement place affirmative duties of notification
and cooperation on the insured. These duties are designed to afford
the uninsured motorist insurer the opportunity to litigate the uninsured motorist claim and to preserve the uninsured motorist insurer's
subrogation rights against the tortfeasor. 480 The injured insured has
three alternatives when pursuing a claim involving an uninsured
motorist. First, he may sue the tortfeasor in tort, obtain a judgment
and then enforce the judgment against the uninsured motorist insurer.
Second, he may sue the uninsured motorist insurer and, as part of
the case, prove that the tortfeasor's negligence proximately caused
his injuries. Third, the injured insured may combine the tort and
contract claims in a single action. 481 Maryland courts seem to favor
the third approach because it promotes judicial economy and gives
each party his day in court. 482

480. Part E of the Personal Auto Policy provides:
We have no duty to provide coverage under this policy unless there
has been a full compliance with the following duties:
A. We must be notified promptly of how, when and where the
accident or loss happened. Notice should also include the names
and addresses of any injured persons and of any witnesses.
B. A person seeking any coverage must:
1. Cooperate with us in the investigation, settlement or defense
of any claim or suit.
2. Promptly send us copies of any notices or legal papers
received in connection with the accident or loss.
3. Submit, as often as we reasonably require:
a. to physical exams by physicians we select. We will pay
for those exams.
b. to examination under oath and subscribe the same.
4. Authorize us to obtain:
a. medical reports; and
b. other pertinent records.
5. Submit a proof of loss when required by us.
C. A person seeking Uninsured Motorists Coverage must also:
1. Promptly notify the police if a hit-and-run driver is involved.
2. Promptly send us copies of the legal papers if a suit is
brought.
ISO Form PP 00 01 12 89, II. Part E-Duties After an Accident or Loss. The
Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement replaces paragraph C. 2. with:
2. Promptly notify us if a suit is brought. We request that a
copy of any legal papers served accompany the notice.
ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, II. Part E-Duties After an Accident or Loss.
481. See Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 321 Md. 165, 582 A.2d 501 (1990);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 436 A.2d 465 (1981); ct.
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Under the first alternative, the insured does not have to obtain
the insurer's permission to sue the tort feasor , and any "consent to
sue" provision is unenforceable. 483 The judgment is binding on the
insurer if it had notice of the action and reasonable opportunity to
intervene. 484 Even a default judgment is binding on the uninsured
motorist insurer as long as the uninsured motorist insurer's due
process right to a day in court was fulfilled.48s The insured's ability
to first obtain a default judgment against the tort feasor and then
enforce it against the uninsured motorist insurer leads to procedural
difficulty. Because the insured does not have to notify the uninsured
motorist insurer of a possible uninsured motorist claim until he
reasonably believes he has such a claim,486 the first notice an insurer
may have of the uninsured motorist claim is after a default order
has been entered against the tortfeasor. 487 Even if the insurer inter~
venes in the tort action, it may not be able to remove the order of
default entered against the uninsured tortfeasor. 488 The insurer's role
then would be limited to litigating the damage aspects of the case.
Without the "due process" protection, an injured insured would

482.

483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.

Reese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 285 Md. 548, 403 A.2d 1229 (1979)
(stating that the insured need not pursue a claim against the uninsured tortfeasor
to judgment).
In Webb, the court of appeals stated that a second suit against the uninsured
motorist insurer "represents neither a proper utilization of judicial resources
nor a sound use of premium dollars." Webb, 291 Md. at 739, 436 A.2d at
475. When an underinsured motorist is involved, the third alternative is almost
automatically necessary. Combining the tort and contract actions presents
several problems with the conduct of the trial. For a discussion of one such
problem, see Allstate Insurance Co. v. Miller, 315 Md. 182, 553 A.2d 1268
(1989).
Webb, 291 Md. at 731-33, 436 A.2d at 472-73.
See id. at 732, 436 A:2d at 471.
See id. at 733 n.8, 436 A.2d at 471 n.8.
[d. at 748 n.12, 436 A.2d at 481 n.12.
See MD. RULE 2-613.
Under MD. RULE 2-613(c), only the defendant against whom an order of default
has been entered can move to vacate the order. The uninsured motorist insurer
would lack standing to remove it. See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Birdsong, 69 Md.
App. 615, 619 n.3, 519 A.2d 219, 221 n.3 (1987). Moreover, even if the injured
insured had sued the uninsured motorist and the uninsured motorist insurer in
the same case, a default judgment could still be entered against the uninsured
motorist notwithstanding the presence of the uninsured motorist insurer. However, a court has the power to remove or defer entry of the order under MD.
RULE 2-602. See Quartertime Video & Vending Corp. v. Hanna, 321 Md. 59,
580 A.2d 1073 (1990) (per curiam) (finding default judgment entered against
one of several defendants subject to revision by the trial judge until a final
judgment is entered). Therefore, if the insured notifies the insurer after the
entry of the default judgment but before the court determines an award of
compensation, the insurer can intervene and move to revise the default judgment
under MD. RULE 2-602.
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always try to obtain a default judgment against the uninsured motorist before notifying the insurer of the uninsured motorist claim,
thereby precluding litigation of whether the insured is legally entitled
to recover uninsured motorist benefits. The uninsured motorist insurer seeks to preclude this eventuality by imposing specific notification and cooperation duties on the insured. 489
The injured insured's second alternative raises significant problems with respect to the statute of limitations. In many states, the
limitation periods for tort and contract actions are different. 490 Maryland litigants do not have this problem because the same three year
period applies to both contract and tort actions. 491 Nevertheless,
inequities can arise because of the application of the discovery
standard to the limitation periods. Since an uninsured motorist claim
is a breach of contract action, the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the insured knows or should know that the
uninsured motorist insurer is denying liability. 492 In contrast, the
limitation period for the tort action against the uninsured motorist
ordinarily begins to run on the date of the accident. 493
This conflict between the running of the tort and contract
limitation periods may prejudice the insurer's ability to recoup any
uninsured motorist benefits it may pay to its insured. While Maryland
courts have not directly addressed the theory on which the uninsured
motorist insurer can recover from the uninsured tortfeasor, the court
of special appeals has correctly observed that it is a right of subrogation. According to the court, "[t]o the extent it has paid uninsured
motorist benefits, the insurer stands in the shoes of its insured and
succeeds to his claim. That is the essence of subrogation. "494 Indeed,
the insurer's only possible theory on which to base its recovery
against the tort feasor is subrogation. 495 Although some states ex489. See supra note 480. The Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement also states

that

490.
491.
492.

493.
494.

495.

[n]o judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought against the
owner or operator of an "uninsured motor vehicle" is binding on us
unless we:
1. Received reasonable notice of the pendency of the suit resulting
in the judgment; and
2. Had a reasonable opportunity to protect our interests in the
suit.
ISO Form PP 04 59 12 89, I. Part C - Uninsured Motorists Coverage, Insuring
Agreement.
See 3 LONG, supra note 29, § 24.49.
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-101 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
See Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 321 Md. 165, 582 A.2d 501 (1990).
The action would arise at the point when the insured knew or should have
known he had a claim against the tortfeasor.
See Maryland Ins. Ouar. Ass'n v. Muhl, 66 Md. App. 359, 376, 504 A.2d
637, 646 (1986).
The uninsured motorist insurer's claim cannot be based on contribution. The
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pressly authorize the insurer's subrogation right,496 Maryland does
not. By preserving the injured insurer's right to proceed against the
uninsured tortfeasor, however, section 542 implicitly establishes the
uninsured motorist insurer's right of subrogation. 497
Resting the insurer's right of recovery from the tort feasor on a
right of subrogation is troublesome. Because an insured does not
have an uninsured motorist claim until he knows or should know
the uninsured motorist insurer is denying liability,498 the insurer may
not receive any notice of the uninsured motorist claim until after the
tort limitation period has expired, thereby precluding a subrogation
claim.499 The insured may even be able to manipulate the limitations
periods to deny the insurer a right of subrogation. soo
1992)

496.
497.

498.
499.
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uninsured tortfeasor and the uninsured motorist insurer certainly do not stand
in aequali jure. See generally 5A MD. L. ENCYCL. Contribution §§ 1-5 (1982)
(discussing joint liability based upon legal relationship). Nor are the tortfeasor
and the uninsured motorist insurer in pari delicto. The liability of the uninsured
motorist insurer rests on a contractual basis and, therefore, the uninsured
motorist insurer cannot be considered a joint tortfeasor under the Uniform
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 16
(1991) (defining joint tortfeasors as "two or more persons jointly or severally
liable in tort for the same injury"); see also Robinson v. Adco Metals, Inc.,
663 F. Supp. 826, 831-33 (D. Del. 1987). Similarly, the insurer would not have
an indemnity claim. The right to indemnification derives either from a contract
between the indemnitor and the indemnitee or, absent a contract, from a
special relationship between the indemnitor and the indemnitee. See generally
12 MD. L. ENCYCL. Indemnity §§ 1-8 (1961). Neither situation is present when
the uninsured motorist insurer pays unInsured motorist benefits to its insured.
There are three types of subrogation recognized in Maryland: legal, conventional, and statutory. See Bachmann v. Glazer, 316 Md. 405, 413, 559 A.2d
365, 369 (1989). Legal subrogation is often called equitable subrogation.
Conventional subrogation is often called contractual subrogation. See Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 74 Md. App. 539, 55253, 539 A.2d 239, 245-46 (1988) (discussing the elements of equitable and
conventional subrogation).
See generally 3 No-FAULT AND UNINSURED MOTORIST AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
§ 31.100 (1993).
Section 542 of the Maryland Insurance Code provides that "[nJothing in this
subtitle shall be deemed to affect the right of any person to claim and sue for
damages or losses sustained by him as the result of a motor vehicle accident."
The section does not preserve the insurer's right to recoup personal injury
protection payments. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 542 (1991); see id. § 54O(c)
(eliminating subrogation); see also id. § 481B (prohibiting subrogation with
regard to medical payments under a motor vehicle insurance policy).
See Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 321 Md. 165, 582 A.2d 501 (1990).
Arguably, the injured insured's act of making a personal injury protection
claim against his insurer should place the insurer on notice that litigation may
result from the accident. Thus, not only is the insurer prepared to defend its
insured in case the other party in the accident seeks compensation, but the
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The Personal Auto Policy contains a subrogation provision. sOI
Once the insurer compensates the insured, the insurer has the right
to proceed against the tortfeasor. SOl Any recovery made by the insurer
reimburses the insurer; any excess inures to the benefit of the insured.
The Personal Auto Policy and the Maryland Uninsured Motorist
Endorsement address the conflict in limitation periods by placing an
affirmative obligation on the insured· to preserve the insurer's right
to recover damages from the uninsured tortfeasor. so3 The Personal
Auto Policy and the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement also
require that the insured notify the insurer of a. suit against the
tort feasor in a timely fashion.s04
The insured may also impair the insurer's subrogation rights by
entering into a settlement agreement with the tort feasor . 50S The ininsurer should also be aware that a possible uninsured motorist claim may
result should its insured seek compensation from the other party.
500. C/. Cotham & Maldonado v. Board of County Comm'rs, 260 Md. 556, 273
A.2d 115 (1971) (rejecting the theory that the limitations period on an indemnity
claim arises from the date of the wrong because "by the manipulation of the
time of filing suit and the speed with which the plaintiff then proceeded, the
plaintiff could easily place [the party asserting an indemnity claim) outside the
statutory period").
501. Part F of the Personal Auto Policy contains the following subrogation agreement:
A. If we make a payment under this policy and the person to or for
whom payment was made has a right to recover damages from another
we shall be subrogated to that right. That person shall do:
1. Whatever is necessary to enable us to exercise our rights; and
2. Nothing after loss to prejudice them.
ISO Form PP 00 01 12 89, Part F. It also contains a "trust agreement,"
which states:
B. If we make a payment under this policy and the person to or for
whom payment is made recovers damages from another, that person
shall:
1. Hold in trust for us the proceeds of the recovery; and
2. Reimburse us to the extent of our payment.
[d.

502. See, e.g., Wescott v. Allstate Ins. Co., 397 A.2d 156 (Me. 1979).
503. See supra note 501.
504. See supra note 480. In other states, insurers seek to protect themselves by
including a limitation period within the contract. See 3 LONG, supra note 29,
§ 24.49 ("An increasing number of companies are adding endorsements to
their uninsured motorist coverage setting forth the time period within which
claims may be made. These periods run from six months to three years. ").
Such a provision would be invalid in Maryland. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§ 377B (1991). Several states have enacted a specific limitations period applicable
to the uninsured motorist insurer's subrogation claim. California, for example,
provides that an insurer may bring a subrogation action within three years of
the date of the payment to the insured. See CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(g) (West
1988).
505. A general release granted to a tort feasor arguably would not release the insurer
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troduction of reduction underinsured motorist coverage506 makes this
problem even more acute because the financially responsible but
under insured tortfeasor's liability insurer will try to obtain a general
release from the injured party before paying its liability limits.507 The
cooperation provisions of the Personal Auto Policy are designed to
prohibit the insured from entering into any settlement agreement
without the knowledge and consent of the insurer. 508 If the uninsured
providing the uninsured motorist coverage. The scope of the release must be
determined by the intent of the parties and, absent a specific provision releasing
the victim's uninsured motorist insurer from liability under the first-party
claims, the insurer would still be obligated to provide uninsured motorist
benefits. See Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. Chung, 76 Md. App. 524, 546 A.2d 654
(1988) (refusing to allow general release given to an insurer providing protection
against robbery and burglary to operate as a release of an uninsured motorist
insurer because the uninsured motorist insurer "was not a party to the release,
paid no consideration to be released, and was unaware of the existence of the
release at the time it was originally executed"), vacated, 322 Md. 713, 589
A.2d 956 (1991); c/. Thomas v. Erie Ins. Exch., 229 Md. 332, 182 A.2d 823
(1962) (holding that general release of tortfeasor released injured party's right
to benefits under the medical payment provision of the tortfeasor's policy).
506. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
507. Some states have enacted provisions to protect the motorist who complies with
the financial responsibility provisions but, nevertheless, is underinsured in
comparison to the injured party. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Maldonado, 515
A.2d 690 (Del. 1986) (discussing Delaware's statute). In Maryland, the uninsured motorist insurer will still be able to pursue the tortfeasor even if the
tortfeasor has complied with the financial responsibility provisions. The situation is no different than when the injured party obtruns a judgment against
the tortfeasor in excess of the tortfeasor's liability limits; the fact that the
tortfeasor complied with the financial responsibility provisions does not preclude
the injured party from pursuing a recovery above and beyond the liability
limits. But c/. 2 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 44.4 ("[T]he assertion of a right of
subrogation - by the underinsured motorist insurer in n,gard to the tort feasor
or the tortfeasor's insurer - is inimical to the very character of the underinsured
motorist coverage so long as the insured has not been fully indemnified.").
508. See supra note 480. The 1966 Standard Form contains a specific "consent to
settle" clause:
This insurance does not apply ... to bodily injury to an insured with
respect to which such insured, his legal representative or any person
entitled to payment under this insurance who shall, without written
consent of the company, make any settlement with any person or
organization who may be legally liable therefor[.]
1 WIDISS, supra note 19, app. A at 14. The validity of a "consent to settlement"
clause in Maryland has not been addressed specifically. In Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721,436 A.2d 465 (1981), the court indicated
that "[u]nlike consent to sue clauses, consent to settle clauses are generally
upheld, at least to the extent that settlements, consent judgments, releases,
covenants not to sue, etc., between insureds and the uninsured motorists are
not binding upon insurers unless the insurers have given their consent." [d. at
740, 436 A.2d at 476; see also Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Van Buskirk,
241 Md. 58, 69, 215 A.2d 467, 473 (1965) ("The purpose of the exclusion in
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motorist insurer does not know about, or knows but does not approve
of,509 an insured's settlement with the uninsured tortfeasor, then the
insured certainly has breached his duty to cooperate. Whether this
violation relieves the insurer of its obligations under the policy is
another question.
Under the Maryland Insurance Code, an insurer must show
actual prejUdice in order to escape its contractual obligations based
on an insured's breach of his duty to notify or to cooperate. 5lO No
Maryland court has addressed the concept of "actual prejudice" in
an uninsured motorist context. 511 Courts from other jurisdictions are
regard to settlement is to protect the company from the payment of claims
which have not been determined by a court, but merely by agreement of the
parties themselves. ").
509. As a practical matter, the uninsured motorist insurer should disapprove of a
settlement only if there is a real possibility that it can collect money above
and beyond the liability policy. Once the uninsured motorist insurer becomes
aware of the possible settlement, it can then investigate the tortfeasor's assets.
If there is no reasonable probability of recouping any uninsured motorist
payments, then there is no reason to withhold approval of the settlement. See
generally 3 No-Fault and Uninsured Automobile Insurance § 30.80(4) (1993).
For an excellent discussion of the problems of settling claims when the tortfeasor
has liability insurance and the injured claimant wants to seek uninsured motorist
benefits, see J. Sue Myatt, Settlement Procedures in Underinsured Motorist
Cases: The Underinsurer's Dilemma Between Preserving the Insurer's Subrogation Right and Protecting the Insured's Settlement Right, 14 J. CORP. LAW
175 (1988).
510. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482 (1991). It is not clear whether § 482 would
apply to an insurer seeking to disclaim uninsured motorist coverage based on
its insured's failure to notify or cooperate. Section 482's prejudice requirement
is applicable when "any insurer seeks to disclaim coverage on any policy of
liability insurance issued by it." Id. (emphasis added). "Liability" insurance
is not defined by the Insurance Code; however, § 482 is contained in Subtitle
28, entitled "Casualty Insurance," which contains a specific section addressing
uninsured motorist coverage. See id. § 481A (requiring uninsured motorist
insurance to cover damage caused by a vehicle insured by an insolvent insurer).
Uninsured motorist insurance falls into the definition of casualty insurance.
See id. § 68 (defining casualty insurance as "[i]nsurance against legal, contractual or assumed liability for death, injury or disability of any human
being .... "). The holding in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Harvey,
278 Md. 548, 336 A.2d 13 (1976), also supports the conclusion that § 482 is
applicable to an insurer who disclaims uninsured motorist coverage based on
its insured's failure to notify or cooperate. In Harvey, the court of appeals
held that § 482 was not applicable to an insurer who sought to disclaim
coverage based on its insured's failure to submit a proof of loss for personal
injury protection within the express statutory time period mandated by MD.
ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 544(a)(l) (1991). See generally Note, A Legal Process
Analysis for a Statutory and Contractual Construction of Notice and Proof of
Loss Insurance Disclaimers - Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Harvey,
38 MD. L. REV. 299 (1978). Since Subtitle 35 does not impose any specific
time limit for making an ·uninsured motorist claim, § 482's "actual prejudice"
standard should apply.
511. See Washington v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 60 Md. App. 288, 482 A.2d 503
(1984) (discussing actual prejudice in a liability context).
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divided. Some courts hold that all the insurer has to do is show that
its subrogation rights were eliminated.S12 Other courts take a narrower
view, holding that the insurer must show not only that its subrogation
rights were eliminated but also that, if the rights had not been
eliminated, it would actually have been able to collect from the
tort feasor .513 Showing a denial of an opportunity is, of course, less
burdensome than showing the opportunity would have been successful. Allowing the insurer to escape its indemnification obligation
because of a theoretical loss of its subrogation rights is inconsistent
with the remedial nature of the uninsured motorist statute. Sl4
XIII.

EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY

The uninsured motorist insurer's liability is not necessarily limited by the amount of uninsured motorist insurance provided in the
policy. Maryland does not allow the recovery of extra-contractual
damages based on an uninsured motorist insurer's bad faith refusal
to pay an uninsured motorist claim. sls In Johnson v. Federal Kemper
Insurance Co., 516 the court rejected the application of bad faith
liability to first-party situations, reasoning that first- and third-party
claims presented different situations. S17 The court also rejected the
insured's argument that the Insurance Code's Unfair Claims Act
created a right to extra-contractual damages. SIS The Johnson court's
holding does not, however, insulate the uninsured motorist insurer
from extra-contractual liability. An insurer's unreasonable and bad
faith refusal to pay a claim may constitute a conversion. sl9 Moreover,

512. See Paape v. Northern Assurance Co. of Am., 416 N.W.2d 665 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1987); accord Charest v. Union Mut. Ins. Co. of Providence, 313 A.2d
407,410 (N.H. 1973) ("The exclusion of [uninsured motorist] coverage occurs
when the insured settles with the uninsured motorist without the insurer's
consent. The policy does not make it dependent on whether the right of
subrogation will eventually produce a reimbursement. ").
513. See General Accident Ins. Co. v. Taplis, 493 So. 2d 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986); see also Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Earnest, 395 So. 2d 330, 331
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that the "technical and illusory 'loss'" of
the insurer's subrogation rights cannot result in a forfeiture of the injured
insured's uninsured motorist insurance).
514. See generally 2 WIDISS, supra note 19, § 15.1.
515. Johnson v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 74 Md. App. 243, 536 A.2d 1211, cert.
denied, 313 Md. 8, 542 A.2d 844 (1988).
516. 74 Md. App. 243, 536 A.2d 1211, cert. denied, 313 Md. 8, 542 A.2d 844
(1988).
517. [d. at 247, 536 A.2d at 1213.
518. The court rejected the insured's argument that MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §
230A (unfair claim settlement practices) and § 240B (notice of renewal premium
due) created a tort action. [d. at 248, 536 A.2d at 1213.
519. In Caruso v. Republic Insurance Co., 558 F. Supp. 430,434-35 (D. Md. 1983),
the court found similarity between the allegations in Caruso's complaint and
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the insured may have a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. ~20 Either claim would support punitive damages if the insured
could show actual malice; the standard, however, is difficult to
meet.~21

The uninsured motorist insurer may also be liable for attorney's
fees incurred by the insured under certain circumstances. ~22 Maryland
courts have not addressed whether an insured is entitled to recover
attorney's fees when he establishes coverage in a declaratory judgment
action. A separate declaratory judgment action, though rare, may
arise when the insurer disclaims coverage on an independent coverage
ground. S23 Neither the uninsured motorist statute nor the Uniform

520.

521.

522.

523.

the allegations in Food Fair Stores v. Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d 43 (1975):
The allegations in this case, that the insurer failed to pay a claim
when it had no good faith defense to payment under the terms of the
insurance contract, are analogous to those in Hevey. As in Hevey,
the alleged unjustified withholding of payments by the insurer here,
if true, constitutes the tort of conversion. The conversion is sufficiently
intertwined with the insurance contract, as it was with the employment
contract in Hevey, as to fit the Court of Appeals' definition of tort
arising out of a contractual relationship.
Caruso, 558 F. Supp. at 435.
Caruso, 558 F. Supp. at 435 n.24 (citing Sere v. Group Hosp., Inc., 443 A.2d
33 (D.C. App. 1982». The insurer may also commit fraud in the application
process.
The Caruso court noted that "[w]hile the decision here with respect to first
party claims may seem harsh, it does not preclude insureds from seeking
punitive damages when insurers refuse or delay payment; it merely elevates the
standard for recovery." Caruso, 558 F. Supp. at 435 (footnote omitted).
In Maryland, the insured is clearly not entitled to recover attorney's fees when
he brings a contract action against the insurer under the uninsured motorist
provisions of the contract because he is not legally entitled to recover attorney's
fees from the uninsured motorist. In some states, the award of attorney's fees
in uninsured motorist cases is allowed by statute. In absence of such legislation,
courts, in general, will decline to award attorney's fees. See generally 2 WIDISS,
supra note 19, § 20.5.
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Webb, 291 Md. 721, 436 A.2d 465
(1981), the court of appeals noted that an uninsured motorist carrier may have
legitimate "coverage defenses" to an uninsured motorist claim. The court noted
that the uninsured motorist carrier could assert these defenses in a separate
action or as a counterclaim in the uninsured motorist case:
When an initial claim is in tort, a counterclaim, cross-claim or thirdparty claim may be in contract, and vice versa. Thus, if the insurer
intervenes in the underlying tort case, the plaintiff insured could
amend his declaration and add a contract claim against the insurer
ground upon the uninsured motorist endorsement. Moreover, in a
circuit court action, if an insured plaintiff fails to assert a contract
claim against the insurer under the endorsement, but if an actual
controversy concerning coverage exists apart from the "tort" issues
the insurer could make a claim against the plaintiff under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Id. at 742-43, 436 A.2d at 477 (citations omitted). If the insurer brings a
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Declaratory Judgments Act authorizes the award of attorney's fees
to an insured who brings a declaratory judgment action to determine
coverage under an uninsured motorist endorsement.
In Maryland, attorney's fees are ordinarily not awarded in a
declaratory judgment action. s2s They are recoverable when an insured
brings a declaratory judgment action to establish the insurer's duties
to defend and indemnify. S26 This is a well-established exception. S27
The court of appeals has admitted that the recovery of the attorney's
fees is based on an "unrefined" legal theorY,S28 and recently refused
to extend the exception to an action involving a breach of a policy
of health insurance.S29 Nevertheless, the award is usually justified on
two grounds. First, the insurer is said to have "authorized" the
expenditure of the fees by its failure to defend. s30 Second, the fees
are considered part of the damages sustained by the insured as a
result of the insurer's breach of its contractual duty.S31 Awarding
attorney's fees on the ground that the insurer authorized them is
always questionable, even in third-party situations. On the other
hand, the attorney's fees certainly arise naturally from the uninsured
motorist carrier's disclaiming coverage. S32 Public policy also supports
S24

524.
525.
526.

527.
528.
529.

530.
531.

532.

declaratory judgment action· as a counterclaim to the insured's uninsured
motorist claim, or just raises the independent coverage issues as affirmative
defenses to the insured's uninsured motorist claim, then, assuming that attorney's fees are appropriate, the court will have to award attorney's fees to the
insured who successfully defends the counterclaim or rebuts the affirmative
defenses. The insured would not otherwise be entitled to the attorney's fees he
incurred in pursuing his uninsured motorist claim. See supra note 514.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. Paoc. §§ 3-401 to -409 (1989).
See American Home Assurance Co. v. Osbourn, 47 Md. App. 73, 84, 422
A.2d 8, IS (1980).
.
See, e.g., Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 409-10, 347 A.2d
842, 849 (1975). The origin of awarding attorney's fees in third-party situations
probably stems from the general proposition that when a person's wrongful
conduct places another in litigation with a third person, the legal expenses are
considered a natural consequence of the wrongful act. See McGaw v. Acker,
Merrall & Co., III Md. 153, 160, 73 A. 731, 735 (1909).
Continental Cas. Co. v. Board of Educ., 302 Md. 516, 538, 489 A.2d 536,
547 (1985).
See id. at 537, 489 A.2d at 547.
See Collier v. MD-Individual Practice Ass'n, 327 Md. I, 10-17, 607 A.2d 537,
541-45 (1992). In Collier, the court of appeals refused to award attorney's fees
in a case involving an action to compel health insurance coverage. [d. The
court's treatment of this issue in the context of first-party health insurance
casts significant doubt on the likelihood of recovery of attorney's fees in the
uninsured motorist coverage context. See id.
Cohen v. American Home Assurance Co., 255 Md. 334, 350-63, 258 A.2d 225,
233-39 (1969).
[d.; see American Home Assurance Co. v. Osbourn, 47 Md. App. 73, 84,422
A.2d 8, 14 (1980).
In Johnson, the court rejected the insured's claim for punitive damages:
[The insured] did not assert at the trial level, any tort claim other
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the extension of the exception to the uninsured motorist context.
The Maryland appellate courts have not attempted to analyze
the "unrefined legal theory" underlying the award of attorney's fees
in third-party situations. It is clear, however, that the award of
attorney's fees is a public policy decision aimed at punishing the
insurer and deterring it from leaving the insured to fend for himself. m
If the insurer were not liable for the attorney's fees then it would
refuse to defend every time the insured was sued, thereby leaving
the insured to defend the tort actions, subjecting the insured to a
possible default judgment, and placing the burden on the insured to
bring a declaratory judgment action against the insurer to establish
coverage. The award of attorney's fees in third-party situations is
especially appropriate because a third party-the injured plaintiff in
the tort case-is involved. By "punishing" the insurer, the court
sends a message to the insurance industry that the insurer's duty to
defend is near absolute, and that there is a public policy to protect
insureds in tort cases by providing them with a defense. Making the
insurer liable for the attorney's fees incurred by the insured in the
declaratory judgment action also encourages resolution and settlement
of tort actions. s34 In short, the award of attorney's fees protects the
insured and encourages proper handling of claims.
Awarding attorney's fees when an insurer wrongfully refuses to
defend a tort claim against its insured recognizes the significant
differences between first and third-party coverage. Admittedly, the
potential harm to the insured in third-party instances does not exist
in a first-party instance. A first-party dispute is merely a dispute
between two parties to a contract, m and third parties, such as injured

than [the claim of bad faith]. Therefore, she is entitled to damages
recoverable in an action for breach of contract. It is well-settled that
such damages are those which arise naturally from the breach of [the]
contract itself, or those which can be shown to have been contemplated
by the parties when they entered into the contract as the probable
result of a breach. . . . In an action for breach of contract above,
such as this one, punitive damages are not available even if the
plaintiff can show actual malice.
Johnson v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 74 Md. App. 243, 248, 536 A.2d 1211,
1213-14 (1988) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
533. Cj. St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Smith, 318 Md. 33, 568 A.2d
35 (1990) (noting that an award of attorney's fees generally serves as a tool
for punishing wrongful conduct in ruling that a jury could consider the amount
of the plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees when calculating an award of
punitive damages).
534. For a discussion of the insurer's duty to defend, see Andrew Janquitto, Insurer's
Duty to Defend in Maryland, 18 U. BALT. L. REv. 1 (1988).
535. In Johnson, the court, after addressing the element of bad faith in third-party
claims, stated that
a first party claim presents an entirely different situation. The insured
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members of the public, are not involved. Resolving the dispute lies
within the power of the insured and insurer. Nevertheless, the overriding public policy that innocent victims of uninsured motorists
should be compensated weighs in favor of extending the exception
to the uninsured motorist context. Awarding attorney's fees when
the insured establishes the existence of uninsured motorist coverage
in a declaratory judgment action certainly protects the insured and
encourages proper handling of claims. S36
XIV.

CONCLUSION

Uninsured motorist insurance in Maryland serves several vital
purposes. It fills the gaps inherent in Maryland's comprehensive
motor vehicle insurance scheme by placing the injured insured in the
same position he would have been in had the tort feasor maintained
liability insurance. As originally designed, uninsured motorist coverage was supposed to place the accident victim in the same position
as if the uninsured tort feasor maintained liability coverage in an
amount equal to the minimum required coverage under the financial
responsibility laws of Maryland. Beginning in 1981, and continuing
through the 1980's and into the 1990's, the Maryland legislature
made substantial changes to the uninsured motori$t statute. These
changes reflected the shift in public policy underlying the uninsured
motorist statute from providing a minimum recovery to providing
the opportunity for a full recovery. In this sense, uninsured motorist
insurance furthers the state's desire to shift the burden of caring for
victims of motor vehicle accidents from the state to the private sector.
A private loss, after all, is more palatable than a public evil.

retains all rights to control any litigation necessary to enforce the
claim. Because it involves a claim by the insured against the insurer,
rather than a claim by a third party against both the insurer and
insured, there is no conflict of interest situation requiring the law to
impose any fiduciary duties on the insurer. Instead, the situation is a
traditional dispute between the parties to a contract.
Johnson, 74 Md. App. at 247, 536 A.2d at 1213.
536. A separate declaratory judgment action is often unnecessary. Rather, the injured
victim should sue the insurer directly. As part of his case, the victim would
have to prove that he was insured under the policy - an essential element in
every uninsured motorist case. The insurer, if it has an independent coverage
defense, can then raise that defense, as well as raising whatever defenses it
had to the uninsured motorist claim, e.g. no liability of the uninsured motorist,
no proximate cause, no damages, contributory negligence, etc. Bifurcation of
the trial may be appropriate to avoid confusion, and a resolution of the
independent coverage issues may obviate the need for trial of the uninsured
motorist claim.

